Shimon ben Shetach Hanged Eighty Women in Ashkelon in One Day
The sages remembered the day Shimon ben Shetach broke the rules of capital procedure in Ashkelon, and why they kept the memory alive instead of burying it.
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Rabbi Eliezer asked the question nobody in the court wanted to answer: did Shimon ben Shetach not hang women in Ashkelon?
The answer, preserved in Sifrei Devarim 221:2, the tannaitic midrash on Deuteronomy shaped in the early centuries of the Common Era, is yes. He hanged eighty women in one day. That should have been procedurally impossible. Capital cases were not supposed to be stacked together. The ordinary rules that protected defendants in capital proceedings, the slow process of investigation and testimony and deliberation designed to make execution rare, were compressed or bypassed entirely. The sages offer one sentence from Psalms (119:126): it was a time to act for God, because Torah was being violated.
That sentence carries the full weight of the case. Emergency measure. Exceptional circumstances. One verse that unlocks every other safeguard.
Ashkelon Became a Broken Hour
The rabbinic term kishuf, sorcery, is treated in these texts not as superstition but as a covenantal violation, a practice that draws human attention away from God and toward hidden manipulation of forces that belong to God alone. Ashkelon, in this account, had become a place where that practice was public enough and organized enough that ordinary judicial process could not address it without delay becoming consent.
The tradition does not tell us exactly what the women were doing. It tells us what Shimon ben Shetach decided and what verse he used to justify it. The text preserves the exception in enough detail that future judges would know what kind of crisis warranted it. Without the record, later authorities could use the precedent without understanding its limits. With the record, they can see that even this extreme measure was tied to a specific covenantal emergency and a specific scriptural justification.
Two Men Died on the Same Day in the Same City
The second Ashkelon tradition from Simeon ben Shetach, the Publican, and the Witches of Ashkelon involves a great sage and a corrupt tax collector who died on the same day in the same city. Their funeral processions met in a narrow street. Enemies attacked the mourners of the sage and scattered the crowd. One loyal disciple stayed by his master's body. When people returned to complete the burial in the resulting confusion, they buried the tax collector in the sage's tomb with full honors. The sage's body was thrown into the common grave.
The community was disturbed by this reversal. A righteous man buried without honor, a sinner buried in state, in the city that had already seen one extreme act of justice. The story asks what human communities owe to the dead and what the dead owe to human communities in the logic of divine accounting. The tradition does not resolve the injustice in this world. It defers the resolution to the world where it can be properly addressed.
The Memory Was Not Buried With the Case
What makes the Ashkelon material unusual is not the extremity of the action but the fact that the sages kept it in the canon at all. They could have let it fade. Legal exceptions, once exploited, become precedents for further exceptions. The way to contain that danger is silence.
They chose memory instead. They preserved Rabbi Eliezer's question because the question itself is the check on future misuse. By keeping the story of what Shimon ben Shetach did, they made it necessary for any future judge who wanted to use the same justification to engage with the specific facts of Ashkelon, to explain why their situation resembled it closely enough to invoke it. The memory of the exception is the protection against its casual reuse.
The Line Between Emergency and Habit
Jewish law has always recognized that there are moments when the normal operation of the law must be suspended for the law to survive. But those moments are precisely described and surrounded with constraints because the same reasoning that justifies an emergency measure can justify any measure if the constraint of genuine emergency is removed. Shimon ben Shetach's case remains in the tradition as a memorial of the line between exception and habit, between a broken hour and a broken system.
The city of Ashkelon appears elsewhere in rabbinic memory as a complicated place, neither fully Jewish nor fully pagan in its social geography, a location where Hellenistic culture and Jewish practice overlapped in ways that created ongoing anxieties about where Jewish communal boundaries lay. Placing the kishuf incident there rather than in a more clearly Jewish city gives the story its particular edge. The problem was not simply that women were practicing sorcery. It was that the covenantal community was permeable enough in that place that the practice had become organized and public. That permeability is what the emergency measure addressed.
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