When a Master Who Strikes a Slave Is Avenged by the Sword

"And if a man strikes his slave or his maidservant" (Exodus 21:20). One might think Scripture speaks of the Hebrew slave and maidservant; therefore it says "slave and maidservant," a slave and maidservant whose law is the same for both, excluding the Hebrew slave and maidservant, whose law is not the same for both, the words of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: behold, it says, "for he is his money" (Exodus 21:21), excluding the Hebrew slave and maidservant, in whom he has no money. "And if a man strikes." From this I know only of a man; how do I include a woman? Scripture says, "he shall surely be avenged," whether man or woman. Then why does it say "a man"? To exclude a minor. "With a rod." From this I know only of a rod; how do I include any object? Scripture says, "he shall surely be avenged," with any object. [Then what does "with a rod" teach? To tell you: with a rod is the case subject to the law of "a day or two days"; but if he struck him with a knife or sword or the like and they assessed him as likely to die, it is not subject to the law of "a day or two days"; rather, even if he dies after a year, the master is executed for him.] "And he dies under his hand." What need have I of this, since even if he dies after ten hours the master is liable? What then does "and he dies under his hand" teach? If it does not apply to the matter of death, apply it to the matter of acquisition. From here you say: one who tells his fellow, "this slave is sold to you after thirty days," Rabbi Eliezer says both are liable under the law of "a day or two days," this one because the slave is not his, and that one because the slave is not yet in his domain. "He shall surely be avenged." Vengeance is stated here and vengeance is stated elsewhere, "and I will bring upon you a sword that avenges" (Leviticus 26:25): just as there it is the sword, so here it is by the sword. One might think he made a blow not sufficient to kill as though it were a blow sufficient to kill; and it would follow logically: he is liable for the slave and liable for the free man, just as for the free man only if the blow was sufficient to kill, so for the slave only if the blow was sufficient to kill.