Judging the Stoned Ox in Its Presence and the Question of Intent

"The ox shall be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death" (Exodus 21:29). Our Rabbis taught: an ox that killed if before its verdict was rendered the guardian returned it to its owner, it is considered returned; if after its verdict was rendered he returned it, it is not considered returned. The Rabbis hold that one does not render its verdict except in its presence, for the owner could say: had you returned it to me, I would have led it off to the marsh, but now you have handed my ox over into a power against which I cannot plead its case in court. And Rabbi Yaakov holds that one does render its verdict even in its absence. The reason of the Rabbis: "the ox shall be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death" as the death of the owner, so the death of the ox; just as the owner is judged in his presence, so the ox in its presence. And Rabbi Yaakov holds: granted the owner can plead, but is the ox a creature that can plead? If it intended to kill an animal and killed a man, it is exempt. But if it intended to kill this one and killed that one, it is liable. The Mishnah does not accord with Rabbi Shimon, for it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says, even if it intended to kill this one and killed that one, it is exempt. What is Rabbi Shimon's reason? As it is written, "the ox shall be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death" as the death of the owner, so the death of the ox; just as the owner is liable only when he intends, so too the ox the verse says, "and it lay in wait for him" until it intends him specifically.