The Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael derives a precise set of liability rules from the verse "and he send his beast" (Exodus 22:4), establishing who is responsible when an animal causes damage to another person's property. The ruling distinguishes between those who can be trusted with responsibility and those who cannot.
The rabbis ruled that if a person entrusts his sheep to his son, his messenger, or his servant, and the animal subsequently causes damage, the owner is not liable. The logic is straightforward: by handing the animal to a competent person, the owner has transferred responsibility. The son, messenger, or servant is now the custodian, and whatever happens under their watch is their concern, not the original owner's.
But there is an exception that cuts sharply in the other direction. If the owner gave the animal to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, the owner remains fully liable for any damage the animal causes. These three categories of people, known in rabbinic law as cheresh, shoteh, and katan, are considered legally incompetent. They cannot bear responsibility because they lack the mental capacity or legal standing to serve as proper custodians.
This distinction became foundational in Jewish tort law. The principle extends far beyond animal damage. Throughout the Mishnah (the earliest code of rabbinic law) and Talmud, the categories of cheresh, shoteh, and katan appear whenever the rabbis need to define who can and cannot serve as a responsible agent. The Mekhilta's teaching here establishes a core principle: you cannot escape liability by entrusting a dangerous situation to someone incapable of managing it. Delegating responsibility only works when the delegate is competent. Hand your animal to your adult son, and you are free. Hand it to a child, and the damage is still on you.