The Torah explicitly states the father's rights regarding the seduced daughter. But what about a daughter who was raped rather than seduced? Does the father have the same power to approve or block the marriage with the rapist?
The Mekhilta derives the answer through analogy. A raped woman is under her father's jurisdiction, and a seduced woman is under her father's jurisdiction. If we have established for the seduced woman that the father can consent to or refuse the marriage, the same must apply to the raped woman.
The parallel is exact: both women remain under their father's authority. Both cases involve a financial penalty paid to the father. If the father's consent is required in the less severe case (seduction), it should certainly be required in the more severe case (rape).
This ruling is significant because the Torah's explicit discussion of the rapist in (Deuteronomy 22:29) says "he shall take her as a wife" without mentioning the father's consent. Read in isolation, that verse might suggest the rapist must marry the victim regardless of anyone's wishes. The Mekhilta's analogy from the seduction law corrects this reading: the father retains veto power even over a rapist's marriage. No man — whether seducer or rapist — can force a marriage over the father's objection. Parental authority stands as a permanent barrier against the perpetrator's access to the victim.