The Torah specifies that a goring ox is put to death by stoning. But what about an ox that kills by biting, kicking, or trampling rather than goring? Are all forms of animal-inflicted death treated the same way?
The Mekhilta says yes, and derives this through parallel reasoning. Both a mued (a habitual gorer that has been warned) and a tam (an animal goring for the first time) are put to death by stoning when they kill a person. If we have established for the mued that all types of killing — not just goring — are treated equivalently, then the same must be true for the tam.
The logic is: goring is just one way an animal can kill. The Torah uses "gore" as its paradigmatic example, but the underlying principle is that any lethal violence by an animal triggers the same legal consequences. Stoning applies whether the ox used its horns, its hooves, or its teeth.
This ruling prevented a dangerous loophole. Without it, an owner could argue that his animal was technically not a "gorer" because it killed by kicking rather than goring. The death would go unpunished, and the animal would remain alive and dangerous. By equating all forms of animal-inflicted death with goring, the Mekhilta ensured that the species of violence was irrelevant. What matters is the result: a human being died because of an animal. That is enough.