When the Priest Himself Misuses the Sacred Offering

Yalkut Shimoni on Torah 478:1

Concerning robbery it is written, "and he shall add its fifths to it" (Leviticus 5:24), and we have learned in the Mishnah: If he gave him the principal and then swore falsely about the fifth, he keeps adding a fifth upon the fifth until the principal is reduced to less than the value of a peruta. Concerning heave-offering it is written, "And if a man eat of the holy thing in error, then he shall add its fifth to it" (Leviticus 22:14), and we have learned: One who eats heave-offering inadvertently pays the principal and a fifth — whether he eats, drinks, or anoints with it, whether the heave-offering is pure or impure, he pays the fifth and a fifth of the fifth. Concerning tithe, it is neither written nor taught, and we have no need to inquire about it. Concerning consecrated property it is written, "and he shall add a fifth of the silver of your valuation" (Leviticus 5:16) — just as the silver of the valuation requires adding a fifth, so too the silver of the fifth itself requires adding a fifth. "And he shall give it" — this excludes the five sin-offerings that are left to die, which are not subject to the law of trespass. "And he shall give it to the priest, and the priest" — what does this teach? Since you might think that because the trespass-procedure comes about through the priest, the priest himself would not be subject to the law of trespass, Scripture teaches "and he shall give it to the priest, and the priest," teaching that the priest too can commit trespass. "And the priest shall make atonement for him" — what does this teach? From where do you say that if he brought his trespass-payment but did not bring his guilt-offering, he has not fulfilled his obligation? Scripture teaches "with the ram of the guilt-offering." If he brought his guilt-offering but did not bring his trespass-payment, he has not fulfilled his obligation; Scripture teaches "with the ram of the guilt-offering." I might think that just as the ram of the guilt-offering is indispensable, so too the fifth is indispensable; Scripture teaches "with the ram of the guilt-offering, and it shall be forgiven him" — the ram of the guilt-offering is indispensable, but the fifth is not indispensable. "And it shall be forgiven him" — teaching that they do not defer his atonement to the Day of Atonement. I might think this is so even though he repented but did not bring the offering; Scripture teaches "him." "And if" (Leviticus 5:17) — this adds to the previous matter, to say that a doubtful case of trespass brings a suspensive guilt-offering; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. And Rabbi Akiva concedes that he does not bring his trespass-payment until the matter becomes certain to him, and then he brings a definite guilt-offering. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: Why should this one bring two guilt-offerings? Rather let him bring the trespass-payment and its fifth, and bring one guilt-offering worth two selas, and declare: "If I certainly committed trespass, this is my trespass-payment and this is my guilt-offering; and if it is in doubt, the money is a freewill gift and the offering is a suspensive guilt-offering" — for from the same kind he brings for a known matter he brings for an unknown one. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Your words seem right in a small trespass. But consider one before whom comes a doubtful trespass worth a hundred manehs — is it not better that he bring a guilt-offering worth two selas and not bring a doubtful trespass-payment of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiva concedes to Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a small trespass. Our Rabbis taught: "And if a soul" — to render one liable to a suspensive guilt-offering for a doubtful trespass; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. And the Sages exempt. The reasoning of the Sages is that they derive "commandments" "commandments" from the sin-offering for forbidden fat: just as there it concerns a matter for whose deliberate violation one incurs excision and for whose inadvertent violation one brings a sin-offering and for whose doubtful case one brings a suspensive guilt-offering, this excludes trespass, for whose deliberate violation one does not incur excision. For it is taught: If one deliberately committed trespass — Rabbi says he is liable to death at the hands of Heaven, and the Sages say he is under a warning. And Rabbi Akiva holds that when we derive "commandments" from the sin-offering of forbidden fat, we derive only this: just as there it concerns a fixed offering, so here a fixed offering, excluding the sliding-scale offering. This is Rabbi Akiva's reasoning, for the verse says "And if a soul" — the connecting letter adds to the previous matter, and the upper case learns from the lower. The Sages hold that it is the lower case that learns from the upper — that the guilt-offering is valued in silver shekels — and Rabbi Akiva holds there is no partial analogy. The Sages say the words "commandments" "commandments" remove it from the analogy. And from where does Rabbi Akiva learn that the guilt-offering is valued in silver shekels? He learns it from "this is the law of the guilt-offering" (Leviticus 7:1). (This is written in remez 492.) "And she has done one" (Leviticus 5:17) — to render one liable for each and every instance: that if there came before him a doubt of forbidden fat, a doubt of blood, of leftover, and of refuse-sacrifice, in a single lapse, he is liable for each one. If forbidden fat and permitted fat were before him and he ate one of them and does not know which he ate; if his wife and his sister were with him in the house and he sinned inadvertently with one of them and does not know with which he sinned; if it was the Sabbath and a weekday and he did labor on one of them at twilight and does not know on which he did it — from where do we know he brings a suspensive guilt-offering? Scripture teaches "And if a soul sin and do one of all the commandments of the LORD which ought not to be done, though he knew it not, yet is he guilty and shall bear his iniquity, and he shall bring a ram" (Leviticus 5:17–18). Rabbi Yehuda says: His wife was menstruant and his sister was in the house, and he sinned inadvertently with one of them and does not know with which; or it was the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement and he did labor at twilight and does not know on which; or forbidden fat and leftover were before him and he ate one of them and does not know which he ate — Rabbi Eliezer renders him liable to a sin-offering and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him. As it says "if a soul sin" — "though he knew it not" excludes one who knew that he sinned. Rabbi Shimon says: This very one brings a suspensive guilt-offering, as it says "if a soul sin" and "she has done" and "though he knew it not" — he did something and does not know what he did. But where it is doubtful whether he acted at all — go out and seek from where he brings a suspensive guilt-offering. "Though he knew it not" excludes a known matter. I might think that the unknown matter of light sins and the unknown matter of grave sins are all included; if I exempted their known matter, is it not logical that I should exempt the unknown? Or the reverse: if I rendered liable their unknown matter, is it not logical that I should render liable the known? And which known matter did I exempt? The known matter of grave sins, which went out to be judged by a sin-offering. And is it not a logical inference: in a place where Scripture rendered the known matter of grave sins liable to a sin-offering it exempted their unknown matter from the sin-offering; in a place where it exempted the known matter of light sins from the guilt-offering, is it not logical that it should exempt their unknown matter from the guilt-offering? Or the reverse: in a place where it exempted the unknown matter of grave sins from the sin-offering it rendered their known matter liable to a sin-offering; in a place where it rendered the unknown matter of light sins liable to a guilt-offering, is it not logical that it should render their known matter liable to a guilt-offering? Therefore Scripture teaches "guilt" "guilt" for a verbal analogy: just as the "guilt" stated elsewhere concerns a matter whose deliberate violation incurs excision and whose inadvertent violation a sin-offering and whose doubtful case a suspensive guilt-offering, so the "guilt" stated here concerns such a matter.

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