Sifrei Bamidbar Reader

(Bamidbar 5:1-2) "And the L-rd spoke to Moses, saying: Command the children of Israel that they send out of the camp every leper (metzora) and everyone with a (genital discharge (zav), and everyone that is unclean by (contact with) a body (tamei meth)." Why was this section stated? (For) from (Bamidbar 19:20) "A man, if he becomes unclean and does not purify himself, that soul shall be cut off from the midst of the congregation, for he has defiled the sanctuary of the L-rd," we hear the punishment; but we have not heard the exhortation. It is, therefore, written "Command the children of Israel that they send out of the camp … (3) and they shall not make unclean their camps in which I dwell." This (3) is the exhortation that the unclean not enter the sanctuary in a state of uncleanliness.

"Command": The command is immediately, for present performance and for future generations. You say thus, but perhaps it is only for future performance! It is, therefore, (to negate this) written "Command the children of Israel that they send … (Bamidbar 5:2) "And the children of Israel did so, sending them outside the camp" — whence we derive that the command is for immediate performance. And whence do we derive that it is (also) for future generations?

From (Vayikra 24:2) "Command the children of Israel that they take to you clear olive oil … (3) … an eternal statute for your generations." — But how do we derive (the same) for all the commands in the Torah? R. Yishmael says: Since we find unqualified commands in the Torah, and one of them was qualified as being for present performance and for future generations, we derive the same for all the mitzvoth in the Torah.

R. Yehudah b. Bethira says: "command" in all places connotes impulsion (to the act), as it is written (Devarim 3:28) "And command Joshua and strengthen him and fortify him" — whence we learn "We strengthen only the (internally) strengthened," and "We impel only the (internally) impelled." R. Shimon b. Yochai says: "Command" in all places entails expense, as it is written (Vayikra 24:2) "Command the children of Israel that they take to you pure olive oil," (Bamidbar 35:2) "Command the children of Israel that they give to the Levites from the inheritance, etc." (Bamidbar 28:2) "Command the children of Israel and say to them: My offering, My bread, for My fires" — whence we see that "command" in all places entails expense.

Except in one; and which is that? (Bamidbar 34:2) "Command the children of Israel and say to them: When you come to the land of Canaan, etc." — where the intent is: Impel them to the division of the land. Rebbi says: "Command" in all places is exhortation, as it is written (Bereshit 2:16-17) "And the L-rd G-d commanded (i.e., exhorted) the man, saying … but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, you shall not eat."

(Bamidbar 5:2) "that they send out of the camp": I understand this to mean from the Levite camp alone. Whence do I derive that the Israelite camp is also meant? From (Bamidbar 5:3) "Outside the camp shall you send them." (Bamidbar 5:3) "and they shall not make unclean their camps in whose midst I dwell": This is the camp of the Shechinah. — But even if this were not mentioned, I could derive it a fortiori, viz. If those with dead-body tumah are ejected from the less stringent camp, that of the Israelites, how much more so are they ejected from the more stringent camp, that of the Shechinah.

If so, why is "and they shall not make unclean their camps" needed? To teach that we do not punish by an a fortiori argument. R. Yehudah says: There is no need (for the verse to teach that they are sent out of the camp of the Shechinah), for it follows a fortiori, viz.: If those with (dead-body) tumah are ejected from the less stringent camp, (that of) the ark (i.e., the camp of the Levites), how much more so are they ejected from the more stringent camp, (that of) the Shechinah, (R. Yehudah obviously holding that we do punish by an a fortiori argument).

If so, why is it written "and they shall not make unclean their camps?" Because from "they shall send out from the camp every leper and every zav and every tamei meth," I would understand that they are all sent to one place; it is, therefore, written in respect to a leper (Vayikra 13:46) "Solitary shall he sit" — that no other unclean ones sit with him. I might then think that zavim and the tamei meth are sent to one camp; it is, therefore, written "and they shall not make unclean their camps" — to assign a separate camp for each.

These are the words of R. Yehudah. Rebbi says: There is no need (for the above). A leper was included in the general category (of the unclean), and left the category (for special mention) to teach concerning the category, viz.: Just as a leper, whose tumah is most stringent — his sending is more stringent than that of his neighbor, so, each one whose tumah is more stringent, his sending is more stringent than that of his neighbor.

This is the source for the sages' gradations of partitions (mechitzoth). Wherever zav confers tumah, metzora (leper) confers tumah. metzora is of greater stringency (than zav) in that it confers tumah upon one who enters (a house afflicted with tzara'ath [viz. Vayikra 14:46] [— wherefore a metzora is sent out of all three camps]). Wherever tamei meth confers tumah, zav confers tumah. zav is of greater stringency (than tamei meth) in that it confers tumah under an even mesama (a stone beneath which there is a cavity [viz. Vayikra 15:9] [— wherefore a zav is sent out of two camps]).

Wherever tvul yom (one who has immersed in the daytime [pending purification in the evening]) confers tumah, tamei meth confers tumah. tamei meth is of greater stringency (than tvul yom) in that it confers tumah upon a man (who touches him, viz. [Bamidbar 19:22] [— wherefore a tamei meth is sent out of one camp]). Wherever one's lacking atonement (through an offering) renders (him) unfit (for eating consecrated food) tvul yom renders (him) unfit. tvul yom is of greater stringency (than one's lacking atonement) in that he renders terumah unfit.

"that they send out of the camp": Is this speaking of all men or only the Levites, the carriers of the ark? It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 3) "From male until female shall you send out" — Scripture speaks of all men. R. Yoshiyah says "that they send out of the camp" connotes both adults and minors. You say both adults and minors, but perhaps the criterion (for inclusion) should be punishment, viz.: Just as we find re sanctuary defilement that only adults are punished, viz. (Ibid. 19:20) "And a man, if he becomes unclean and does not purify himself, that soul shall be cut off" — here, too, only adults are intended.

It is, therefore, written "From male until female shall you send out," both adults and minors. R. Yochanan says: Why is it written "From male until female shall you send out"? Because it is written "They shall send out of the camp," I might think, only these (viz. (Ibid. 2). Whence do I derive (the same for) all the other types of tumah?

From "From male until female — any (type of tumah) that affects male or female — shall you send out." This tells me only of male and female. Whence do we derive the same for one whose sex is unknown or a hermaphrodite? From (the redundant) "Outside the camp shall you send them."

This tells me only of one who can be sent away (i.e., of one who can walk). Whence do I derive (the same for) one who cannot be sent away (i.e., that he must be taken by another)? From "Outside the camp shall you send them." This tells me only of men.

Whence do I derive (the same for) appurtenances (that have become tamei)? From "and they shall not make unclean their camps." R. Akiva says: "Outside of the camp shall you send them" connotes both men and appurtenances. R. Yishmael says: It is derived by induction, viz.: A man is subject to plague tumah and garments are subject to plague tumah.

Just as a man is subject to being sent away, so, appurtenances. — No, this may be so for a man, who imparts tumah (to an object) by reclining (mishkav) or sitting (moshav [upon it]), for which reason he must be sent away — as opposed to appurtenances, which do not impart tumah in that manner! — No, this is refuted by (the instance of) stones from a leprous house, which, though they do not impart tumah through mishkav or moshav, require being sent away.

Do not wonder, then, if appurtenances, though they do not impart tumah through mishkav and moshav are to be sent away. R. Yossi Haglili says "From male until female shall you send them out": Just as male and female are distinctive in being subject to becoming proto-tumah (av hatumah) require being sent away, so, all that are thus susceptible — to exclude earthenware vessels, which are not thus susceptible.

(Vayikra 17:15) "and every soul that eats neveilah (carcass) or treifah (what is "torn") … he shall wash his clothes and bathe in water …" R. Yitzchak says: It is written (Ibid. 16) "And if he does not wash (his clothes) and he does not bathe his flesh (and he eats kodshim or enters the sanctuary), he shall bear his sin." For not bathing his body Scripture makes him liable to kareth ("cutting-off').

You say, it is for not bathing his body, but perhaps it is for not washing his clothes! — Can you say this? If for the more stringent tumath meth he is not punished (with kareth) for not washing his clothes, how much more so is he not punished for not washing his clothes for the less stringent eating of carcass! If so, what is the intent of "And if he does not wash his clothes"? To serve as an exhortation (against not washing them).

"Outside of the camp shall you send them": What is the intent of this (after "They shall send out of the camp")? From "They shall send out of the camp," I might think the intent is (only) that they not touch the ark or its bearers, but they should be assigned a place for themselves (inside the camp). It is, therefore, written "Outside of the camp shall you send them": "and they shall not make unclean their camps" — whence (i.e., from the three-fold repetition of "camp") they stated: There were three camps: the Israelite camp, the Levite camp, and the camp of the Shechinah.

From the entrance to Jerusalem until the Temple mount — the Israelite camp. From the entrance to the Temple mount until the azarah (the Temple courtyard) — the Levite camp. From the entrance to the azarah and inwards — the camp of the Shechinah. (Ibid. 3) "in whose midst I dwell": Beloved are Israel, who, even when they are tamei, the Shechinah is among them, as it is written (Vayikra 16:16) "who dwells with them in the midst of their uncleanliness," and (Bamidbar) 35:34) "And you shall not defile the land which you inhabit, in which I dwell, for I, the L-rd, dwell in the midst of the children of Israel (even when they are unclean)."

(Ibid. 5:4) "And the children of Israel did so, and they sent them outside the camp": R. Yossi Haglili says: Come and see how great is the power of transgression. For before they stretched forth their hands to transgress (with the golden calf), there were no zavim or lepers among them, and after they did so, there were zavim and lepers among them. In the course (of our learning) we learned that these three things (zavim, lepers, and tamei meth) occurred on the same day (the day that they made the golden calf).

R. Shimon b. Yochai says: Come and see how great is the power of transgression. For before they stretched forth their hands to transgress, what is written of them? (Shemot 24:17) "and the sight of the glory of the L-rd was like a consuming fire on the top of the mountain in the eyes of the children of Israel" — They did not fear and they did not tremble. After they stretched forth their hands to transgress, what is written of them? (Ibid. 34:30) "And Aaron and all of Israel saw Moses, and, behold, the skin of his face shone, and they were afraid to approach him."

"And the children of Israel did so": This is to declare the praise of Israel, that just as Moses told them, thus did they do. What is the intent of (the additional) "As the L-rd spoke to Moses, so did the children of Israel do"? To teach that the unclean ones themselves, (who were sent out), did not protest.

(Bamidbar 5:5-6) "And the L-rd spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel: A man or a woman, if they do of all the sins of man": Why is this section mentioned? (i.e., it has already been mentioned elsewhere.) — It is written (Vayikra 5:20-22) "If a soul sin and commit a profanation against the L-rd … or if he find a lost object and swear falsely, etc." But the stolen property of a proselyte is not mentioned.

It is, therefore, written (here) "Speak to the children of Israel: A man or a woman, if they do all of the sins of man." Scripture comes to teach us about the stolen property of a proselyte that if one swore to him falsely (that he did not steal it) and the proselyte died, he pays the principal and the fifth to the Cohanim and the guilt-offering to the altar, (a proselyte, halachically, not having any heirs).

This is a rule in the Torah: Any section stated in one place in the Torah, missing one thing, and repeated in a different place is repeated only for the sake of the thing that is originated. R. Akiva says: Everything stated therein must be expounded. R. Yoshiyah (in explication of R. Akiva) says: Why is "a man or a woman" stated? From (Shemot 21:3) "And if a man open a pit or if a man dig a pit," I would know only of a man.

Whence would I derive (the same for) a woman? From "a man or a woman," to liken a woman to a man in respect to all transgressions and damages in the Torah. R. Yonathan says: (The above derivation) is not needed, for it is already written (Ibid. 34) "The owner (whether man or woman) of the pit shall pay," and (Ibid. 22:5) "Pay shall pay the kindler (whether man or woman) of the fire." Why, then, is it stated "a man or a woman"?

For its (own) teaching, (i.e., that the law of theft of the proselyte" obtains both with men and with women.) "if they do all of the sins of man to commit a profanation against the L-rd": Why is this stated? (i.e., it is already written [Vayikra 5:21] "If a soul sin and commit a profanation, etc.") Because it is written "If a soul sin and commit a profanation… (22) or find a lost object, etc.", I might think that only one who lies in respect to what is mentioned therein is regarded as one who lies against the L-rd Himself.

Whence do I derive (the same for) one who lies in respect to all other things? It is, therefore, written "if they do all of the sins of man to commit a profanation against the L-rd." "to commit a profanation" ("limol ma'al"). "me'ilah" in all places is "lying." And thus is it written (I Chronicles 5:25) "Vayimalu ('and they lied') against the G-d of their fathers," and (Joshua 7:1) "And the children of Israel yimalu ma'al ('falsified') in respect to the ban," and (I Chronicles 10:13) "And Saul died because of his falsification ('bima'alo ma'al') against the L-rd."

And, in respect to Uzziyahu (II Chronicles 26:18), "Leave the sanctuary, for you have acted falsely (ma'alta')," and (Bamidbar 5:12) "… and she be false (uma'ala) to him" — whence we see that "me'ilah" is "lying." (Ibid. 6) "and that soul shall be guilty": Why is this stated? (i.e., it seems redundant.) "a man or a woman" would seem to indicate specifically these. Whence would I derive (the same for) one whose sex is unknown or a hermaphrodite?

From "and that soul shall be guilty" — All are included, even proselytes and servants. — But this would seem to include all, both the above and minors! — Would you say this? If a minor is exempt from (punishment for) the grave sin of idolatry, how much more so (is he exempt from punishment for) all the mitzvoth of the Torah! Whence is it derived that if one stole and swore (falsely) and went to bring the money (to repay) and the guilt-offering and could not manage to bring them before he died, that his heirs are exempt?

From "and that soul shall be guilty." — But perhaps just as they are exempt from the guilt-offering, so, they are exempt from the principal. — It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 7) "and he shall give it (the principal) to the one to whom he is liable (for payment)." "and that soul shall be guilty": Why is this stated? Whence do you derive that if one burned his neighbor's grain sack on the Sabbath that beth-din does not exact payment from him because he is liable to the death penalty?

From "and that soul shall be guilty" (i.e., in the aforementioned instance, the life alone is taken.) (Ibid. 7) "and they confess their sin which they have done": This tells me that a sin-offering requires confession. Whence do I derive (the same for) a guilt-offering? From "and that soul be guilty and they confess." R. Nathan says: This is a paradigm (binyan av) for all that are put to death that they require confession.

(Bamidbar 5:7) "and they confess their sins which they have done": and not for what his father has done. So that if one says to him: Give me the pledge that I deposited with your father and he says: You did not deposit (any pledge), and the other says: I beswear you (to that effect), and he says "Amen," I might think that (if he confesses) he is liable; it is, therefore, written (Vayikra 5:5) "then he shall confess wherein he has sinned," and not for what his father has done. "then he shall restore his guilt at its head": Why is this stated?

Because it is written (Ibid. 5:24) "and he shall pay it at its head," I might think that this applies to monetary payment (of the principal). Whence is it derived that he may return the theft itself? From "then he shall restore." (Bamidbar 5:7) "and its fifth shall he add to it": so that it and its fifth make five (equal parts). These are the words of R. Yoshiah.

R. Yonathan says: a fifth of the principal. "and he shall give it to the one to whom he is liable": Why is this stated? Because it is written (Vayikra 5:24) "To whom it belongs shall he give it on the day of (the acknowledgement of) his guilt," I might think that he must give it either to him or to his messenger. Whence do I derive (that he may also give it to) the messenger of beth-din or to the heir (of the one to whom he is liable)?

From "and he shall give it to the one to whom he is liable." R. Nathan says: If one stole a maneh from his neighbor, and he came to beth-din, and he did not manage to pay it before the debtor of the robbed one arrived — Whence is it derived that beth-din may take it from the robber and give it to the debtor? From "and he shall give it to the one to whom he is liable" — in any manner.

(Bamidbar 5:8) "And if the man does not have a redeemer (to whom to return the debt"): R. Yishmael says: Now is there a man in Israel who does not have a redeemer? Scripture (in this instance) is teaching about one who robs a proselyte and swears to him (falsely), after which the proselyte dies — that he pays the principal and the fifth to the Cohanim and the guilt-offering to the altar, (a proselyte, halachically, having no heirs.)

R. Nathan says: "And if the man does not have a redeemer": This tells me only of a man. Whence do we derive (the same for) a woman? From "to whom to return the debt," (connoting either man or woman). If so, why is it written "the man"?

For a man, a search must be made to determine whether or not he has a redeemer. For a minor, a search need not be made, it being certain that he has no redeemer (i.e., sons who can inherit him). ("And if the man does not have a redeemer":) Abba Chanan says in the name of R. Eliezer. Scripture speaks of the one who was robbed. — But perhaps it speaks of the robber. — (This cannot be, for) "to whom to return the debt" proves that it speaks of the one who is robbed. "the debt (ha'asham) which is returned": Scripture here speaks of money (and not of the guilt-offering proper). — But perhaps it does speak of the guilt-offering proper! — (This cannot be, for) "aside from the ram of atonement whereby atonement shall be made for him" speaks of this.

How, then, am I to understand "ha'asham which is returned to the L-rd"? As referring to money (i.e., the principal and the fifth). "is the L-rd's to the Cohein": The L-rd has acquired it and He has given it to the Cohanim of the officiating watch. — But perhaps he can give it to any Cohein he wishes! — It is, therefore, written "aside from the ram of atonement whereby atonement shall be made for him." (He gives it) to those who make atonement for him by it — the men of the watch.

If the thief (himself) were a Cohein, I might think that he acquires it. And this would follow a fortiori, viz.: If he acquires that of others, shall he not acquire what is his own! (That is, if others had stolen from the proselyte, who died without heirs, the Cohein acquires that theft. How much more so does he acquire the theft which he already possesses!) R. Nathan phrased it otherwise, viz.: If something which I do not acquire until it comes into my hand (i.e., ma'aser, and terumath ma'aser), another cannot acquire and take it from me, then something which I do acquire before it comes into my hand (i.e., what has been stolen from a proselyte without heirs), then when it does come into my hand, how much more so (does it follow) that another cannot acquire it and take it from me! — No, this may be true of something which he does not acquire until it comes into his hand, for just as he has no portion in it, so, others have no portion in it.

But would you say the same for this (what has been stolen from a proselyte)? Just as he has a portion in it, so, others have a portion in it, and since this is so, it follows that it should be taken from his hand and be apportioned among the men of the officiating watch.

Whence is it derived that if one steals from a proselyte and swears (falsely) to him and goes to bring the money and the guilt-offering and does not manage to bring them before the proselyte dies — (Whence is it derived that his heirs are exempt (from the guilt-offering)? From "aside from the ram of atonement with which atonement shall be made for him." (And in the above situation, his death has atoned for him.)

Thus did R. Akiva teach before he came from Zifron. When he came from Zifron he said: If he gave the money to the men of the watch and then the proselyte died, the heirs do not retrieve it from the Cohein, and I pronounce over him (the giver) (Ibid. 10) "Whatever a man gives to the Cohein, to him (the Cohein) shall it be." The Cohein says to the heir: Bring a guilt-offering and it will be sacrificed, and he (the heir) says: "whereby atonement shall be made for him" — to exclude (from the guilt-offering) one who died, whose death has atoned for him.

"aside from the ram of atonement": From "Whatever a man gives to the Cohein, to him (the Cohein) shall it be," do you say that if he gave the money to (the watch of) Yehoyariv and (afterwards) the guilt-offering to (that of) Yedayah, he has fulfilled his obligation and I pronounce over him (the giver) "Whatever a man gives to the Cohein, to him shall it be," or even if he gave the guilt-offering (first) to Yehoyariv, and (then) the money to Yedayah, he has fulfilled his obligation and I pronounce over him "Whatever a man gives to the Cohein, to him shall it be"?

It is, therefore, written "aside from the ram of atonement whereby atonement shall be made for him" (and there is no atonement until the money has been returned.) But, (in the above instance), if the animal to be offered is still alive, it is sacrificed by (the watch of) Yedayah, and he (the giver) is told to offer another offering and give it to Yedayah (sic. [Yehoyariv?])

(Bamidbar 5:9) "And all terumah of all the holy things of the children of Israel which they present to the Cohein, to him shall it be." R. Yishmael says: Scripture comes to teach you that if one dedicates (to the Temple) his grain pile before he levels it off and then he redeems it, he must take terumah (from it). I might think (he must do so) even if he redeemed it after he leveled the pile; it is, therefore, written (of terumah, Devarim 18:4) "the first of your corn (pile)."

R. Akiva says: "and all terumah": Scripture comes to teach you that if he wishes to make his entire granary terumah, he may do so, so long as he leaves some over. "and all terumah of all the holy things": Scripture hereby teaches us that the laws of terumah apply to all varieties (of produce, and not just to those specifically indicated). Issi b. Yehudah says: If the ma'aser — the less stringent — obtains with all produce, how much more so, terumah — the more stringent.

Variantly: If ma'aser, which does not obtain in the third and sixth year (of shemitah), obtains with all produce, how much more so, terumah, which obtains in all years! Issi b. Menachem says: if ma'aser, which is brought only as an adjunct to learning and fear (viz. Devarim 14:23), obtains with all produce, how much more so, the more stringent, terumah! (Ibid. 5:9) "which they offer to the Cohein, to him shall it be": R. Yishmael says: Now is terumah offered to the Cohein? (Does he not rather come to receive it?)

What, then, is the intent of "which they offer to the Cohein"? Because it is written (Shemot 23:19) "The first of the first-fruits (bikkurim) of your land shall you bring to the house of the L-rd your G-d," but we are not told what is to be done with them; it is, therefore, written "which they offer to the Cohein, to him shall it be." Scripture hereby teaches us that bikkurim, (which are presented as offerings), are to be given to the Cohanim.

(Bamidbar 5:10) "And a man, his holy things, to him shall they be": All kodshim ("holies") were included in "And a man, his holy things, to him shall they be." Scripture "pulled out" all the kodshim and gave them to the Cohanim, leaving over (to the owners) only ("portions") of thank-offerings, peace-offerings, the Pesach offering, beast-tithe, second-tithe, and neta revai (plantings of the fourth year).

Variantly: And a man, his holy things, to him shall they be": From here you derive that to the Cohein who performs the sacrifice (even in a different watch), its service (i.e., its flesh) and its skin belong "to him" (the Cohein). Variantly: "And a man, his holy things, to him shall they be": What is the intent of this? From (Vayikra 19:24) "And in the fourth year all of its fruit shall be holy in praise of the L-rd," (I would not know) "holy" to the owners or "holy" to the Cohanim?

It is, therefore, written "And a man, his holy things, to him shall they be." Scripture here speaks of neta revai, that it belongs to the owners. These are the words of R. Meir. R. Shimon says: "holy" to the owners.

You say "holy" to the owners, but perhaps it is "holy" to the Cohanim! — You derive it thus: second-tithe is called "holy" (viz. Devarim 26:13) "and neta revai is called "holy." Just as second-tithe is "holy" to the owners, so, neta revai should belong to the owners. — (No,) this is refuted by terumah, which is called "holy" (viz. Vayikra 22:14) and yet belongs to the Cohanim. — Would you say that?

There is a difference. Second-tithe requires bringing to the place (Jerusalem) and neta revai requires bringing to the place. If I learned that second-tithe belongs to the owners, neta revai should belong to the owners. — (No,) this is refuted by bikkurim, which, even though they require bringing to the place, belong to the Cohanim. — Would you say that? There is a difference.

Second-tithe is called "holy," and requires bringing to the place, and redemption. And neta revai is called "holy," and requires bringing to the place, and redemption. And this is not to be refuted by terumah, which, even though it is called "holy," does not require bringing to the place, nor by bikkurim, which, even though they require bringing to the place, do not require redemption. I will learn a thing from a thing, and I will reason out a thing from a thing.

I will learn a thing of three facets from a thing that is similar in (these) three facets, and I will not learn a thing of three facets from a thing which is not similar in (these) three facets, but only in one or two. If I have learned, then, that second-tithe belongs to the owners, then neta revai, too, should belong to the owners. R. Yossi says "holy" to the owners. You say "holy" to the owners, but perhaps it is "holy" to the Cohanim! — It is, therefore, written (of neta revai, Vayikra 19:25) "And in the fifth year you may eat its fruit to increase for you its produce." For whom is it increased? For him to whom it has already been given (in the fourth year, i.e., the owner.)

(Bamidbar 5:10) "And every man, his holy things, to him shall they be": What is the intent of this? Because it is written (Ibid. 18:19) "All the terumoth of the holy things which the children of Israel will separate for the L-rd have I given to you (Aaron) and to your sons, etc.", I might think that he (a Cohein) could forcibly seize them (the priestly gifts). It is, therefore, written "And every man, his holy things, to him shall they be" — He has the option of giving them to any Cohein he wishes.

"And a man, his holy things, to him shall they be": If one measured out (terumah) for them (certain Cohanim) on the ground and others (later) joined them, I might think that I pronounce over him "Whatever a man gives to the Cohein, (in this instance the Cohein for whom he measured it out), to him (that Cohein) shall it be"; it is, therefore, written "And every man, his holy things, to him (the man) shall they be" (i.e., he retains the option of giving it to those who came later).

I might then think that if he measured it out (for him) in a basket and others joined later, I still pronounce over him "And every man, his holy things, to him (the man) shall they be" (and he can give it to the later ones); it is, therefore, (for such a circumstance) written "Whatever a man gives to the Cohein, (in this instance, the first Cohein), to him (that Cohein) shall it be." R. Yossi says if one redeemed his (first-born) son within thirty days, and he (the son) died, I might think that I pronounce over him (the father) "Whatever a man gives to the Cohein to him (the Cohein) shall it be"; it is, therefore, written "And every man, his holy things, to him (the man) shall they be." (If he died) after thirty days, the money is not taken back from the Cohein, it being pronounced over the father "Whatever a man gives to the Cohein, to him (the Cohein) shall it be."

(Bamidbar 5:12) "Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: A man, a man, if his wife go astray, and she be faithless to him": What is the intent of this section? From (Devarim 24:1) "If a man take a woman and he cohabit with her, etc.", we hear only that if he had two witnesses (to her adultery) and she had not been forewarned, that she leaves him by divorce. But if she were adulterous in the presence of only one witness or it is in doubt whether she had or had not been adulterous after having been secreted (with the one she had been forewarned against), we did not hear what is to be done with her.

It is, therefore, written "Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: "A man, a man, if his wife go astray, etc.", that (in the above instance) she must drink the bitter waters. This is the intent of this section. "A man, a man": to include the wife of a deaf mute, an imbecile, one who has gone abroad or been incarcerated, or a dullard — that beth-din forewarns her (if she is deporting herself immodestly) to the end of invalidating her kethubah (her marriage contract).

I might think, even to the end of making her drink (the bitter waters); it is, therefore, written (to negate this) (Ibid. 11) "Then the man shall bring his wife." R. Yossi b. Yehudah says: also to the end of making her drink when her husband is released from incarceration. Variantly: "A man, a man": to include a woman awaiting levirate marriage (yibum). "if his wife go astray": Scripture speaks of those who are fit to be "wives" — to exclude a widow married to a high-priest, a divorcée or a chalutzah (one who has performed the chaliztah ceremony to break a levirate connection), who are married to a regular priest, a mamzereth or a Nethinah (a descendent of the Geveonites) married to an Israelite, and a daughter of an Israelite married to a Nathin or a mamzer.

And, according to Akavya b. Mehallalel, (to exclude) a woman who is a proselyte or a freed slave. They (the sages) said to him (Akavya): But there was a freed slave, Charkemis, in Jerusalem, and Shemaya and Avtalyon had her drink (the bitter waters)! He replied: They dissimulated their doing so — whereupon they excommunicated him and he died in his state of excommunication, and beth-din stoned his coffin. ("if his wife go astray,) and she is guilty of ma'al against him": ("ma'al") In the area of illicit relations or in the area of monetary (fraudulence)? (Ibid. 5:13) "And a man lie with her a lying of seed" indicates that ma'al here is in the area of illicit relations, and not in that of monetary (fraudulence). "and she is guilty of ma'al against him": "me'ilah" in all places is "lying."

And thus is it written (I Chronicles 5:25) "Vayimalu ('and they lied') against the G-d of their fathers," and (Joshua 7:1) "And the children of Israel yimalu ma'al ('falsified') in respect to the ban," and (I Chronicles 10:13) "And Saul died because of his falsification ('bema'alo ma'al') against the L-rd." And, in respect to Uzziyahu, king of Judah, (II Chronicles 26:18) "Leave the sanctuary, for you have acted falsely (ma'alta)," and (Vayikra 5:21) "and he (the denier) ma'ala ma'al against the L-rd" — whence we see that "me'ilah" in all places is "lying."

"And a man lie with her a lying of seed": a man, and not a minor. "And a man lie with her": and not with her sister. For it would follow (otherwise), viz.: If in a place where the forbidder [(i.e., her husband, who forbids her to all men)] does not forbid her all of his days, (for he can divorce her) — she forbids her forbidder (her husband) from living with her (if she secretes herself), then in a place where the forbidder (his wife) forbids her (sister to him) all of his days — how much more so should she forbid (to herself) her forbidder (if he cohabits with her sister)!

It is, therefore, written ("and a man lie) with her," and not with her sister. Abba Channan says in the name of R. Eliezer: "with her": and not (if he lay with) with his mother-in-law; "with her": and not with one of the illicit relations. For it would follow (otherwise), viz.: If one commits a (relatively) "light" act of forbidding, in that he does not forbid her all of his days — she forbids her forbidder, then if one commits a grave act of forbidding, in that he forbids her all of his days, how much more so should she forbid (to herself) her forbidder!

It is, therefore, written "with her," and not with his mother-in-law; "with her," and not with one of the illicit relations.

(Ibid. 5:13) "and it be hidden from the eyes of her husband": but not if her husband see and make himself "unseeing." If her husband knows, he is not permitted to scheme and make her drink." "and she had secreted herself and she be defiled": (Does this mean that) there were no witnesses to defiling, but there were witnesses for secreting, or that there were no witnesses to both defiling and secreting?

If you say this (the latter), she is permitted to her husband. The former, then, is the case and not the latter. There are no witnesses to defiling, but there are witnesses to secreting. "and she had secreted herself": We have not been apprised of the (minimum) time of secreting; it is, therefore, written "and she had secreted herself and she be defiled": the (minimum) time for defilement — for intercourse; for he'arah (the initial stage) — for circling a palm tree.

These are the words of R. Yishmael. R. Eliezer says: the (minimum) time for pouring a cup. R. Yehoshua says: for drinking it. Ben Azzai says: for frying an egg.

R. Akiva says: for swallowing it. R. Yehudah b. Betheira says: for swallowing three eggs, one after the other. "and there be no witness in her": Is Scripture speaking of two witnesses or of one? It is, therefore, written (Devarim 19:15) "There shall not arise one witness against a man for every transgression and for every sin." Why (emphasize) one?

To serve as a prototype (binyan av), viz.: Wherever "witness" (alone) is mentioned, two are understood, unless Scripture specifies "one." "and she were not seized": to exclude one who was forced. For it would follow (otherwise), viz.: If in the instance of "light" tumah (e.g., a widow (cohabiting) with a high-priest, where there is only a lav (transgression of a negative commandment), forced is equated with consenting, how much more so, in an instance of grave tumah, such as ours, where the penalty is death, forced should be equated with consenting; it is, therefore, written "and she were not seized."

Or, I might think (that this halachah obtains both) with (the wife of) an Israelite or of a Cohein; it is, therefore, written "and she (the wife of an Israelite) were not seized" — to exclude (from being forbidden to her husband) the wife of a Cohein, (who is forbidden to him even if she were forced.) (Ibid. 14) "And there pass over him a spirit of rancor and he warn his wife": optional (i.e., "he may warm his wife.")

These are the words of R. Yishmael. R. Akiva says: mandatory (i.e., "he must warn his wife.") R. Akiva says: Why is "venitma'ah" ("and she be tamei") written three times, (5:14, 5:27, 5:29)? tumah vis-à-vis her husband, and vis-à-vis her cohabitor, and vis-à-vis (her eating) terumah (if she is the daughter of a Cohein). R. Yishmael says: If a divorcée, the "lighter," (in that she may return to her divorcer), is unfit (for marriage) to the priesthood, how much more so sotah, the "graver," (who may not return to her husband; and no verse is needed for this.) (Ibid. 5:14) "and she were defiled … and she were not defiled": What is the intent of this?

If she were (positively) defiled, why does she drink? And if she were (positively) not defiled, why does he make her drink? Scripture hereby (by this ambiguity) comes to teach us that she drinks only in a case of doubt (as to whether or not) she were defiled. And from here you rule (accordingly) in the instance of (the tumah of sheretz) [a creeping thing], viz.: If in an instance (that of sotah), where unwittingness is not equated with wittingness (to make her tamei) or forcing to consent, doubt is equated with certainty (to forbid her to her husband until she drinks and resolves the doubt), then in an instance where unwittingness (of contact) is equated with wittingness, and forcing with consent, how much more so should doubt be equated with certainty!

And just as here (for tumah to obtain, the locus of the act is) a private domain, there, too, it must be a private domain. Just as here we are dealing with a subject (the woman) which has the intelligence to be questioned, there, too, (for tumah to obtain), we must be dealing with a subject (e.g., the carrier of the sheretz) which has the intelligence to be questioned — whence they ruled: In a case of doubt involving a subject which has the intelligence to be questioned — in the private domain, the ruling is tamei; in the public domain, the ruling is tahor (clean). (In a case of doubt involving a subject) which lacks the intelligence to be questioned, both in the public and in the private domain, the ruling is tahor.

(Bamidbar 5:15) "Then the man shall bring his wife to the Cohein": According to the Torah, the man brings his wife to the Cohein. But they said: He is given two Torah scholars (as chaperones) on the way so that he not live with her. R. Yossi says: Her husband is trusted with her, a fortiori, viz. If he is trusted (to be alone) with his wife when she is a niddah, though the punishment for cohabiting with her is kareth, how much more so is he to be trusted with her when she is a sotah, cohabitation with whom is not liable to kareth!

They replied: How much more so (is he not to be trusted with her!) If he is not liable to kareth he will not be deterred! Variantly: (The instance of niddah is no refutation). He may be trusted (to be alone with her) when she is a niddah, for she is permitted to him afterwards, but not with a sotah, who may not be permitted to him afterwards.

According to the Torah, the husband brings his wife, it being written "and the man (i.e., her husband) brings his wife to the Cohein." "and he shall bring her offering for her": Every offering devolving upon her. These are the words of R. Yehudah. The sages say: Any offering that permits her to him, such as that of a zavah and that of a woman who has given birth, she brings of what is his and it is not deducted from her kethubah.

And any offering that does not permit her to him, such as that for taking a Nazirite vow or desecrating the Sabbath, she brings of what is hers and he deducts it from her kethubah. "one-tenth of an ephah of meal": Why state ("of meal")? For it would follow, since the offering of a sinner comes for a sin and this comes for a sin, that since the first comes only of fine flour, this, too, is to be only of fine flour; it is, therefore, written "meal." "barley": Why?

For it would follow, since the offering of a sinner comes for a sin and this comes for a sin, then this, too, should come only from wheat; it is, therefore, written "barley." R. Gamliel said: Scribes, allow me, and I will interpret it symbolically, viz.: Just as her deeds were those of a beast, so, her food shall be that of a beast." He shall not pour oil upon it": If he does, he transgresses a negative commandment.

Would you say, then, that just as he transgresses (a negative commandment) with his oil so, he transgresses with his frankincense? Would you say that? (I would say that) he transgresses with oil, for he cannot remove it, but not with frankincense, for he can remove it." It is, therefore, written "He shall not pour oil upon it" and "He shall not place frankincense upon it" — so that if he places either oil or frankincense upon it he transgresses a negative commandment.

Why is that? "For it is an offering of rancors." "rancors": two rancors: rancor against her and rancor against her husband (and) just as there is rancor below, there is rancor Above. "an offering of memorial": I hear (from this, a "memorial" [i.e., a "reminder"] both of) merit and of liability; it is, therefore, written (afterwards, to negate this) "a reminder of sin." All of the "memorials" in the Torah are for the good, except for this one, which is for punishment.

These are the words of R. Tarfon. R. Akiva says: This one, too, is for the good, as it is written (Ibid. 28) "And if the woman had not been defiled (in this concealment), and she be clean, then she shall be absolved (of the blighting waters), and she will sow seed." This (verse) tells me only "a reminder of sin." Whence do I derive (that it is also) a reminder of merit?

From "an offering of memorial" — in any event. R. Yishmael says: "an offering of memorial" — general; "a reminder of sin" — specific. (This is an instance of "general-specific," (where the resolution is) — "There obtains in the general only what is stated in the specific," (i.e., that it is a memorial of sin and not of merit.) For, (if not for this principle) the "contender" could argue. Which attribute (of the L-rd) is stronger?

That for good or that for punishment? Certainly, that for good (viz. Shemot 34:7) If the attribute of punishment diminished (that of good), it would be a reminder of sin, but since the attribute of good is stronger, it follows that it should be a reminder of merit. This is an attribute of the Torah: Whenever a "general-specific" (application) defeats an a fortiori (application [as in the above]) — If both can be satisfied, the a fortiori (application) is not to be defeated.

How can both be satisfied (in our instance) without the a fortiori (application) being defeated? (As follows:) If she had been defiled, then punishment visits her immediately. And if she has a certain merit, that merit may suspend (the operation of the bitter waters) for three months so that the fetus is recognizable. These are the words of Abba Yossi b. Channan. R. Eliezer b. Yitzchak of Kfar Darom says: For nine months, as it is written (Ibid. 28) "and if she is clean, then she will sow seed.

Just as "seed" connotes nine months, so, merit (can suspend for) nine months. R. Yishmael says: Twelve months. And even though there is no proof for this, there is intimation of it in (Daniel 4:24-26) "O king, let my counsel be acceptable to you … All this befell King Nevuchadnezzar. At the end of twelve months, etc." R. Shimon b. Yochai says: Merit does not suspend (the operation of) the blighting waters.

For if you say that it does, you "dilute" the (deterrence of the) bitter waters before all women, and they will drink them; and you cast an evil name upon the clean ones who drank. For people will say: They were really defiled, but their merit suspended (the operation of the waters). Rebbi says: I can determine (whether or not she was clean). If she were clean, in the end, she will die, as all men do, and if she had been defiled, she will die as depicted by Scripture, viz. (Bamidbar 5:27) "and her belly will swell and her thigh will fall."

R. Shimon says: Who is going to inform all of the standersby that she will die and her belly will swell and her thigh will fall? But (if she were guilty), then as soon as she drank, her face would turn green and her eyes would bulge, and her veins would swell in her, and they would say: Hurry and take her out so that she not defile the azarah (the Temple court)!

(Bamidbar 5:16) "And the Cohein shall draw her near": whence it is derived that the draught is not given to two sotahs together. "and he shall stand her": He shall not stand with her, her manservant and her maidservants, because she tends to be callous in their presence. "before the L-rd": at the gates of Nikanor (opposite the entrance to the sanctuary), whence they stated: The head of the watch would stand those who were tamei at the gates of Nikanor.

(Bamidbar 5:17) "And the Cohein shall take consecrated water: This refers to water consecrated in a vessel, the waters of the laver. "in an earthen vessel": We are hereby taught that all vessels are not equated with earthen vessels. For it would follow: Since soil and water consecrate in the instance of the red heifer and soil and water consecrate in the instance of sotah, then if I derive that all vessels are equated with earthen vessels re the red heifer, then re sotah, too, all vessels should be equated with earthen vessels; it is, therefore, written (specifically) "in an earthen vessel" (to negate the above derivation). "in an earthen vessel": a new one.

For it would follow: If I have derived that re the red heifer both a new and an old vessel are permitted, I should derive the same for sotah. It is, therefore, written here "in an earthen vessel," and, elsewhere (Vayikra 14:5) "into an earthen vessel." Just as there, a new one, here, too, a new one. These are the words of R. Yishmael. "and of the soil that shall be on the floor of the mishkan the Cohein shall take": Scripture hereby teaches us that if there were no soil there, he brings soil from elsewhere and places it there; for it is the place which consecrates.

Issi b. Yehudah says ("that shall be"): to include (the same for) the soil of the Temple (in Jerusalem). Issi b. Menachem says (in demurral): If in respect to a lesser form of tumah (e.g., dead-body tumah or sheretz tumah), the Temple (mikdash) was equated (vis-à-vis kareth liability for entry) with the sanctuary (mishkan), then, in respect to a graver form of tumah, sotah, (where death is the punishment,) how much more so, should the (strictures of the) mikdash be equated with (those of) the mishkan!

Why, then, need it be written "that shall be on the floor of the mishkan"? — That he not bring soil in his basket, (but shall use soil that is already there.) R. Shimon says: It is written here "afar" ("and of the afar that is on the floor of the mishkan"), and, elsewhere (Ibid. 19:17) "And they shall take for the unclean one of the afar of the burning of the (heifer) for cleaning." Just as "afar" here," "afar on the face of the water" (i.e., visible on the surface of the water), so, there, afar on the face of the water.

And, just as there if the afar preceded the water, it is valid, so, here. "the Cohein shall take (the afar) and place it on the water": so that it be visible. Three "things" in the Torah must be visible: the ashes of the heifer (Ibid.), the afar of the sotah, and the spittle of the yevamah (viz. Devarim 25:9). R. Yishmael says: Also the blood of the (slaughtered) bird (viz. Vayikra 14:6).

(Bamidbar 5:18) "And the Cohein shall stand the woman before the L-rd": Where he stood her before (viz. Ibid. 16), he stands her afterwards, (after she had been moved away from her original position [They would walk her from place to place to "weary" her into confession]). "And he shall uncover the head of the woman": The Cohein moves behind her and uncovers her hair to fulfill the mitzvah to do so.

R. Yishmael said: From here (i.e., from the fact that he is to uncover her hair) we derive an exhortation for the daughters of Israel to cover their hair. And though there is no proof for this, there is an intimation of it in (II Samuel 13:19) "And Tamar put earth upon her head … and she put her hand on her head." R. Yehudah says: If her top-knot were beautiful, he did not expose it, and if her hair were beautiful, he did not dishevel it.

If she were dressed in white, she is dressed in black. If black were becoming to her, she is divested of it and clothed in ungainly garments. If there were golden ornaments upon her — necklaces, nose-rings, and rings — they are taken from her to render her unattractive. R. Yochanan b. Beroka says: The daughters of Israel are not made more unattractive than the Torah prescribes, viz. — "… before the L-rd and he shall uncover the head of the woman."

They would spread a sheet of linen between him and the people. The Cohein would walk around her in order to fulfill the mitzvah of disheveling her hair. They say to him: Just as she was not solicitous of the honor of the L-rd, so, we are not solicitous of her honor — wherefore she is demeaned in this manner. And all who wish to look at her may do so except her man-servants and her maid-servants, for she is callous in their presence.

Both men and women, kin and non-kin, may look at her, as it is written (Ezekiel 23:48) "and all the women will be chastised and not act according to your lewdness." (Devarim, Ibid.) "and he shall place into her hands the offering of memorial" Abba Channan says in the name of R. Eliezer: So that she is "wearied" into confession. Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If the L-rd is so solicitous of the transgressors of His will, how much more so, of the doers of His will! "and in the hand of the Cohein will be the bitter waters": Scripture herby apprises us that the waters turn bitter only in the hand of the Cohein. Variantly: They are called "bitter" because of their effect — they impart bitterness to the body and convulse the eye.

(Bamidbar 5:19) "And the Cohein shall beswear her": The Cohein administers the oath and she does not swear of herself. For it would follow (that she does), viz.: It is written here "swear," and, elsewhere (Vayikra 5:4) "swear." Just as there, he swears of himself, so, here, she should swear of herself. It is, therefore, written "And the Cohein shall beswear her." "and he shall say to the woman": in any language that she understands.

These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. For it would follow (otherwise), viz.: If in the instance of yevamah, (the instance) of lesser stringency, the other languages are not equated with the holy tongue (Hebrew) (viz. Devarim 25:9), then, (in the instance of) sotah, the graver instance, how much more so should the other languages not be equated with the holy tongue! It is, therefore, written "and he shall say to the woman" — in any language that she understands.

These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. R. Yonathan says: This (derivation of R. Yoshiyah) is not necessary; for it is written (Bamidbar 5:22) "and the woman shall say 'Amen,' 'Amen.'" If she does not understand, how can she say this! — But perhaps she says "Amen" only on the curse (i.e., "to swell the belly, etc." [and not on the oath])! — (This cannot be,) for she says Amen twice — both on the curse and on the oath.

What, then, is the intent of "and he shall say to the women" (according to R. Yonathan)? That the Cohein teaches her (the import of) the order of the oath. (5:19) "If no man has lain with you": We are hereby taught that he opens for merit. He says to her: Much wine causes this. Much frivolity causes this.

Much childishness causes this. Many have preceded you and been swept away (by lust). Do not allow His great name written in holiness to be erased by the (bitter) waters. He recounts before her things from the tradition, things mentioned in the early writings (Iyyov 15:18) "which wise men relate and which they did not withhold from their fathers."

And he says before her things which are not fit to be heard, by her and by all the families of her father's house. R. Yishmael says: In the beginning he apprises her of the strength of the bitter waters. He says to her: My daughter, what are these bitter waters like? Like a dry powder placed on raw flesh, which causes no harm, but which, when it finds a sore spot, penetrates and descends.

You, too, if you are clean, drink and do not refrain, and, if you are unclean, in the end you will be swollen by these bitter, blighting waters.

(Bamidbar 5:20) "And you, if you have gone astray": This tells me only of the regular mode. Whence do I derive (that the same applies for) the irregular mode (i.e., anal intercourse)? From "and if you have become unclean." "and a man has put his lying in you": to include (in these strictures) one who is impotent, (where there is only "lying," but no seed.) "aside from your husband": to include the wife of one who is impotent. He stipulates all (contingencies) with her.

(Bamidbar 5:21) "Then the Cohein shall beswear the woman with the oath of the curse." What is the intent of this? Because it is written (Vayikra 5:1) "and he hear the voice of a curse," this tells me only of a curse. Whence do I derive that an oath is like a curse?

It is derived inductively, viz.: It is written here (Bamidbar) "curse," and it is written elsewhere (Vayikra) "curse." Just as here "oath" is equated with "curse," (viz. "the oath of the curse"), so, there, "oath" is equated with "curse." And just as here, (the oath is administered) with "yod-keh" (viz. Ibid. "May the L-rd [yod-keh-vav-keh] render you, etc."), so, all the oaths in the Torah (are administered with) "yod-keh." "in the midst of your people": and your people (will remain at) peace. "in the midst of your people": and not at this time (when you are in the midst of gentiles.)

There is a (crucial) difference between one being degraded in a place where he is known, and one being degraded in a place where he is not known, (the former degradation being more severe).

(Bamidbar 5:22) "to swell the belly and to make fall the thigh": R. Yossi Haglili says: This refers to the belly and the thigh of the adulterer. You say the belly and the thigh of the adulterer; but (perhaps it refers to) the belly and the thigh of the adulteress! — (This cannot be, for) [5:21] "… causing your thigh to fall and your belly to swell" already refers to the adulteress. How, then, am I to understand "to swell the belly and to make fall the thigh"?

As referring to the adulterer, Scripture apprising us that just as punishment overtakes her, so, it overtakes him. Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If re the attribute of punishment, the "weaker" attribute (of the Holy One Blessed be He), if one brings misfortune to his neighbor, he suffers likewise, then re the attribute of benefaction, (the stronger attribute, if one bring benefit to his neighbor,) how much more so (is he benefitted himself!) (Ibid. 22) "and the woman shall say 'Amen,' 'Amen.'": "Amen" that I have not become unclean; "Amen" that I will not become unclean, (in which instance the bitter waters operate retroactively).

These are the words of R. Meir. And the sags do not agree, (but they say) "Amen" that I have not become unclean (i.e., acceptance of the oath) and ("Amen" that) if I have become unclean, they (the waters) should enter her (i.e., acceptance of the curse). "Amen" in respect to this man (the suspected adulterer); "Amen" in respect to any other man; "Amen" when betrothed — "Amen" when married; "Amen" when awaiting levirate marriage — "Amen" after levirate marriage.

This is the rule: For a woman to be lived with and (thereby) to be forbidden (to her husband), the stipulated conditions must be those of that time (i.e., while she is still married to him [and not, e.g., before betrothal or after divorce]).

Since oaths are mentioned in the Torah generically, and in one case (that of sotah) it is specifically indicated that the oath must be accompanied by a curse, I derive that the same must obtain with all oaths in the Torah. Since in one case (that of sotah) it is specifically indicated that the oath must be administered under the Name "yod-keh," I derive the same for all oaths in the Torah. And since oaths are mentioned generically in the Torah, and of one of them (sotah), it was specified that it be (answered) with "Amen," so, I derive that the same holds true for all oaths in the Torah.

Abba Channan says in the name of R. Eliezer: ("Amen" is repeated here) to include the oath administered by the judges, that it be answered by "Amen." For if it is not answered by "Amen," it is rendered a "vain oath" (in the name of the L-rd.) Since oaths are mentioned generically in the Torah, and in one case (sotah) it is specifically indicated that a previous oath (i.e., an oath for a previous matter) can be "rolled" onto it (e.g., When she answers "Amen" to not having been defiled by this man, she also answers "Amen" to not having been defiled by another, etc.), I derive the same for all of the oaths in the Torah.

Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If in the instance of sotah, where no previous claim has been made against her, a previous oath is "rolled" onto her, then, in instances of thefts, where previous claims have been made, how much more so may previous oaths be "rolled" onto them!

(Bamidbar 5:23) "Then the Cohein shall write the curses (these"): I might think, all the curses in the Torah (written in the curses of the covenant); it is, therefore, written "these." "the Cohein": What is the intent of this (i.e., is it not understood from the context?) For it would follow: It is written here "and he shall write," and it is written elsewhere (Devarim 24:1) "and he shall write" (a scroll of divorce).

Just as there, any man may write it, so, here, (I would say that) any man may write it. It is, therefore, written "the Cohein." "and erase it": (He must write it) on something that can be erased. Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If in order to make peace between a man and his wife, the L-rd said: A scroll written in holiness — let it be erased by the waters, then the scrolls of heretics, which inject (into the world) contempt and hatred and envy and contention — how much more so should they be erased from the world!

R. Yishmael says: How does one deal with the scrolls of the heretics? He cuts out the "mentionings" (of G-d's name) and burns the rest. R. Akiva says: He burns them entire, for they were not written in holiness. "into a scroll": From here they ruled: It is not to be written on a tablet, or on paper, nor on hide, but on a scroll (of finished parchment). And he is not to write it with gummed ink or with vitriol, but with ink, it being written "and erase it into the bitter waters" — writing that can be erased. "and erase it into the bitter waters": the connotation is that the writing makes the waters bitter.

(Bamidbar 5:25) "And the Cohein shall take from the hand of the woman": and not from the hand of her representative — If she were in her menstrual period, she did not drink, (being forbidden to enter the azarah at that time). (5:24) "And he shall make the woman drink": Why is it written again (Ibid. 27) "and he shall make her drink the water"? For if the scroll were erased and she said "I will not drink," they shake her and make her drink perforce.

These are the words of R. Akiva. R. Shimon says: (Ibid. 26) "and then he shall make the woman drink": What is the intent of this? It is written afterwards "and he shall make her drink the water"! (To indicate that) three things are categorically required for (the validity of) the sotah (procedure): the erasure of the scroll, the offering of the fistful, and her acceptance of the oath. If the scroll were erased and she said; I am tamei, the waters are spilled out, the offering is scattered in the beth hadeshen, and the scroll is not valid for the drinking of a different sotah.

R. Achi b. R. Yoshiyah says: It is valid. "and he shall wave the offering": back and forth and up and down. Whence is this derived? From (Shemot 29:23) "which was waved and which was lifted": Lifting is hereby likened to waving. Just as waving is back and forth, so, lifting.

And just as lifting is up and down, so, waving — whence they ruled: The mitzvah of waving — back and forth, up and down. "before the L-rd": in the east (i.e., at the eastern side of the altar [opposite the sanctuary]). Wherever "before the L-rd" is written, the east is intended unless specified otherwise. "and he shall wave the offering before the L-rd, and he shall present it at the (south-west corner of the) altar" — whereby we are taught that the offering of the sotah requires waving and presentation. (Ibid. 26) "And the Cohein shall take a fistful from the offering as its 'remembrance,' and he shall smoke it on the altar.": This refers to the smoking of the fistful, which is called "remembrance" (viz. Vayikra 2:2) "and then he shall make the woman drink the water": as mentioned above.

(Bamidbar 5:27) "and her belly will swell and her thigh will fall": This tells me only of her belly and her thigh. Whence do I derive (the same for) the rest of her limbs? From "then the blighting waters will enter into her." — Let only this be stated, then. Why need it be added "and her belly will swell and her thigh will fall"?

From that limb whence the sin began, from that limb will the punishment begin! Similarly, (Bereshit 7:23) "And He blotted out every being upon the face of the ground — from man until beast." He who began the sin, from him will the punishment begin! Similarly, (Ibid. 19:11) "And the men at the entrance of the house they smote with blindness, from small to great."

They who began the sin, from them the punishment began. Similarly, (Shemot 14:4) "and I will be honored through (the downfall of) Pharaoh and all of his host." Pharaoh began the sin — from him the punishment began. Similarly, (Devarim 15:16) "Smite shall you smite the inhabitants of that city by the sword.

Lay it waste and all that is in it, etc." Whence the sin began, the punishment began. Here, too, "and her belly will swell and her thigh will fall." From that limb whence the sin began, from it the punishment began. Now does this not follow a fortiori.

If re the attribute of punishment, the weaker attribute — the limb whence the sin began, from it the punishment begins, how much more so re the attribute of benefaction, the stronger attribute, (the limb whence the good began, from it the reward begins!) "and the woman will be a curse in the midst of her people": They will curse through her — "May it happen to you as it happened to her!" "for an oath" (see verse 21): They will swear by her — ("I swear that if, etc.,) may it happen to me as it happen to her!"

And thus is it written (Isaiah 65:15): "And you (the wicked) will leave your name as an oath for My chosen ones" — whence we learn that the wicked are an oath for the righteous. And whence do we derive that the righteous are a blessing for the wicked? (Jeremiah 4:2) "And in it (Israel) will nations bless themselves, and in it will they be praised," and (Bereshit 12:3) "And there will bless themselves in you (Avram) all the families of the earth."

And it is written (Ibid. 48:20) "And he blessed them on that day, saying: In you (Ephraim and Menasheh) will Israel bless, etc."

(Bamidbar 5:298) "And if the woman had not been defiled and she be clean": What is the intent of this? From (Vayikra 20:10) "And a man who lives with another man's wife, etc.", we learn that only where there were witnesses (to her adultery) and she were forewarned that she is put to death. If there were witnesses, but she had not been forewarned, she is not liable to the death penalty. (I would think that) since she is not liable to the death penalty she is permitted to her husband; it is, therefore, written (Devarim 24:1) "If a man take a woman (as a wife) and cohabit with her … having found in her a thing of nakedness … he shall write her a scroll of divorce, etc." — whence we learn that she is forbidden to her husband.

Whence is derived (the halachah) in an instance of doubt as to whether or not she has been defiled? From "And the woman had not been defiled and she be clean." Now who defiled her that Scripture must cleanse her? We are being told, then, that since an evil name has gone out against her, she is forbidden to her husband. "and she be clean": clean to her husband, clean to the (suspected) cohabitor (i.e., if her husband divorced her or died, he may marry her), and clean vis-à-vis (the eating of) terumah. "then she shall be absolved": of the curses and of the oath. "and she will sow seed": If she were barren, she conceives.

These are the words of R. Yishmael. R. Akiva said to him: If so, all the barren ones will go astray (and secrete themselves) in order to conceive and the modest (barren) ones will lose out! What, rather, is the intent of "then she will be absolved and she will sow seed"? If she had borne only females, she will now bear males; if she had borne only one, she will now bear two; if she had borne swarthy ones, she will now bear fair ones; if she had borne short ones, she will now bear fair ones.

R. Shimon says: Would it enter your mind that she is rewarded for transgression (i.e., secreting herself)? Rather, because she had been forbidden (to her husband) for seed before (drinking), it is, therefore, written "and she will sow seed," i.e., she is now permitted for "seed." Variantly: "and she will sow seed" — to exclude (from drinking) an eilonith (a wombless woman) or one who is (otherwise) unfit to bear.

(Bamidbar 5:29) "This is the law of the rancors": This tells me (that this is the law) only for that time. Whence do I derive (that it is also the law for succeeding generations? From (the construction) "zoth torath," (connoting one law for all generations). These are the words of R. Yoshiyah.

R. Yonathan says: ("zoth torath" is) conventional terminology (for conclusion of a subject, and not indicative of a new learning.) "for a woman who goes astray under her husband": to liken the woman to the man and the man to the woman (e.g., if either the man or the woman were blind, she does not drink). — But perhaps (the thrust of "under her husband" is) to exclude (from drinking,) a woman awaiting levirate marriage (shomereth yavam).

It is, therefore, written (5:12) "a man, a man" (twice) to include (in drinking,) a shomereth yavam. — But perhaps I should also include a betrothed woman. It is, therefore, written "under her husband" — to exclude a betrothed woman. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. R. Yonathan says (Ibid. 19) "under your husband" — to exclude a shomereth yavam.

I would then exclude a shomereth yavam, but I would not exclude a betrothed woman. It is, therefore, written (Ibid.) "for a woman (connoting a married woman) who goes astray under her husband" — to exclude one who was (only) betrothed. If so, why is it written "a man, a man" — to include the wife of an imbecile, a deaf-mute, a dullard, one who had gone abroad, and one who had been incarcerated, in which instance beth-din forewarn her to the end of disqualifying her from (receiving) her kethubah.

I might think, even to the end of making her drink. It is, therefore, written (in that regard) (Ibid. 15) "Then the man shall bring his wife to the Cohein." R. Yossi says also to the end of making her drink when her husband is released from prison.

(Bamidbar 5:30) "Or a man over whom there shall pass a spirit of rancor": What is the intent of this? (i.e., it is already written, viz. 5:14). — From "and he shall have forewarned his wife," (I might think that) this (i.e., forewarning) is optional, or that just as so long as he had not forewarned her, this (making her drink) is optional, then here (5:30), too, making her drink is optional; it is, therefore, written "Or a man over whom there shall pass a spirit of rancor and he warn his wife, then he shall stand the woman before the L-rd, and the Cohein shall do to her all of this law" — It is obligatory, and not optional. "and the Cohein shall do to her all of this law (31) and the man will be clean of sin.": If he did so, he will be clean of sin; if not, he will not be clean of sin. "and the man will be clean of sin": He should not say (if she drinks and dies) "Woe unto me!

I have killed a daughter of Israel, Woe unto me! I have desecrated a daughter of Israel, Woe unto me! I have cohabited with a defiled one." This is the intent of "and he will be clean."

Shimon b. Azzai says: Scripture here speaks of a woman who is clean (i.e., who has not been defiled); but since she has brought herself to these things (by secreting herself), she, too, shall not escape (some form of) punishment. This is the intent of "and the man will be free of sin, and that woman will bear her sin." Rebbi says: Scripture comes to teach you that it is the end of this woman (one who was defiled, even if a certain merit may suspend her death) to die of that death — "her belly will swell and her thigh will fall, and the woman will be a curse in the midst of her people."

Variantly: Why is it written "and the man will be clean of sin"? (To teach that) "when the man is clean of sin, that woman will bear her sin" — as opposed to (Hoshea 4:14) "I shall not punish your daughters when they commit harlotry, nor your brides, when they fornicate. For they (themselves) betake themselves with the whores and sacrifice with the harlots, and a people that does not understand will fall!"

He said to them: If you yourselves pursue harlotry, the waters, too, will not prove your wives. This is the intent of "and the man will be clean of sin" — Of that sin itself!

(Bamidbar 6:1-2) "And the L-rd spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: A man or a woman, if he shall declare to vow the vow of a Nazirite, to be a Nazirite to the L-rd": What is the intent of this section? (i.e., the section of vows has already been stated!) — Because it is written (Ibid. 30:3) "A man if he vow a vow to the L-rd, or if he take an oath to bind upon his soul, etc.", whence if he vows (to forbid) something for one day it is forbidden for one day; for two days, it is forbidden for two days; (to forbid) a specific thing, that specific thing is forbidden — I would think that the same is true of Naziritism.

It is, therefore, written (here) "Speak to the children of Israel, etc." that if he vowed (Naziritism, to forbid something to himself) for one day or for one moment, it is forbidden to him for thirty days. And he is forbidden to drink wine and to render himself tamei for the dead and to cut his hair. This is the intent of this section. "a man or a woman": to equate women with men (in respect to Naziritism).

For it would follow (otherwise), viz.: If, where minors are equated with adults, (i.e., in respect to Cohanim not rendering themselves tamei for the dead, viz. Vayikra 21:1), women are not equated with men, then here (in respect to Naziritism), where minors are not equated with adults, how much more so should women not be equated with men! It is, therefore, written "a man or a woman," to equate women with men. "a man": and not a minor.

For it would follow (otherwise), viz.: If, where women are not equated with men (see above), minors are equated with adults, then here, (in respect to Naziritism), where women are equated with men, how much more so should minors be equated with adults! It is, therefore, written "a man," and not a minor. "if he shall declare": to include (Naziritism as obtaining with) one who knows how to declare (i.e., one who is cognizant of the import of what he is saying.)

From here they ruled: The vows of a girl of eleven years and one day are examined (for such cognizance); of twelve years and one day — her vows stand. The vows of a boy of twelve years and one day are examined; of thirteen years and one day — his vows stand. "if he declare": willingly, and not under coercion. — But perhaps even under coercion! — It follows (that they must be willing), viz.: It is written here "declare," and, in respect to vows and gifts (Vayikra 22:21) "declare."

Just as there, willingly; here, too, willingly. "to vow a vow": I might think that even if he vows to bring an offering he becomes a Nazirite; it is, therefore, written "to make a Nazirite" — he must make the vow of a Nazirite. I might think (from "to make a Nazirite") that he may make even others Nazirites. It is, therefore, written "nazir," (which connotes that) he makes himself a Nazirite, and not others.

If so, why is it written (lit.,) "nazir, to make a nazir"? To equate epithets of Naziritism with Naziritism and "signals" of Naziritism with Naziritism. This tells me only of Naziritism. Whence do I derive (the same for) vows?

From "the vow of a Nazirite," to equate vows with Naziritism and Naziritism with vows, viz.: Just as in Naziritism, epithets of Naziritism are equated with Naziritism, and signals of Naziritism are equated with Naziritism, so, with vows, epithets of vows are equated with vows, and signals of vows are equated with vows. And just as vows are subject to transgression of (Bamidbar 30:3) "He shall not profane his word" and (Devarim 23:22) "You shall not delay to pay it," so, Naziritism.

And just as with vows a father may void the vows of his daughter, and a husband, the vows of his wife, so, with Naziritism. R. Yehoshua says: "to make a Nazirite": (to make) even others (Nazirites, e.g., a father, vis-à-vis his son). "to make a Nazirite to the L-rd": It is a mitzvah to become a Nazirite to the L-rd. Shimon Hatzaddik said: I never ate the guilt-offering of a Nazirite who had become unclean (by contact with a dead body) but once.

Once a Nazirite came to me from the south. His eyes were beautiful, he was very handsome, and his hair was wavy. I said to him: "What prompted you to destroy this beautiful hair?" (at the end of the Nazirite period). He answered: "I was a shepherd for my father in my town.

Once, while drawing water from the well, I gazed upon my reflection and my evil inclination seized hold of me and threatened to snatch me from the world — whereupon I said to it: 'Empty one, why do you vaunt yourself in a world that is not yours, where you are destined to be consigned to worms and maggots? I swear, I shall shear you in the name of Heaven!'" I thereupon arose, and, kissing him on the head, said to him: "May Nazirites like you multiply in Israel, doing the will of the L-rd!

Of such as you it is written 'A man … if he shall declare to vow the vow of the Nazirite to be a Nazirite to the L-rd.'"

(Bamidbar 6:3) "From wine and strong drink he shall separate himself": (The intent is) to equate wine of mitzvah with non-mitzvah (i.e., optional) wine, as being forbidden to a Nazirite (viz. Ibid. 4). For (without this verse) it would follow that since a mourner is forbidden to drink wine (viz. Devarim 26:14) and a Nazirite is forbidden to drink wine, then since I have learned about a mourner that wine of mitzvah (i.e., second-tithe wine) was not equated with optional wine, (the first being forbidden, and the second, permitted), also, in the instance of a Nazirite, wine of mitzvah is not to be equated with optional wine, (i.e., the second, being forbidden, the first must be permitted, [wherefore the verse is needed to tell us that mitzvah wine, too, is forbidden to a Nazirite]). — No, this may be so in the instance of a mourner, where mitzvah eating was not equated with optional eating, (the first being forbidden, and the second, permitted,) wherefore mitzvah wine was not equated with optional wine.

But in the instance of the Nazirite, we would say that just as mitzvah eating was equated with optional eating, so, mitzvah wine should be equated with optional wine, (and both should be forbidden. Why, then, is the verse needed to tell us this?). And, furthermore, it follows a fortiori (that mitzvah wine is forbidden to a Nazirite,) viz.: If in the instance of an officiating (Cohein in the Temple), where the rind was not equated with the fruit, nor eating with drinking, nor the eating of grapes with the drinking of wine, (only the last being forbidden), mitzvah wine was equated with optional wine, (both being forbidden, viz. [Vayikra 10:9]), then in the instance of the Nazirite, where the rind was equated with the fruit (both being forbidden), and eating with drinking, and the eating of grapes with the drinking of wine, how much more so, should mitzvah wine be equated with optional wine (and be forbidden!)

Why, then, is the verse needed? — No, (i.e., it is needed.) This (i.e., what you have said), may be so with the officiating (Cohein), whose punishment (for drinking) is death, wherefore mitzvah wine was equated with optional wine, whereas in the instance of the Nazirite, whose punishment (for drinking) is not death, we would say that mitzvah wine was not to be equated with optional wine, (and should be permitted.)

It must, therefore, be written "From wine and strong drink he shall separate himself," to equate mitzvah wine with optional wine (as forbidden). R. Yossi Haglili says: What is the intent of "From wine and strong drink he shall separate himself"? Because it is written (Devarim 14:23) "and you shall eat before the L-rd your G-d … the (second-) tithe of your grain and wine, etc.", I might think that even Nazirites are included.

And how would I satisfy "From wine and strong drink he shall separate himself"? With other wines, excluding mitzvah wines. Or even with mitzvah wines. And how would I satisfy "and you shall eat, etc."?

With other men, aside from Nazirites. Or even with Nazirites. It is, therefore, written "From wine and strong drink he shall separate himself" — to equate mitzvah wine with optional wine (as forbidden.) Abba Chanan says in the name of R. Eliezer: Why is it written "From wine and strong drink he shall separate himself"?

For it would follow: Since he (a Nazirite) is forbidden to defile himself (for the dead) and he is forbidden (to drink) wine, then if I learn that (for a Nazirite) a meth-mitzvah [(one who, lacking kin, it is a mitzvah for everyone to bury)] is not equated with a non-meth-mitzvah, then mitzvah wine, likewise, should not be equated with optional wine (to be forbidden.) And, further, it would follow a fortiori, viz.: If (dead-body) tumah, which voids (one's elapsed period of Nazaritism) does not equate a meth-mitzvah with a non meth-mitzvah, (it being a mitzvah for a Nazirite to render himself tamei for the first, but forbidden to do so for the second), how much more so should mitzvah wine, which does not void (his lapsed Naziritism) not be equated with optional wine (to be forbidden)!

It must, therefore, be written "From wine and strong drink he shall separate himself" to equate mitzvah wine with optional wine (as forbidden). "From yayin (wine) and shechar he shall separate himself": Now yayin is shechar, and shechar is yayin! — But the Torah (sometimes) speaks in two tongues (i.e., synonymously). Similarly: Shechitah (slaughtering) is zevichah, and zevichah is shechitah. Kemitzah (taking the fistful) is haramah, and haramah is kemitzah.

Amuka (lowland) is shefelah, and shefelah is amukah. Oth (a sign) is mofeth, and mofeth is oth — but the Torah (sometimes) speaks in two tongues. Here, too — "From yayin and shechar he shall separate himself": Now yayin is shechar and shechar is yayin. But the Torah (sometimes) speaks in two tongues.

R. Elazar Hakappar says: "yayin" is diluted; shechar is undiluted. You say this, but perhaps the reverse is the case! — From(Bamidbar 28:7) "And its libation a fourth of a hin for the one lamb. On the holy place (i.e., the altar) shall it be poured (connoting "undiluted"), a pouring of shechar to the L-rd," you must deduce that "yayin" is diluted, and "shechar," undiluted. "From wine and strong drink yazir": "nezirah" in all places connotes separation, viz. (Vayikra 22:2) "and they shall separate ("veyinazru") from the holy things of the children of Israel," and (Ibid. 25:5) "The after-growth of your harvest you shall not reap (in the sabbatical year), and the guarded ("nezirecha," lit., "separated") grapes of your vine you shall not gather," and (Hoshea 9:10)) "And they came to Baal-peor and 'separated themselves' ('vayinazru') to shame," and (Zechariah 7:3) "Shall I weep in the fifth month (Tisha B'av), separating myself ("hinazer"), etc." We find, then, that in all places "nezirah" connotes separation.

"From wine and shechar he shall separate himself": I might think, (even) from selling wine or healing (himself with it); it is, therefore, written "he shall not drink," but he is permitted to sell it or to heal himself with it. "Vinegar of wine and vinegar of shechar he shall not drink": We are hereby taught that vinegar is equated with wine. For (without the verse) it would follow (otherwise), viz.: Since an officiating Cohein may not drink wine, then if I have learned that in his case vinegar is not equated with wine, then for a Nazirite, too, vinegar should not be equated with wine.

And, furthermore, this should follow a fortiori, viz.: If (in the instance of) an officiating Cohein, whose punishment (for drinking wine) is death, vinegar is not equated with wine, then (in the instance of) a Nazirite, whose punishment is not death, how much more so should vinegar not be equated with wine! (The verse then is needed) to tell us that vinegar is equated with wine. And just as mitzvah wine is equated with optional wine, so, mitzvah vinegar (i.e., second-tithe vinegar) is equated with optional vinegar.

What is the intent of "and any steeping of grapes he shall not eat"? We are hereby taught that if he steeped grapes in water, and the taste (of the grapes) was transmitted to the water, it is forbidden. And this serves as a paradigm for everything forbidden by the Torah, viz.: If (in the instance of) a Nazirite, whose prohibition (re wine) is not for all time, (but only for the period of his Naziritism), and whose prohibition does not extend to derivation of benefit (e.g., selling and healing), and whose prohibition is subject to release (by absolution of his Naziritism), the taste (of the forbidden substance) was regarded as the substance itself, then the other prohibitions in the Torah, whose prohibitions are for all time, and whose prohibition extends to derivation of benefit, and whose prohibition is not subject to release — how much more so should the taste (of the forbidden substance) be regarded as the substance itself! "and grapes": Why is this written?

It follows (logically) even without being stated, viz.: If he is liable for what issues from the fruit (i.e., wine), should he not be liable for the fruit itself! Rather, what is the intent of "wet" grapes"? To include (as forbidden) half-ripe grapes. You say "to include half-ripe grapes.

But perhaps its intent is to exclude dry grapes? (This cannot be) for "and dry" includes dry grapes. What, then, is the intent of "wet"? For (without the verse) it would follow (otherwise), viz.: He is liable for wine and he is liable for grapes. Just as wine is a finished fruit (i.e., product), so, grapes must be a finished product (and not half-ripe).

It is, therefore, written "wet" to include half-ripe grapes (as forbidden). Issi b. Yehudah says: What is the intent of "grapes wet and dry"? To impose liability for each in itself (i.e., eating "wet" and "dry" grapes together is regarded as two separate transgressions though one kind of fruit is eaten). (And this serves as a paradigm for all prohibitions in the Torah.) Let it be written "and dry grapes he shall not eat" (i.e., "wet" is understood from "grapes itself," and only "dry" need be written.)

If it were stated thus, all dried fruits would be understood (to be forbidden). "wet" and "dry" (in this context) implies what issues from the vine wet and then dried up.

(Bamidbar 6:4) "All the days of his Naziritism, of all that is made from the grape-vine, from the kernels to the husk, he shall not eat": Scripture hereby apprises us that if he ate an olive-size of all of them (kernel and husk combined), he receives forty lashes. And this serves as a paradigm for all of the prohibitions of the Torah, viz.: If (in the instance of) a Nazirite, whose prohibition (re wine) is not for all time, (but only for the period of his Naziritism), and whose prohibition does not extend to the derivation of benefit, and whose prohibition is subject to release (by absolution of his Naziritism), separate elements (in an injunction) combine with each other to (form the forbidden) olive-size, then the other prohibitions of the Torah, whose prohibitions are for all time, and whose prohibition extends to derivation of benefit, and whose prohibition is not subject to release — how much more so do they combine with each other to (form the forbidden) olive-size! "of all that is made from the grape-vine": I might think that leaves and sprouts, too, (are included); it is, therefore, written "from the kernels to the husk": Just as the specific instance is of fruit (kernel) and residue of fruit (husk), so, only these are included (in the prohibition), to exclude leaves and sprouts, (which do not satisfy these parameters).

R. Eliezer says: Leaves and sprouts are also subsumed in "of all that is made from the grape-vine." "from the chartzanim to the zag he shall not eat": The minimum (amount for transgression) — two kernels, one husk. These are the words of R. Eliezer b. Azaryah. Which are the chartzanim and which are the zagim? "chartzanim" are the outer, and "zagim" are the inner. These are the words of R. Yehudah.

R. Yossi says: So that you not err, (they are) like the bells ("zugim") of an animal: the outer (part) is the "zag"; the inner (the clapper) is the "inbal." "From the kernels to the husk he shall not eat": We are hereby apprised that "pained eating" (as in eating kernels and husk) does not free him from liability. For it would follow (otherwise), viz.: If for the graver — Yom Kippur — one is not liable for "pained eating," should this not be so for the lesser, Naziritism?

It is, therefore, written "From the kernels to the husk he shall not eat.": Why is this written" (i.e., it may be derived from the preceding verse, viz.:) "of all that is made of the grape-vine … he shall not eat" — general. "From wine and strong drink he shall separate himself. Vinegar of wine and vinegar of strong drink he shall not drink" — particular. (We have here an instance of) general-particular. (The rule is:) There is subsumed in the general only what is in the particular.

Just as the particular is "fruit (wine) and residue of fruit (vinegar)," so, I derive (as forbidden) anything which is "fruit and residue of fruit" — including kernels and husk, which satisfy that parameter! (Why, then is "from the kernels to the husk" needed?) — Perhaps, just as the particular is an "actual" fruit, so, I may derive only an "actual" fruit. — (No!) Which "actual" fruit has not been mentioned?

You must revert, then, to the original formulation, (and the question remains:) If I can derive it from the rule, why need "from the kernels to the husk" be stated? We are hereby taught that (in the instance of) a "general" which adds to the "particular," what is to be derived is not (of necessity) to be of the same nature as the "particular" to remove it from the "general" (formulation) unless Scripture indicates it specifically, as it does in the instance of the Nazirite.

(Bamidbar 6:5) "All the days of the vow of his Naziritism (a blade shall not pass over his head."): Scripture now leaves the subject of wine and comes to speak of shaving. "All the days of the vow of his Naziritism": His vow (i.e., his offerings) is contingent upon his Naziritism (i.e., If he vows to be a Nazirite, then after his (period of) Naziritism he must bring his offerings), and his Naziritism is not contingent upon his vow (i.e., If he vows to bring the offering, he need not become a Nazirite.) "a blade shall not pass over his head": to equate the shaver with the shaved one (i.e., one who shaves him is liable, as is the shaved one himself). "a blade shall not pass over his head": This tells me only of a blade.

Whence do I derive that he also receives forty lashes for tearing, plucking, and trimming? From "holy shall he be," in any event. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. R. Yonathan says: Scripture speaks (only) of a blade.

If he tore, plucked, or trimmed, he does not receive stripes. "until the fulfillment of the days of his Naziritism to the L-rd": Whence is it derived that if one vows to be a Nazirite without qualifying (for how long), he shaves on the thirty-first day, and if he shaved on the thirtieth day he has fulfilled his obligations? From "until the fulfillment of the day of his Naziritism to the L-rd" — and they have been fulfilled.

I might think that even if he vowed a one hundred day Naziritism and he shaved on the thirty-first day he has fulfilled his obligation; it is, therefore, written "until the fulfillment of his days," and he has not yet fulfilled them. This tells me (only) of one whose (period of) Naziritism is limited. Whence do I derive (the same for) one who vowed "eternal" Naziritism (i.e., that he must be a Nazirite all of his days)?

From "all the days of the vow of his Naziritism … holy shall he be." "holy shall he be": You say that this refers to holiness of (i.e., not shaving) the hair. But perhaps it refers to the holiness of the body (i.e., not to become defiled by the dead). (This is not so, for) (Ibid. 8) "He is holy to the L-rd" speaks of holiness of the body. How, then, am I to understand "holy shall he be"? As referring to holiness of the hair, "holy shall he be": What is the intent of this?

Because it is written (Ibid. 18) "And the Nazirite shall shave at the door of the tent of meeting," I would think that only the hair of one who shaves as prescribed is forbidden and imposes constraints. How would I know (that the same applies) if vandals shaved him? From "holy shall he be" — in any event. R. Yossi says: Why is it written "holy shall he be"?

Because it is written "he shall let grow the locks of the hair of his head," I might think (that Naziritism obtains only) with one who has hair. Whence do I derive (that it also obtains) with one who does not have hair? From "holy shall he be" — in any event. R. Yonathan says: It is not needed (for the above), for it is written (Ibid. 7) "for the crown of his G-d is on his head" — whether or not he has hair.

What, then, is the intent of "holy shall he be"? As we stated above (in respect to "eternal" Naziritism). Unqualified Naziritism is thirty days, it being written "holy shall he be ("yiheyeh"): The numerical equivalent of "yiheyeh" is thirty. "he shall let grow the locks of the hair of his head." Why is this written? (i.e., it is already written "a blade shall not pass over his head.")

It is written (of a leper, Vayikra 14:9) "And it shall be on the seventh day that he shall shave all of his hair." This implies even a Nazirite (leper). And how would I understand "he shall let grow the locks of the hair of his head"? As applying to other Nazirites, excluding the leper.

Or, perhaps, even a Nazirite (leper). It is, therefore, written "he shall let grow the locks ('pera') of the hair of his head." From here you learn of the leper, of whom it is written (Vayikra 13:45) "And his head shall be parua" that "parua" means "grown long." You say it means that, but perhaps it is to be taken literally (as meaning "uncovered.")

You, therefore, reason as follows: It is written here (in respect to a leper) "parua," and elsewhere, (in respect to a Nazirite) "parua" (i.e., "pera," like "parua"). Just as there (re Nazirite), "parua" means growing the hair, so, "parua" here (re leper) means growing the hair. "All the days of the vow of his Naziritism (a blade shall not pass over his head."): (A Nazirite who shaved his head at the end of his period of Naziritism [before he brought the offering, etc.] is liable,) it being written "All the days of the vow of his Naziritism a blade shall not pass over his head" — to include the days after the termination of his period of Naziritism before the bringing of his offering (as in the above-cited instance) as equivalent (for liability) to the days in the midst of his Naziritism. — But perhaps he is liable (for shaving his head) only if he does so before he completes his period of Naziritism! — (No,) it follows (that this is not so,) viz.: Since he is forbidden to drink wine and he is forbidden to shave, if I have learned about wine that the days after the termination of his period of Naziritism before the bringing of his offering were equated with the days in the midst of the period of his Naziritism, the same must be true of shaving.

And, furthermore, this follows a fortiori, viz.: If re wine, the drinking of which does not void (the count of his preceding Nazirite days), the days after his Nazirite period before the bringing of his offering were equated (for liability) with the days in the midst of his Nazirite period, then re shaving, which does void (the Nazirite count), how much more so should this be true! — (No,) this may be true of the drinking of wine, where no act in its category (the drinking of wine by a Nazirite) was permitted — wherefore the days after his Nazirite period before the bringing of the offering were equated with the days in the midst of his Nazirite period — but would you say the same for shaving, where an act in its category (the shaving of a Nazirite leper on the seventh day) was permitted — wherefore we would say that the days after his Nazirite period before the bringing of the offering were not equated with the days in the midst of his Nazirite period! — (No!) This is refuted by the instance of tumah (a Nazir's defiling himself with a dead body), where though there is an act in its category which is permitted (i.e., a Nazir's defiling himself for a meth mitzvah [one who has no kin to bury him]), still the days after his Nazirite period before the bringing of the offering were equated with the days in the midst of his Nazirite period!

And this would indicate about shaving, that even though there is an act in its category which is permitted, still, the days after the Nazirite period before the bringing of the offering are to be equated with the days in the midst of the Nazirite period. — No, this may be true of tumah, which voids the whole (previous) count, which is not so with shaving, which does not void the whole. I have not succeeded (in proving the equality) with my a fortiori argument.

It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 20) "and thereafter (i.e., after bringing the offering), the Nazirite may drink wine." Now may a Nazirite drink wine? But (the idea is that) it (the word "Nazirite") is "extra" to signal a gezeirah shavah (identity), viz.: it is written here (in respect to shaving [6:5]) "nazir," and it is written elsewhere (20) "nazir" (in respect to the drinking of wine). Just as with (the "extra") "nazir" there, the days after his Nazirite period before the bringing of the offering are equated with the days in the midst of the Nazirite period, so, with shaving. (6:5) "He shall let grow the locks of the hair of his head."

Why is this written? (i.e., it is already written [Ibid.] "a blade shall not pass over his head until the fulfillment of the days when he is a Nazirite to the L-rd.") From "until the fulfillment of the days," I would think that this ("fulfillment") is satisfied by a minimum of two days; it is, therefore, written "He shall let grow the hair of the locks of his head." How long does this take? Not less than thirty days.

But (if he said: I will be a Nazirite) a month and above — even a month and one day or a month and two days, (he is a Nazirite for any period superadded.)

(Bamidbar 6:6) "All the days of his Naziritism to the L-rd, upon the soul of a dead one he shall not come." Scripture now leaves the subject of shaving and comes to speak of tumah. "upon the soul … he shall not come": I might think that even beasts are herein subsumed, as in (Vayikra 24:18) "One who strikes the soul of a beast, etc."; it is, therefore, written: "upon the soul of a dead one he shall not come," Scripture referring to a human being.

R. Yishmael says: This (proof) is not needed, for it is written "he shall not come." Scripture is speaking of a (dead) soul that confers tumah by entry (into his tent, [i.e., the soul of a man, and not that of a beast]). (6:7) "For his father and his mother … he shall not become tamei" — but he does become tamei for a meth-mitzvah (one who has no one to bury him). Why need this be stated? It is understood a fortiori, viz.: If the high-priest, whose holiness is permanent, becomes tamei for a meth-mitzvah, how much more so, a Nazirite, whose holiness is temporary! — No, this may be true of a high-priest, who does not bring an offering for his uncleanliness — wherefore he becomes tamei for a meth-mitzvah, as opposed to a Nazirite, who does bring an offering for his uncleanliness — wherefore he should not become tamei for a meth-mitzvah!

It must, therefore, be written "For his father and his mother he shall not become tamei" — but he does become tamei for a meth-mitzvah. — But perhaps the intent of the verse is: "For his father and his mother … he shall not become tamei," but he does become for other dead! — Would you say such a thing? If an ordinary Cohein, who does become tamei for his kin, may not become tamei for other dead, how much more so a Nazirite, who may not become tamei for his kin!

What, then, is the intent of "For his father and his mother … he shall not become tamei? He does not become tamei for his father and his mother, but he does become tamei for a meth-mitzvah. — But even without this verse, I can derive it by reasoning, viz.: There is a general rule for a high-priest (Vayikra 21:11: "And upon all souls of the dead he shall not come"), and there is a general rule for a Nazirite ("Upon the soul of a dead one he shall not come.")

Just as with the general rule for the high-priest, he may not become tamei for kin, so with the general rule for the Nazirite, he may not become tamei for kin. You derive it from the high-priest, but I can derive it from an ordinary priest, viz.: There is a general rule for an ordinary priest and there is a general rule for a Nazirite. Just as with the general rule for the ordinary priest he does become tamei for kin, so, with the general rule for the Nazirite, he should become tamei for kin.

It must, therefore, be written "For his father and his mother; for his brother and for his sister, he shall not become tamei, etc." R. Akiva says (on Vayikra 21:11): "souls" — these are the distant (i.e., non-kin); "the dead" — these are kin; "for his (the high-priest's) father and his mother" — For his father and his mother he does not become tamei, but he does become tamei for a meth-mitzvah. (Bamidbar 6:7) "for his brother": If he were a high-priest or a Nazirite, he may not become tamei, but he does become tamei for a meth-mitzvah. "and for his sister": What is the intent of this?

If one (an ordinary Cohein) were going to slaughter his Paschal lamb or to circumcise his son, and he hears that one of his kin had died, I might think that he should become tamei for them; it is, therefore, written (Ibid.) "he shall not become tamei." I might think that he should (also) not become tamei for a meth-mitzvah; it is, therefore, written "and for his sister" — He does not become tamei for his sister, but he does become tamei for a meth-mitzvah.

But (a verse) is not needed for his (young) son and daughter; for minors cannot become Nazirites. "he shall not become tamei for them in their death": In their death he does not become tamei for them, but he does become tamei for them in their leprous or zivah (genital discharge) state. This tells me only of a Nazirite. Whence do I derive (the same for) a high-priest? It is written in respect to a high-priest (Vayikra 21:11) "for his mother (he shall not) become tamei."

This is superfluous, for I can derive it a fortiori, viz.: If in an instance where an ordinary Cohein may become tamei for his father's brother, a high-priest may not become tamei for his father, then in an instance where an ordinary Cohein may not become tamei for his father's brother, how much more so may a high-priest not become tamei for his father! If I can derive it, then, a fortiori, why is the verse "for his mother, etc." needed in respect to a high-priest?

It is "extra," to the end of formulating an identity (gezeirah shavah), viz.: It is written "his mother" here (in respect to a high-priest), and it is written "his mother" elsewhere (in respect to a Nazirite). Just as there he does become tamei (for them) in their leprous or zivah state, so, here. Variantly: "He shall not become tamei for them in their death": In their death he may not become tamei for them, but he may stand at their eulogy and in the mourner's row. (Bamidbar, Ibid.) "for the crown of his G-d is on his head": whether or not he has hair. These are the words of R. Yonathan.