The wicked kingdom once sent two officers to the sages of Israel with a curious assignment: teach us your Torah. The manuscript was put into their hands, and three times over they read it through — carefully, the way an auditor reads a ledger.
When they were ready to leave, they returned the scroll and said, "We have studied your Torah thoroughly. We find it equitable, save in one particular."
The particular was this: "When the ox of an Israelite gores to death the ox of a stranger, the owner is not liable. But when the ox of a stranger gores an Israelite's ox, the owner pays in full — even if it is the first or second goring, not only the third." (See Exodus 21:35.)
The officers read the law as unjust, reading the Hebrew word re'ehu, "his neighbor," as if it applied only within Israel and not to outsiders. The sages' answer — which the tradition preserves — is that God's law means exactly what it says, and that when they admitted they found one "particular" troubling, the Roman officers themselves testified to the justice of the rest.
The sages took a small comfort from this: even Rome, studying the Torah carefully, could find only one seam to complain about, and even that complaint rested on a misreading.
(From the 1901 Hebraic Literature anthology, drawing on Bava Kamma 38a.)