Swearing to Harm or to Benefit and the Boundary Around Sacred Duty

Yalkut Shimoni on Torah 471:10

One might think that one who swore to nullify a commandment and did not nullify it should be liable; Scripture says "to do evil or to do good" (Leviticus 5:4) - just as doing good is optional, so doing evil is optional. I therefore exclude one who swore to nullify a commandment and did not nullify it, who is exempt. One might think one who swore to fulfill a commandment and did not fulfill it should be liable; Scripture says "to do evil or to do good" - just as doing evil is optional, so doing good is optional. One might think one who swore to harm himself and did not is exempt; Scripture says "to do evil or to do good" - just as good is optional, so evil is optional; so I include one who swore to harm himself, for the matter is within his power. One might think one who swore to harm others and did not should be liable; Scripture says "to do evil or to do good" - I exclude one who swore to harm others, for that is not within his power. From where do we include benefiting others? Scripture says "or to do good." And what is harming others? "I will strike so-and-so and split his skull." From what do we know the verses are written about an optional matter, and not perhaps about a matter of commandment? It cannot enter your mind, for he compares harm to benefit and benefit to harm: just as benefiting is not the nullifying of a commandment, so harming is not the nullifying of a commandment - for harming is itself a kind of benefit; and just as harming is not the keeping of a commandment, so benefiting is not the keeping of a commandment - for benefiting is itself a kind of harm. As for Rabbi Yoshiya, he holds like Rabbi Akiva, who expounds by inclusion and limitation.

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