It is taught in another source: "whether it gores a son or gores a daughter" comes to make one liable for minors as for adults. But could this not be derived by logic? Since a person is liable for harm done to a person, and an ox is liable for harm done to a person, just as when a person is liable for a person you did not distinguish between minors and adults, so too when an ox is liable for a person you should not distinguish between minors and adults. And furthermore, it is an a fortiori argument: if regarding a person harming a person, where you did not equate minors with adults [in all respects], he is nevertheless liable for minors as for adults, then regarding an ox harming a person, where you did equate minors with adults, is it not logical that he is liable for minors as for adults? No: if you said so regarding a person harming a person, who is liable for four things, would you say so regarding an ox harming a person, which is not liable for four things? Scripture teaches, saying, "whether it gores a son," to make one liable for minors as for adults. I would know only of a forewarned ox; from where do I derive a tame ox? It is logical: since the owner is liable regarding a man and a woman, and liable regarding a son and a daughter, just as when liable regarding a man and a woman you did not distinguish between tame and forewarned, so too when liable regarding a son and a daughter you should not distinguish between tame and forewarned. And furthermore an a fortiori argument: if regarding a man and a woman, whose claim for damages is weaker, you did not distinguish between tame and forewarned, then regarding a son and a daughter, whose claim for damages is stronger, is it not logical that you should not distinguish between tame and forewarned? You said: but do we reason from the lenient to the stringent in order to be stringent upon it? If the Torah was stringent regarding the forewarned, the stringent case, shall we be stringent regarding the tame, the lenient case? And furthermore, if you said so regarding a man and a woman, who are obligated in the commandments, would you say so regarding a son and a daughter, who are exempt from the commandments? Scripture teaches, saying, "whether it gores a son or gores a daughter": goring for the tame, goring for the forewarned; goring for death, goring for damages. Our Rabbis taught: "according to this judgment it shall be done to him," just as the law of an ox goring an ox, so is the law of an ox goring a person; just as an ox goring an ox, when tame, pays half damages, and when forewarned pays full damages, so too an ox goring a person, when tame, pays half damages, and when forewarned pays full damages. Rabbi Akiva says: "according to this judgment" means like the lower case and not like the upper case. One might think he pays from the best of his property; Scripture teaches, saying, "it shall be done to him": he pays from the ox's body and does not pay from the best of his property. And the Rabbis, why do they need this "it shall be done to him"? To exempt him from the four things. And Rabbi Akiva derives this from "a man against his fellow" (Leviticus 24:19), and not an ox against his fellow. And the Rabbis: from that verse I might have said only pain, but for healing and loss of work I might say they are like damage and should be given to him; therefore it teaches us this.
Goring Children Like Adults and the Tame and Forewarned Ox
Yalkut Shimoni on Torah 341:3
תַּנְיָא אִידָךְ, אוֹ בֵן יִגָּח אוֹ בַת יִגָּח, לְחַיֵּב עַל הַקְּטַנִּים כַּגְּדוֹלִים. וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא, הוֹאִיל וְחַיָּב אָדָם בְּאָדָם וְחַיָּב שׁוֹר בְּאָדָם, מַה כְּשֶׁחַיָּב אָדָם בְּאָדָם לֹא חִלַּקְתָּ בּוֹ בֵּין קְטַנִּים לִגְדוֹלִים, אַף כְּשֶׁחַיָּב שׁוֹר בְּאָדָם לֹא תַּחֲלֹק בּוֹ בֵּין קְטַנִּים לִגְדוֹלִים. וְעוֹד, קַל וָחֹמֶר הוּא, וּמָה אָדָם בְּאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה בּוֹ קְטַנִּים כִּגְדוֹלִים חַיָּב בּוֹ עַל הַקְּטַנִּים כַּגְּדוֹלִים. שׁוֹר בְּאָדָם שֶׁעָשָׂה בּוֹ קְטַנִּים כִּגְדוֹלִים אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁחַיָּב עַל הַקְּטַנִּים כַּגְּדוֹלִים. לֹא אִם אָמַרְתָּ אָדָם בְּאָדָם שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים, תֹּאמַר בְּשׁוֹר בְּאָדָם שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר אוֹ בֵן יִגָּח, לְחַיֵּב עַל הַקְּטַנִּים כַּגְּדוֹלִים. אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בְּמוּעָד, בְּתָם מִנָּיִן, וְדִין הוּא, הוֹאִיל וְחַיָּב בְּאִישׁ וּבְאִשָּׁה וְחַיָּב בְּבֵן וּבַת, מַה כְּשֶׁחַיָּב בְּאִישׁ וּבְאִשָּׁה לֹא חִלַּקְתָּ בּוֹ בֵּין תָּם לְמוּעָד, אַף כְּשֶׁחַיָּב בְּבֵן וּבְבַת לֹא תַּחֲלֹק בּוֹ בֵּין תָּם לְמוּעָד. וְעוֹד קַל וָחֹמֶר, וּמָה אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה שֶׁהוּרַע כֹּחָן בְּנִזְקֵיהֶן לֹא חִלַּקְתָּ בָּהֶן בֵּין תָּם לְמוּעָד, בֵּן וּבַת שֶׁיָּפֶה כֹּחָן בְּנִזְקֵיהֶן אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁלֹּא תַּחֲלֹק בָּהֶן בֵּין תָּם לְמוּעָד. אָמַרְתָּ, וְכִי דָנִין (קַל וָחֹמֶר) [קַל] מֵחָמוּר לְהַחְמִיר עָלָיו, אִם הֶחְמִיר בְּמוּעָד הֶחָמוּר נַחְמִיר בְּתָם הַקָּל. וְעוֹד, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּאִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּבִין בְּמִצְוֹת, תֹּאמַר בְּבֵן וּבַת שֶׁפְּטוּרִין מִן הַמִּצְוֹת. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר אוֹ בֵן יִגָּח אוֹ בַת יִגָּח, נְגִיחָה לְתָם נְגִיחָה לְמוּעָד, נְגִיחָה לְמִיתָה נְגִיחָה לִנְזִיקִין. תָּנוּ רַבָּנָן, כַּמִּשְׁפָּט הַזֶּה יֵעָשֶׂה לּוֹ, כְּמִשְׁפַּט שׁוֹר בְּשׁוֹר כָּךְ מִשְׁפַּט שׁוֹר בְּאָדָם, מַה שּׁוֹר בְּשׁוֹר תָּם מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֵזֶק וּמוּעָד מְשַׁלֵּם נֵזֶק שָׁלֵם, אַף שׁוֹר בְּאָדָם תָּם מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֵזֶק וּמוּעָד מְשַׁלֵּם נֵזֶק שָׁלֵם. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, כַּמִּשְׁפָּט הַזֶּה, כַּתַּחְתּוֹן וְלֹא כָּעֶלְיוֹן, יָכוֹל יְשַׁלֵּם לוֹ מִן הָעֲלִיָּה. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר יֵעָשֶׂה לּוֹ, מִגּוּפוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם מִן הָעֲלִיָּה. וְרַבָּנָן, הַאי זֶה לָמָּה לִי, לְפוֹטְרוֹ מֵאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מֵ"אִישׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ" וְלֹא שׁוֹר בַּעֲמִיתוֹ. וְרַבָּנָן, אִי מֵהַהִיא הֲוָה אֲמִינָא צַעַר לְחוּדֵיהּ, אֲבָל רִפּוּי וְשֶׁבֶת אֵימָא כִּי נֵזֶק דָּמֵי וְנֵיתִיב לֵיהּ. קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.