Yalkut Shimoni on Torah Reader

"And if it gores" (Exodus 21:35) - included in striking are goring, shoving, lying down upon, kicking, and biting; the words of Rabbi Josiah. Abba Saul says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: included in striking are goring, shoving, lying down upon, and kicking. From where do we learn biting? Scripture teaches "and its owner did not guard it" (Exodus 21:36). And the matter follows by inference from minor to major: if when he had guarded it and it got out and caused damage he is liable, then all the more so before he has guarded it. Then what does Scripture teach by "and its owner did not guard it"? Rather, Scripture comes to add yet another act of guarding, and which is it? This is biting. "The ox of a man" (Exodus 21:35) - to exclude the ox of a minor. "The ox of a man" - to include the ox of others. "His neighbor's" - to include the ox of a minor. One might think Scripture speaks of two animals of equal value, or is it speaking both of equal and unequal value? You reason: just as it is the way of those who cause damage to gain or to lose, and so forth, so too those who suffer damage take their damages or more than their damages - you must say: not more than their damages. Rabbi Akiva says: half is stated regarding the living and half regarding the dead, so Scripture speaks of animals of equal value.

"And they shall also divide the dead" (Exodus 21:35) - from here they said: an ox worth a maneh that gored an ox worth a maneh, or an ox worth two hundred that gored an ox worth two hundred, the owner takes half. An ox worth a maneh that gored an ox worth two hundred, he takes all of it. An ox worth two hundred that gored an ox worth a maneh, he takes a quarter. Rabbi Meir said: concerning this it is said, "and they shall sell the live ox" (Exodus 21:35). Rabbi Akiva said to him: read the entire verse, "and they shall also divide the dead." And which case is this? This is an ox worth two hundred that gored an ox worth two hundred where the carcass is worth a maneh; they sell the live one and divide the dead one equally, and the owner of the carcass tends to his own carcass. Therefore it is said, "and they shall also divide the dead."

Our Rabbis taught: an ox of an ordinary person that gored an ox of the sanctuary, or an ox of the sanctuary that gored an ox of an ordinary person, he is exempt, as it is said, "the ox of his neighbor" (Exodus 21:35) - and not the ox of the sanctuary. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: an ox of the sanctuary that gored an ox of an ordinary person is exempt; but an ox of an ordinary person that gored an ox of the sanctuary, whether it was an innocuous ox or a forewarned ox, pays full damages. They asked: what does Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya hold? If "his neighbor" means strictly an ordinary person, then when it gores an ox of the sanctuary why is he liable? And if "his neighbor" is not strict, then when an ox of the sanctuary gores an ordinary person's ox he should likewise be liable. And if you say he indeed holds "his neighbor" to be strict, yet an ordinary person's ox that gored the sanctuary's is liable because we derive it by inference from minor to major - just as an ordinary person's ox that gored an ordinary person's ox is liable, so when it gores the sanctuary's, all the more so it is liable - it is enough that the law derived by inference be like the case from which it is derived: just as there an innocuous ox pays half damages, here too half damages. Rather, Resh Lakish said: all were included in full damages. When Scripture specified "his neighbor" regarding an innocuous ox, it is for his neighbor's ox that an innocuous ox pays only half damages; but the sanctuary's, even an innocuous ox, pays full damages. For if not so, let the Merciful One have written "his neighbor" regarding the forewarned ox.

"And they shall sell the live ox and divide its money" (Exodus 21:35). It was stated regarding half damages: Rav Papa said half damages is monetary compensation. Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua said it is a fine. Rav Papa said it is monetary compensation, for he holds that ordinary oxen are not presumed to be guarded, and by strict law the owner should pay the whole, and it was the Merciful One who had mercy upon him because his ox had not yet been forewarned. And Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua said half damages is a fine, for he holds that ordinary oxen are presumed to be guarded, and by strict law he should not pay at all, and it was the Merciful One who fined him so that he would guard his ox. And the law is that half damages is a fine. A refutation followed, and yet it is the law. What is the reason it was refuted yet remains the law? Because it does not list it, and so forth - the matter is not clear-cut to him, since there is half damages for pebbles, which is a fine established by tradition that is monetary, so he neither states it cleanly nor includes it. Now that you have said half damages is a fine, this dog that ate lambs and this cat that ate chickens is an abnormal act, and we do not collect for it in Babylonia. And this applies to large ones, but small ones are its normal way. And if the injured party seized payment, we do not take it from him. And if he summoned the offender to the Land of Israel, we summon him; and if he does not go, we place him under a ban. In either case we place him under a ban until he removes his harmful thing, in line with Rabbi Nathan, as it was taught: Rabbi Nathan says, from where do we learn that a person should not raise a vicious dog in his house, nor set up a rickety ladder in his house? Scripture teaches "and you shall not place blood in your house" (Deuteronomy 22:8).

Our Rabbis taught: An ox worth two hundred that gored an ox worth two hundred, and the carcass is worth three zuz, this one takes half of the living and half of the dead and that one takes half of the living and half of the dead, and this is the ox spoken of in the Torah. These are the words of Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi Meir says: This is not the ox spoken of in the Torah. Rather, which is the ox spoken of in the Torah? An ox worth two hundred that gored an ox worth two hundred, and the carcass is worth nothing at all; concerning this it is said, "They shall sell the live ox and divide its price" (Exodus 21:35). Then how do I uphold "and also the dead they shall divide"? The loss that death caused to the carcass they divide out of the live one. Now whether according to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Yehudah, this one takes a hundred and twenty-five and that one takes a hundred and twenty-five; what is the difference between them? The enhancement of the carcass is between them. Rabbi Meir holds that the enhancement of the carcass belongs to the one injured, and Rabbi Yehudah holds they split it. And this is what was difficult for Rabbi Yehudah: Now that you have said the Merciful One had compassion on the one who caused damage, so that he takes even of the enhancement, one might think that an ox worth five selas that gored an ox worth a maneh, and the carcass is worth fifty zuz, this one takes half the live and half the dead and that one takes half the live and half the dead. You said: Where have we found a damager who profits, that this one should profit? And it says "he shall surely pay" (Exodus 21:36): owners pay and owners do not take. What is the force of "and it says"? This is what it states: And should you say these words apply only where the injured party has a loss, but where the injured party has no loss, such as an ox worth five selas that gored an ox worth five selas and the carcass is worth thirty zuz, he too takes of its enhancement, therefore Scripture teaches "he shall surely pay": owners pay and owners do not take. Rav Tachlifa said to Rava: If so, we have found according to Rabbi Yehudah that an innocent ox pays more than half-damage, yet the Torah said "they shall sell the live ox and divide its price"! Rabbi Yehudah holds that the loss which death caused to the carcass they take from the half, out of the live one. From where does he derive it? From "and also the dead they shall divide." But did not Rabbi Yehudah already apply this verse to "this one takes half the dead and half the live"? If so, let the Merciful One write "and the dead"; what is "and also"? Learn from it two teachings.

And let tooth and foot be liable in the public domain, by an a-fortiori argument: If horn, which in the domain of the injured party pays only half-damage, is nonetheless liable in the public domain for half-damage, then tooth and foot, which in the domain of the injured party pay full damage, is it not logical that in the public domain they should be liable for half-damage? Scripture said, "and it consumes in another's field" (Exodus 22:4), and not in the public domain. But is it full damage we are speaking of? It is half-damage we are speaking of! Scripture said, "and they shall divide its price" (Exodus 21:35): the price of this one, and not the price of another. And let horn not be liable at all in the public domain, by an a-fortiori argument: If tooth and foot, which in the domain of the injured party pay full damage, are exempt in the public domain, then horn, which in the domain of the injured party pays only half-damage, is it not logical that in the public domain it should be exempt? Scripture said, "and also the dead they shall divide": half-damage is not divided, neither in the public domain nor in the private domain.

"And the dead shall be his" (Exodus 21:36). Our Rabbis taught: this concerns the payments for damage; it teaches that the owners tend to the carcass. From where are these words derived? Rabbi Ammi said, Scripture said, "one who strikes a beast shall make it whole" (Leviticus 24:21): do not read "yeshalmenah" [he shall pay for it] but "yashlimenah" [he shall make it whole, i.e. restore the value of the carcass against the payment]. Rav Kahana said, from here: "if it is surely torn, let him bring it as evidence; for what is torn he shall not pay" (Exodus 22:12) — up to the point of being torn he pays, but for the torn thing itself he does not pay. Hezekiah said, from here: "and the dead shall be his" — meaning the injured party's. Or is it perhaps the damager's? You said: it was not so, for if it should enter your mind that the carcass belongs to the damager, let the Merciful One write "an ox in place of the ox" and be silent; why do I need "and the dead shall be his"? Learn from it: it belongs to the injured party. And all three verses are necessary, for if Scripture had written only "one who strikes a beast shall make it whole," I might say this is because such a case is uncommon, but a torn animal, which is common, say no. And if it had taught us only the torn case, that comes about on its own, but striking a beast, which is by one's own hands, say no. And if it had taught us these two, this one because it is uncommon and that one because it comes about on its own, but "the dead shall be his," which is common and by one's own hands, say no. And if it had taught us only "the dead shall be his," because there it is property that causes the damage, but those where one's own body causes the damage, say no; therefore all are necessary. Rav Kahana said to Rabbah: The reason is that the Merciful One wrote "and the dead shall be his"; otherwise I would have said it is the damager's. But now that he has of his own, he gives to him, as the Master said: "he shall restore" (Exodus 21:34) is to include something worth money. That it is his own goes without saying! It is not necessary except for the depreciation of the carcass.

"If a man steals an ox or a sheep" (Exodus 21:37). Even the one who slaughters and the one who sells were already included in the general rule, as it says, "if the thief is found" (Exodus 22:6). Yet Scripture removes him from the general rule to be stringent with him, that he should pay fourfold and fivefold; for this reason the passage was stated. "If a man steals an ox or a sheep" — to make him liable for this one on its own and for that one on its own. "And he slaughtered it" — I have only one who slaughters; from where do I include one who sells? Scripture teaches, "or sold it." Before this is stated, one might say: I have it by reasoning — if the one who slaughters is liable, shall the one who sells not be liable? If you say so, you have imposed a penalty by reasoning. Therefore it is said, "or sold it," to teach you that one does not impose penalties on the strength of reasoning alone.

Another interpretation: Scripture compared the one who slaughters to the one who sells, and the one who sells to the one who slaughters. Just as a sale is outside his domain, so too the slaughter must be outside his domain. Just as a sale leaves the animal permitted to be eaten, so too the slaughter must leave it permitted to be eaten. Just as a sale leaves it permitted in benefit, so too the slaughter must leave it permitted in benefit. Just as a slaughter cannot be reversed, so too a sale must be one that cannot be reversed. Just as a slaughter is of the whole animal, so too a sale must be of the whole animal.

Another interpretation: "If a man steals" — consecrated animals too were included, for if he stole and slaughtered them outside he pays fourfold and fivefold; yet Scripture removes them from the general rule to be stringent with them, binding them to liability for extirpation. One might think they are also liable for payment, and reasoning supports it: if he is liable for the severe punishment of extirpation, shall he not be liable for the lighter payments? Scripture teaches, "This is the thing which the LORD commanded" (Leviticus 17:2): they left the category of extirpation but not the category of payment. "Five oxen he shall pay" — four and the animal itself; "four sheep" — three and the animal itself. Rabbi Meir used to say: Come and see how beloved labor is before the One who spoke and the world came into being. An ox, because it has labor, he pays fivefold; a sheep, which has no labor, he pays fourfold. Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai says: The Omnipresent had pity on the dignity of creatures. An ox, which walks on its own legs, he pays fivefold; a sheep, because he must carry it, he pays fourfold. Rabbi Akiva says: "in place of the ox," "in place of the sheep" — to exclude the wild beast. For by reasoning one might say: since a domestic animal is subject to payment and a wild beast is subject to payment, if you have learned of a domestic animal that he pays fourfold and fivefold, so too a wild beast should pay fourfold and fivefold. No: if you say so of a domestic animal, which is offered upon the altar, and therefore he pays fourfold and fivefold, will you say so of a wild beast, which is not offered upon the altar? Then a blemished animal proves otherwise, for it is not offered upon the altar yet he pays fourfold and fivefold for it, and it proves regarding the wild beast that even though it is not offered upon the altar he pays fourfold and fivefold. No: if you say so of a blemished animal, whose kind is offered upon the altar, and therefore he pays fourfold and fivefold, will you say so of a wild beast, whose kind is not offered upon the altar? Therefore Scripture teaches, "in place of the ox," "in place of the sheep," to exclude the wild beast.

The measure of fourfold and fivefold payment applies only to an ox and a sheep. And why? Let us derive "ox" "ox" from the Sabbath: just as there [the law extends to] a wild beast and a bird like them, so too here a wild beast and a bird like them. Scripture said "ox or sheep" twice: ox and sheep, yes; anything else, no. They asked: which is superfluous? If you say the "ox and sheep" of the latter clause, that the Merciful One should have written "If a man steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters it or sells it, five oxen he shall pay in its place and four sheep he shall pay in its place" — if Scripture had written thus I would have said he must pay nine to each one. And should you say "in its place" is itself superfluous — it is needed for another teaching, as it was taught: one might think one who stole an ox worth a maneh pays in its place five superior animals; Scripture teaches "in its place," like it. Rather the "ox and sheep" of the opening clause is superfluous. Rabbi Akiva said: Why did the Torah say that one who slaughtered or sold pays fourfold and fivefold? Because he became rooted in sin. Rava said: Because he repeated the sin. "And he slaughtered it or sold it" — just as slaughter cannot be reversed, so too a sale that cannot be reversed, excluding one who transferred it for thirty days. It was taught: one who stole and slaughtered on the Sabbath, stole and slaughtered for idolatry, stole and slaughtered an ox condemned to stoning, pays fourfold and fivefold; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt, and they establish the case as one who slaughters through another. Does this one sin and that one become liable? It is different here, for Scripture said "and he slaughtered it or sold it": just as a sale is through another, so too slaughter through another. These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. It was taught: "or" — to include the agent. The school of Hezekiah taught: "in place of" — to include the agent. Is there anything such that, were he to do it himself he would not be liable, yet if an agent did it he would be liable? There it is not because he is not liable, but because he is condemned to a graver penalty. Rava asked Rav Nachman: One who stole an ox belonging to two partners and slaughtered it and confessed to one of them, what is the law? "Five oxen" the Merciful One said, and not five half-oxen; or perhaps "five oxen" even five half-oxen? He said to him: "Five oxen" the Merciful One said, even five half-oxen; and the reason I did not tell you so last night is that I had not eaten ox meat. Our Rabbis taught: if he sold it apart from its hand, apart from its foot, apart from its horn, apart from its fleece, he does not pay fourfold and fivefold. Rabbi says: anything that prevents slaughter — he does not pay fourfold and fivefold; anything that does not prevent slaughter — he pays fourfold and fivefold. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: if he sold it apart from its horn he does not pay fourfold and fivefold, apart from its fleece he pays fourfold and fivefold.

"If the thief is found breaking in" (Exodus 22:1) — this is a doubt: perhaps he came to steal, perhaps he came to kill. Or is it only a doubt whether he came to steal or did not come to steal? You said: if, when he certainly comes to steal and one kills him, this is permitted, all the more so in a case of doubt whether he comes to steal or not. From here you may reason about the saving of life [that its doubt overrides the Sabbath], for if the shedding of blood, which defiles the land and drives away the Divine Presence, overrides the doubt, all the more so the saving of life overrides the Sabbath. Therefore you must say it not by the latter formulation but by the first: a doubt whether he came to steal or came to kill. "If the thief is found breaking in" — the one who comes by breaking in is judged on account of his end. Rava said: What is the reasoning of the tunnel-breaker? There is a presumption that a man does not restrain himself over his money, and this one reasoned: if I go, the owner will stand against me and not let me, and if he stands against me I will kill him. And the Torah said: if he comes to kill you, rise early to kill him. Rav said: If he came breaking in and took vessels and went out, he is exempt; what is the reason? He acquired them with his blood. Rabbah said: Rav's statement is reasonable where he broke them, since they no longer exist, but where he took them, no. By God, said Rav, even where he took them, for if he had "blood" and they were lost by accident he would be liable, which shows they stood in his domain; here too they stand in his domain. But it is not so: when the Merciful One placed them in his domain, it was regarding accidents, but regarding acquisition they stand in their owner's domain, as is the case with a borrower. Our Rabbis taught: "and he is struck and dies" — "struck" by any person; "and dies" — by any death by which you can put him to death. "If the sun has risen upon him, there is bloodguilt for him" (Exodus 22:2) — and did the sun rise upon him alone? Rather, if the matter is as clear to you as the sun that he is at peace with you, do not kill him; and if not, kill him. The other was taught: "there is no bloodguilt for him, if the sun has risen" — and did the sun rise upon him alone? Rather, if the matter is as clear to you as the sun that he is not at peace with you, kill him; and if not, do not kill him. The two are not contradictory: this one speaks of a son against the father, that one of a father against the son. Rav said: anyone who comes against me by tunnel I will kill, except for Rav Chanina bar Shila, for I am certain of him that he has compassion on me as a father on a son. Rav Sheshet said: "there is bloodguilt for him" was needed only for clearing away the rubble upon him on the Sabbath.

Rabbi Ishmael says: When Scripture states, "If the sun has risen upon him" (Exodus 22:2), would you say it came to teach only this? Or does it come merely to divide between day and night, to tell you that if he killed the burglar by day he is liable, but if he killed him by night he is exempt? Scripture therefore teaches, "but to the young woman you shall do nothing" (Deuteronomy 22:26 and context). Now what have we learned for the murderer from this? Rather, this verse comes to teach and ends up itself being taught: just as there [in the case of the betrothed maiden] Scripture did not divide between day and night, so here too we do not divide between day and night. And just as here, if the owner anticipated the burglar and killed him he is exempt, so too there, if she anticipated the attacker and killed him she is exempt. And just as there, if there were rescuers who could have saved her from him and she nonetheless killed him she is liable, so too here, if there were rescuers who could have saved the owner from the burglar and he nonetheless killed him he is liable. "There is bloodguilt for him; he shall surely make restitution" (Exodus 22:2): Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: If there were before the burglar jars of wine and jars of oil and he broke them while tunneling in, he is liable to pay. And whenever it is certain that the owner was at peace from the burglar [in no danger of being killed] and yet killed him, the owner is liable. Therefore it says, "There is bloodguilt for him; he shall surely make restitution." "And if he has nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft" (Exodus 22:2): I might think he is sold forever. Scripture therefore teaches, "Six years he shall serve" (Exodus 21:2), telling us that he serves six years and goes free in the seventh. "And he shall be sold for his theft" - not for less and not for more. Rabbi Judah says: If he stole less than what he himself is worth, he is not sold for more than he is worth; the choice rests with the owner of the stolen property: if he wishes to sell him, he sells him, and if not, he writes a bond. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he stole less than what he is worth, he is not sold for more than he is worth; the law is to profit by half and lose by half. A man is sold for his theft, but a woman is not sold for her theft, for the verse says, "he shall be sold for his theft" - and not for her theft. Our Rabbis taught: There is in the Hebrew bondwoman what is not in the Hebrew bondman, for the Hebrew bondwoman goes free upon showing the signs of puberty, and they redeem her even against her will, and she is not sold a second time. This implies that the Hebrew bondman is sold and sold again. But has it not been taught: "for his theft" - and not for its double penalty; "for his theft" - and not for the muzzling penalty of false witnesses; "for his theft" - once he has been sold a single time you are no longer permitted to sell him? Abaye said: There is no difficulty. Here it speaks of selling him to one man; there it speaks of selling him to two men. Our Rabbis taught: If his theft was a thousand and he is worth five hundred, he is sold. If he stole five hundred and he is worth a thousand, he is not sold. Rabbi Eliezer says: If his theft equaled his sale price he is sold, and if not he is not sold. Why is it different that one who stole five hundred and is worth a thousand is not sold? Because the Merciful One said, "he shall be sold" - the whole of him and not half of him. Here too, "he shall be sold for his theft" the Merciful One said - and not for half of his theft. And they redeem her [the bondwoman] even against the father's will, on account of the disgrace to the family. Then in the case of the Hebrew bondman too, let his family members be compelled to redeem him on account of the disgrace to the family! He would simply go and sell himself again. So here too, the bondwoman might be sold again! But it has been taught: she is not sold a second time.

Plotting witnesses [who were proven false] are not sold as a Hebrew bondman. What is the reason? Rava said: "for his theft" (Exodus 22:2) - and not for the muzzling penalty of false witnesses. "If the stolen item is actually found in his hand" (Exodus 22:3): I would know only his hand; from where do I learn his roof, his courtyard, and his enclosure? Scripture therefore teaches, "if it is actually found in his hand" - in any case. And it has likewise been taught: "And he writes her a bill of divorce and places it in her hand" (Deuteronomy 24:1) - I would know only her hand; from where do I learn her roof, her courtyard, and her enclosure? Scripture therefore teaches, "and places it in her hand" - in any case. And both verses are necessary. For had Scripture taught us only the divorce case, I might have said it is because she is divorced against her will, but as for the thief, say no. And had it taught us only the thief, I might have said it is because of the penalty, but as for divorce, say no. Therefore both are necessary. As for her courtyard - whatever a woman acquires, her husband acquires. The case is where he writes to her while she is still betrothed: "I have no claim or dispute upon your property," in accordance with Rav Huna's teaching that an inheritance coming to a person from another source - a person may stipulate concerning it that he shall not inherit it. Rava said: Is it so that the husband does not acquire her hand? Rather, her bill of divorce and her hand come as one [the divorce takes effect at the instant the hand ceases to be his]; so too her bill of divorce and her courtyard come as one. Rabbi Simeon ben Lakish said in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: A minor girl has no [legal acquiring] courtyard and has no four cubits. And Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: She has a courtyard and she has four cubits. One master holds: the courtyard's power was derived from the hand, and just as she has a hand, she also has a courtyard. And one master holds: the courtyard's power was derived from agency, and just as she has no agency, she also has no courtyard. But is there one who holds that the courtyard was derived from agency? Has it not been taught, "his hand - I would know only his hand," and so on? And if it enters your mind that the courtyard was derived from agency, then we would have found an agent for a matter of transgression, whereas we hold that there is no agency for a matter of transgression. Ravina said: Where do we say there is no agency for transgression? Where the agent is himself subject to liability. But a courtyard, which is not subject to liability, makes the one who sent it liable. Rav Sama said: Where do we say there is no agency for transgression? Where, if the agent wishes he acts and if he wishes he does not act. But a courtyard, into which one places the item against its will, makes the sender liable. What is the difference between them? The case of a priest who said to an Israelite, "Go and betroth for me a divorced woman," or, if you wish, the case of a man who said to a woman, "Round off for me the head of a minor." And is there one who holds that the courtyard was not derived from her hand? Has it not been taught, "I would know only her hand," and so on? Regarding divorce, all agree that the courtyard was derived from her hand; where they disagree is regarding a found object: one master holds we derive the found object from divorce, and one master holds we do not derive the found object from divorce. Or, if you wish: regarding a minor girl all agree that we derive the found object from divorce, and here they disagree concerning a minor boy: one master holds we derive the minor boy from the minor girl, and one master holds we do not. Or, if you wish: this master stated one ruling and that master stated another, and they do not actually disagree.

"He shall pay double" (Exodus 22:3): It has been taught: Rabbi Jacob says: "He shall pay double" - even without an oath. Or perhaps it means only with an oath? You may answer: it was not so. For let the Merciful One not write "he shall pay double" concerning the thief, and it would follow by an a fortiori argument from one who falsely claims that the deposit was stolen [by another]. If concerning one in whose hand the object came lawfully, the verse says he pays double, then the thief himself, in whose hand the object came unlawfully, all the more so. So why then did the Merciful One write "he shall pay double" for the thief? To teach that it applies even without an oath. His disciples asked Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai: Why did the Torah treat the thief more severely than the robber? He said to them: The robber equated the honor of the servant with the honor of his Master; but the thief did not equate the honor of the servant with the honor of his Master. As it were, the thief acted as though the Eye above does not see and the Ear above does not hear, as it is said, "Woe to those who dig deep to hide their counsel from the LORD" (Isaiah 29:15). Rabbi Meir said: They told a parable. To what may this be compared? To two men in a city who made a feast. One invited the townspeople but did not invite the king's household; and one invited neither the townspeople nor the king's household. Which of them deserves the greater punishment? The one who invited the townspeople but did not invite the king's household.

"If the stolen item is actually found in his hand" (Exodus 22:3): there is no "finding" except by witnesses. "In his hand" - "in his hand" everywhere means only his domain. "From ox to donkey": Rabbi Akiva says: since Scripture need not have said "alive," it comes to include the wild beast. "Alive - he shall pay double" - and not when dead. "He shall pay double": You thus find that there are seven kinds of thief. The first among thieves is one who steals the mind of his fellow creatures: one who urges his fellow to be his guest when he has no intention in his heart to invite him; one who plies him with gifts while knowing he will not accept them; one who opens a cask [implying he opened it for the guest when he had opened it for sale]; one who falsifies measures; one who tampers with weights; and one who mixes seeds of the carob into fenugreek, or sand into beans, or vinegar into oil. Because they said: oil does not absorb misuse [its quality is not so easily hidden], therefore kings are anointed with it. And not only that, but they reckon it against such a person as though, were he able to steal the mind of the One on high, he would steal it. And so we find with Absalom, who stole three thefts: the heart of his father, the heart of the court, and the heart of the men of Jerusalem, as it is said, "And Absalom stole the heart" (2 Samuel 15:6). And who is the greater, the one who steals or the one stolen from? You must say: the one stolen from, who knows he is being robbed and stays silent. And so we find that when Israel stood before Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, they sought, as it were, to steal the mind of the One on high, as it is said, "All that the LORD has spoken we will do and we will hear" (Exodus 24:7); and the heart of the court was, as it were, stolen into their hand, as it is said, "Who would give that this heart of theirs would remain in them" (Deuteronomy 5:26). And should you say that not all is revealed before Him, has it not already been said, "And they enticed Him with their mouth and with their tongue they lied to Him, and their heart was not steadfast with Him" (Psalms 78:36-37)? Yet even so, "He, being compassionate, atones for iniquity" (Psalms 78:38). And it says, "Like silver dross overlaid upon earthenware are burning lips and an evil heart" (Proverbs 26:23). One who stole items forbidden in benefit is exempt from payment. For clothing, produce, vessels, a wild beast, or a bird, he pays the double penalty. For slaves, bonds, and land, he pays only the principal. For the firstborn of a donkey he pays double, for although it is forbidden now, it has a release at a later time. "He shall pay five for the ox and four for the sheep" (Exodus 21:37). Above these is one who steals a human being, for he is liable with his life. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai says: A parable. To what is this compared? To one who was leaving his fellow's house laden with vessels. His fellow met him and said, "What are you doing?" He answered, "Take your share and tell no one." Later the owner of the stolen goods came and said, "I adjure you, if you saw so-and-so leaving my house laden with vessels," and he answered, "I swear I do not know what you are talking about" - such a man is liable with his life. Of him it says, "He who shares with a thief hates his own soul" (Proverbs 29:24). But one who "steals" from behind his fellow and goes off and studies words of Torah, even though he is called a thief, acquires merit for himself, and of him it says, "They do not despise a thief" (Proverbs 6:30). In the end he is found appointed over the community, and he "repays sevenfold" (Proverbs 6:31), as it says, "all the wealth of his house he gives." And "sevenfold" means nothing but words of Torah, as it is said, "The words of the LORD are pure words" (Psalms 12:7).

"If a man causes a field or vineyard to be grazed over" (Exodus 22:4): Why is this said? Before it is stated, one might say: I have it by logical argument. Since the pit is his property and the fire is his property, if you have learned that he is liable on account of his pit, shall he not be liable on account of the fire? And if I have established it by logic, what need is there for Scripture to say "if a man causes to be grazed over"? Rather, the verse comes to teach you that the tooth is a forewarned danger to eat what is fit for it, and the animal is a forewarned danger to break things in the manner of its walking. From here they said: a person is never liable until the damaging agent has gone out of his domain and caused damage. For damages are assessed from the best land, and all the more so concerning consecrated property.

Another interpretation: "If a man causes to be grazed over," and so on - to make him liable for this on its own and for that on its own [for the tooth and for the foot as separate liabilities]. "A field or vineyard": just as a vineyard has produce, so too the field has produce. "And he sends his animal": from here they said: if he handed his flock over to his bondman or to his agent, he is exempt. If he handed it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, he is liable. "And it grazes in another's field": Rabbi Nathan says: now consider one who stacks his grain within his fellow's field without permission, and the householder's animal goes out and damages it - I might apply to the owner the verse "and he sends his animal." Scripture therefore teaches, "in another's field" [the damage must occur in a field that is properly the other party's domain]. "The best of his field and the best of his vineyard" - of the one who caused the damage; these are the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: the verse comes to teach you that damages are assessed from the best land, and all the more so concerning consecrated property.

It has been taught: "And he sends" - this is the foot. And so it says, "who send out the foot of the ox and the donkey" (Isaiah 32:20). "And it grazes" - this is the tooth. And so it says, "as the dung is consumed until it is gone" (1 Kings 14:10). The reason is that the Merciful One wrote "who send out the foot." Were it not so, how would you establish the verse? If as horn-damage, that is already written; if as tooth, that too is written. It was necessary, for it might have entered your mind to say that both this phrase and that refer to the tooth - the one where the principal is consumed and the one where the principal is not consumed; this teaches us otherwise. And now that we have established one phrase as the foot, from where do we derive tooth-damage where the principal is not consumed? It is analogous to the foot: just as for the foot it makes no difference whether the principal is consumed or not, so too for the tooth it makes no difference whether the principal is consumed or not. The master said: "And it grazes" is the tooth, and so it says, "as the dung is consumed." The reason is that the Merciful One wrote "as the dung is consumed until it is gone." Were it not so, how would you establish it? If as horn, that is written; if as foot, that is written. You might think both refer to the foot - the one where the animal was driven out by an agent and the one where it went of its own accord; this teaches us otherwise. And now that we have established one as the tooth, from where do we derive foot-damage where the animal went of its own accord? It is analogous to the tooth: just as for the tooth it makes no difference whether it was driven by an agent or went of its own accord, so too for the foot it makes no difference. Let the Merciful One write only "and he sends," and not need "and it grazes," since "sends" implies the foot and also implies the tooth, as it is written, "and the tooth of beasts I will send against them" (Deuteronomy 32:24). Were it not for the extra verse, I would have said: either the foot, whose damage is common, or the tooth, where there is benefit in its damage. Since they are balanced, let both come - for which of them would you exclude? It was necessary, for it might have entered your mind to say that this applies only where the animal was driven by an agent, but where it went of its own accord, no; this teaches us otherwise. And what is a subcategory of the tooth? If the animal rubbed against a wall for its pleasure, or soiled produce for its pleasure. How is the tooth distinctive? There is benefit in its damage, and it is your property, and its safekeeping is upon you - these too have benefit in their damage, and are your property, and their safekeeping is upon you. Thus a subcategory of the tooth is like the tooth. And when Rav Pappa spoke, he spoke of a subcategory of the foot. What is a subcategory of the foot? If the animal damaged with its body in the course of its walking, or with its hair in the course of its walking, or with the saddle upon it, or with the load upon it. Four things the Torah lessened in their safekeeping (this is written in the verse "If a man opens a pit," Exodus 21:33).

"The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay" (Exodus 22:4): "the best of his field and the best of his vineyard" - of the injured party; these are the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: the verse comes only to require that damages be collected from the best land, and all the more so concerning consecrated property. And as for Rabbi Ishmael: if the animal ate fat produce, the owner pays with fat land; if it ate lean produce, he still pays with fat land. With what case are we dealing here? Where the best land of the injured party is equal to the worst land of the one who caused the damage. And on this they disagree: Rabbi Ishmael holds that we assess according to the property of the injured party, and Rabbi Akiva holds that we assess according to the property of the one who caused the damage. What is Rabbi Ishmael's reason? "Field" is stated above and "field" is stated below: just as the "field" stated above refers to the injured party, so too the "field" stated below refers to the injured party. And Rabbi Akiva holds: "the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay" - of the very one who is paying. And Rabbi Ishmael: the analogy of identical terms serves one purpose and the verse serves another. The analogy serves as we said; and the verse serves a case such as where the one who caused the damage has both best and worst land, and the injured party has best land, and the worst land of the one who caused the damage is not equal to the best land of the injured party - so that the damager cannot say, "Come and collect from my worst land," but rather he collects from the best. Rabbi Akiva says: the verse comes only, and so on. What is the meaning of "all the more so concerning consecrated property"? If we say that our ox gored an ox belonging to the sanctuary - the Merciful One said "the ox of his fellow" (Exodus 21:35), and not an ox of the sanctuary! Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, who said: an ox of the sanctuary that gored an ox of an ordinary person is exempt; an ox of an ordinary person that gored an ox of the sanctuary, whether the ox was harmless or forewarned, pays full damages.

Abaye raised a difficulty to Rava: It is written, "the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay" (Exodus 22:4) - the best, yes; anything else, no. But it was taught, "he shall make restitution" comes to include payment in money's worth, even bran. When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua came from the house of study, they explained: everything is "the best," for if it cannot be sold in this town it can be sold in another town; except for land, for which one gives him from the best, so that a buyer will leap upon it. It was taught: those who suffer damage are appraised from the best land, a creditor from middling land, and a wife's marriage settlement from the poorest land, for the sake of the order of the world [tikkun ha-olam]. But damages are by Torah law: "the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay." Abaye said: this is necessary only according to Rabbi Yishmael, who said that by Torah law we appraise from the property of the one damaged; the teaching tells us that for the sake of the order of the world we appraise from the property of the one who damaged. Ravina said: in truth the Mishnah follows Rabbi Akiva, who said that by Torah law we appraise from the one who damaged, and it is Rabbi Shimon who expounds the reason of the verse: what is the reason those who suffer damage are appraised from the best land? For the sake of the order of the world. For it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says, why did the Torah say those damaged are appraised from the best land? Because of robbers and extortioners, so that a person will say, why should I rob, why should I extort, for tomorrow the court will descend upon my property and take my fine field, relying on what is written in the Torah, "the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay." And why did they say a creditor is paid from middling land? So that a person will not see his fellow's fine field and fine dwelling and say, I will pounce and lend to him so that I may collect it for my debt. If so, let it be from the poorest land! Then you lock the door before borrowers. And why did they say a wife's marriage settlement is from the poorest land? Because more than a man wishes to marry, a woman wishes to be married. And should you say: just as the Sages instituted for her a marriage settlement from him when he divorces her, so when she leaves, let the Sages institute a settlement for him from her - come and hear: a woman is sent out whether willing or unwilling, but a man divorces only of his own will. It is possible for her to delay him over the bill of divorce.

"When a fire goes out" (Exodus 22:5) - why is this said? So that one should not say: I could argue by law, since one is liable when fire spreads by way of thorns, surely one should not be liable through one's own act. And if I am acquitted by the argument, why does Scripture say "when a fire goes out"? Rather, Scripture comes to treat the accident like the intentional act, the unintentional like the intentional, and the woman like the man, in all the damages in the Torah. "And finds thorns" - the thorns are mentioned only to set a measure: if there are thorns there is a measure, and if there are no thorns there is no measure. From here they said: if a fire crossed a river, a road, or a wall higher than ten handbreadths, and caused damage, one is exempt from paying. How is the matter assessed? One sees it as though he stood in the middle of a field of a kor's size and kindled - the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah. Rabbi Eliezer says: sixteen cubits, like a public road. Rabbi Akiva says: fifty cubits. Rabbi Shimon says: "he who kindled the blaze shall surely make restitution" - all according to the fire. It happened that a fire crossed the Jordan and caused damage, because it was great. "And a stack of grain is consumed" - everything is included: bundles of reeds, courses of stones prepared for lime. "Or the standing grain" - even the tree is included. "Or the field" - even if it scorched the soil. "He who kindled the blaze shall surely make restitution" - why is this said? Because it says "a man"; from "a man" I would know only a man. A woman, one of doubtful sex, one of double sex - from where? Scripture says "he who kindled," in any case. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachman said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: punishment does not come to the world except when the wicked are in the world, and it begins only with the righteous first, as it says "when a fire goes out and finds thorns." When does the fire go out? When the wicked are present. And it begins only with the righteous, as it says "and a stack of grain is consumed" - it does not say "and it consumes a stack" but "a stack is consumed," teaching that it was already consumed. Rav Ami and Rav Asi were sitting before Rabbi Yitzchak Nappacha. One said to him, let the master tell us a matter of law; the other said, let the master tell us a matter of aggadah. He began to say law and the one would not let him; he began to say aggadah and the other would not let him. He said to them: I will tell you a parable. To what is the matter like? To a man who had two wives, one young and one old. The young one plucked out his white hairs, the old one plucked out his black hairs, and he was left bald on both sides. He said to them: I will tell you a matter that suits you both. "When a fire goes out" - of itself. "He who kindled the blaze shall surely make restitution" - the Holy One, blessed be He, said: I set fire in Zion, as it says "and He kindled a fire in Zion" (Lamentations 4:11), and I am destined to rebuild it with fire, as it says "and I will be to her, says the LORD, a wall of fire around, and for glory I will be in her midst" (Zechariah 2:9). The law: Scripture opened with damage by one's property and concluded with damage by one's body, to tell you that one's fire is treated as one's arrows.

"And it grazed in another's field" (Exodus 22:4) - if it went down in its usual manner and caused damage, one pays what it damaged. How so? They appraise a seah's measure of land in that field: how much was it worth before and how much is it worth now. Rabbi says: if it ate fully ripened produce, he pays fully ripened produce; if a seah, a seah; if two seahs, two seahs. From where are these matters derived? The verse says "and it grazed in another's field," teaching that they appraise it in relation to another field. But this verse is needed for "in another's field" - to exclude the public domain! If so, let Scripture write "in his fellow's field," or "in a field belonging to another." What is "another's field"? It teaches that they appraise in relation to another field. Say the whole verse comes only for this; from where do we exclude the public domain? If so, let it write regarding payment "the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay in another's field." Why does Scripture write it by "and it grazed"? Learn from it two things. How do we appraise? Rabbi Yose bar Chanina said: a seah within sixty seahs. Hizkiyah said: a stalk within sixty stalks. Rabbi Yannai said: a measure within sixty measures. And we do not appraise a single kav by itself, because that improves the position of the one damaged, nor a kav within a field of a kor, because that lowers the position of the one damaged, but within sixty.

"When a man gives to his fellow money or vessels" (Exodus 22:6) - "when a man gives to his fellow" is a generalization; "money or vessels" is a specification; "and it is stolen from the man's house" is again a generalization. With a generalization, a specification, and a generalization, you may judge only according to the character of the specification: just as the specification is explicit in being something movable and whose body is itself property, so too everything that is movable and whose body is itself property. Excluded are tracts of land, which are not movable. Excluded are slaves, who are compared to land. Excluded are deeds, whose body is not itself property. As for consecrated property - the verse says "his fellow," and not what belongs to the Sanctuary.

One does not impose an oath on the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, for the verse says "when a man gives to his fellow," and the giving of a minor is nothing. The claim must be two silver maahs. Rav said: the denial of the claim must be two silver maahs. Shmuel said: the claim itself must be two silver maahs, so that even if he denied only a perutah's worth and admitted only a perutah's worth, he is liable. Rava said: the inference of the Mishnah supports Rav, and the verses support Shmuel. The inference of the Mishnah as Rav holds: as we learned, the claim is two silver maahs and the admission a perutah's worth, but it does not teach denial of a claim of a perutah. We also learned the admission is a perutah, but it does not teach denial of a perutah. And the verses as Shmuel holds: as it is written "money or vessels" - just as vessels are two, so money is two; just as money is something of value, and so forth - and the Merciful One says "that this is it" (Exodus 22:8). Rav says to you: that verse is needed for partial admission of a claim. And Shmuel says to you: "this" and "it" are both written, for if he denied part and admitted part, he is liable. And Rav says: one is for partial admission of the claim, and one for admission of the same kind as the claim. And Shmuel: do you not learn it of itself, that part of the claim is missing? Rather, Rav says to you: "money," when it comes at the start, comes for denial, for if so let the Merciful One write "when a man gives to his fellow vessels to keep," and I would say, just as vessels are two so all are two; why does the Merciful One write "money"? If it is not needed for the matter of the claim, apply it to the matter of denial. And Shmuel says to you: had the Merciful One written "vessels" and not "money," I would say just as vessels are two so all are two, but a thing of value we do not require; therefore it teaches us. The claim is two silver maahs. Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel: they taught this only regarding the claim of a lender and the admission of a borrower. But for the testimony of a single witness, even if he claimed only a perutah, he is liable. What is the reason? As it is written, "one witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity or any sin" (Deuteronomy 19:15) - for any iniquity or sin he does not stand, but he does stand to impose an oath. And it was taught: wherever two witnesses obligate him in money, one witness obligates him in an oath. One who steals consecrated property from the owner's house is exempt. What is the reason? "And it is stolen from the man's house" - and not from the house of the Sanctuary. Rabbi Shimon says: consecrated property for which one bears responsibility, he is liable. What is the reason? "And it is stolen from the man's house."

"When a man gives to his fellow money" - Rabbi Yishmael says: only when he deposits it with him and says to him, "here, keep this for me." But if he said to him, "keep an eye on it," he is exempt. "Money or vessels" - just as money is something customarily counted, so vessels customarily counted. From here they said: any claim that is not by measure, weight, or number is no claim. Rabbi Natan says: "money" includes second-tithe money; "vessels" includes vessels. I would know only money and vessels; any other thing, from where? Scripture says "to keep," to include anything that needs safekeeping. "And it is stolen from the man's house, if the thief is found he shall pay double" - when? When it is not found in the keeper's possession. But if it is found in his possession, I might hear that he swears and is exempt; Scripture says "if it is indeed found in his hand" (Exodus 22:3), in any case. You have no need to say it according to the latter reading, but according to the first. "And it is stolen from the man's house" - to exempt one who steals from a thief. "If the thief is found he shall pay double" - the thief pays double, but the robber pays only the principal. What did the Torah see to be stricter with the thief than with the robber? Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai says: the robber treated the slave as equal to his Master, and so forth. "And if the thief is not found" - why is this said? From what is said "if the thief is found," I might hear that if the thief is found the householder is exempt from everything; what does "if the thief is not found" teach? I might hear that if the thief is found and has nothing to pay, the owner of the stolen object may not say to the keeper, "come and swear to me that you did not intend to sell them"; therefore it says "if the thief is not found" - that if the thief is found, the householder is exempt from everything. "And the householder shall draw near" - I might hear he is questioned by the Urim and Thummim; Scripture says "whom the judges condemn," I said only "judges" [Elohim], who condemn. "And the householder shall draw near" - with an oath. You say with an oath; or with or without an oath? You may reason: "laying of a hand" is said here and "laying of a hand" said there; just as there it is with an oath, so here with an oath; just as there with the divine Name, so here with the divine Name; just as here before a court, so there before a court; just as there for its own need, so here for its own need; just as here "for any matter of trespass," so there "for any matter of trespass." "If he has not put his hand to his fellow's goods" - for its own need. You say for its own need, or for its own need and not for its own need? Scripture says "for any matter of trespass" - for the House of Shammai obligate for the thoughts of the heart in misappropriation, as it says "for any matter of trespass." And the House of Hillel obligate only from the moment he put his hand to it; therefore it says "if he has not put his hand to his fellow's goods," for its own need.

Our Rabbis taught: "if the thief is found" - Scripture speaks of one who falsely pleads that a thief took it. Or is it only the thief himself? When it says "if the thief is not found," the thief himself is already stated; how then do I uphold "if the thief is found"? You must say Scripture speaks of one who falsely pleads a thief took it. It was taught otherwise: "if the thief is found" - Scripture speaks of the thief himself. Or is it only one who falsely pleads a thief took it? When it says "if the thief is not found," the false pleader is already stated; how do I uphold "if the thief is found"? Scripture speaks of the thief himself. In any case, all agree that "if the thief is not found" speaks of one who falsely pleads a thief took it. What is the implication? Rava said: if it is not found as he pleaded, but he himself stole it, he shall pay double. And from where that it is with an oath? As it is written "and the householder shall draw near to the judges" - with an oath. Or is it only for judgment? "Laying of a hand" is said above and below; just as there for an oath, so here for an oath. Granted to the one who says one verse speaks of the thief and one of the false pleader - why are two verses needed? One to exclude one who falsely pleads it was lost. And the other learns it from "the thief, the thief." And the other needs it for the teaching of Rabbi Chiya bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: one who falsely pleads a thief took a deposit, and slaughtered or sold it, pays fourfold and fivefold. And from where does the other derive Rabbi Chiya bar Abba's rule? He says to you: it is a comparison [hekkesh], and one does not raise objections against a comparison. Granted to the one who says one verse is the thief and one the false pleader, the thief himself is derived from here. But to the one who says both speak of the false pleader, from where the thief himself? Should you say, let it come by an a fortiori argument from the false pleader - it suffices that what comes from a derivation be like the source of the derivation: just as there with an oath, so here with an oath - it is derived from "if it is indeed found in his hand." And as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: "in the water, in the water" twice is not a generalization and specification, but it restricted, then expanded, then restricted, so it expanded the whole. What did it expand? It expanded everything. If so, why are all these particulars needed? One to exclude slaves and one to exclude deeds. "Theft, and live animals" - for the teaching of Rav, who said: he must restore the principal in the form he stole it. And the other holds "if it is indeed found" is needed for the teaching of Rava bar Ahilai, that one who admits to a fine is exempt. "And it is found" - by witnesses; "if it is found" - by judges, excluding one who condemns himself. And the other derives this from "whom the judges condemn," and not the one who condemns himself. And the other needs it for one who admits to a fine and afterward witnesses come, that he is exempt; while the other holds that one who admits to a fine and afterward witnesses come is liable. Granted "if it is indeed found" for Rava bar Ahilai's rule; but why "ox, sheep, donkey"? For the teaching of the school of Rabbi Yishmael: any passage stated and then repeated was repeated only for some matter newly taught in it.

Rav Sheshet said: a guardian who falsely pleads a thief took the deposit, once he has put his hand to it, is exempt. What is the reason? The Merciful One said "and the householder shall draw near to the judges if he has not put his hand to it" - so if he put his hand to it, he is exempt. Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef said: a guardian who falsely pleads a thief took it is not liable until he puts his hand to it. What is the reason? As the verse says "the oath of the LORD shall be between the two of them, if he has not put his hand to it" (Exodus 22:10), meaning we deal with a case where he did put his hand to it. Our Rabbis taught: "and the householder shall draw near to the judges" - here is one. "To the judges shall come the matter of the two of them" - here are two. "Whom the judges condemn" - here are three. These are the words of Rabbi Yoshiyah. Rabbi Yonatan says: the first is stated at the outset, and one does not expound openings. Rather, "to the judges shall come the matter of the two of them" - here is one. "Whom the judges condemn" - here are two. And since a court may not be evenly balanced, they add one more to them; here are three. Shall we say they disagree about whether one expounds openings? No - all agree one does not expound openings. Rabbi Yoshiyah says to you: if so, let the verse write "and the householder shall draw near to judgment"; what is "to the judges" [Elohim]? Learn from it, for counting. And Rabbi Yonatan: it took an elevated expression, as people say, one who has a case should draw near to the judge. Does Rabbi Yoshiyah not hold there is a court that inclines? But it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer the son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean says, what does "after the majority to incline" (Exodus 23:2) teach? The Torah said, make for yourself a court that inclines. He holds like Rabbi Yehudah, who said seventy, and even more than Rabbi Yehudah; for Rabbi Yehudah denies it only of the Great Sanhedrin, but in other courts he affirms it, while Rabbi Yoshiyah denies it of other courts as well. Then what does this "to incline" do for him? He applies it to capital cases. But in monetary cases he does not say it. Then what of the teaching: two say acquitted and one says liable - he is acquitted; shall we say it is not according to Rabbi Yoshiyah? You may even say it is Rabbi Yoshiyah: he derives it by an a fortiori argument - if in capital cases, which are stringent, the Merciful One said go after the majority, then in monetary cases, which are lenient, all the more so.

"If he has not laid his hand" (Exodus 22:7) — it was stated regarding misappropriation [a bailee taking the deposit for his own use]. Rav said: it requires a diminishment [of the object before liability attaches]. Levi said: it does not require a diminishment. What is the reasoning of Levi? Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Yose bar Nehorai: The misappropriation stated regarding a paid bailee differs from the misappropriation stated regarding an unpaid bailee — and I say it does not differ. What is the supposed difference? You might have argued: do not state misappropriation regarding a paid bailee at all, and derive it instead from the unpaid bailee. For if the unpaid bailee, who is exempt for theft and loss, is nonetheless liable when he misappropriates, then the paid bailee, who is liable for theft and loss, all the more so should be liable for misappropriation. For what law, then, did the Merciful One write it explicitly? To tell you that misappropriation does not require a diminishment. And I say it does not differ, in accordance with Rabbi Elazar who said "this and that are one and the same," because there is a refutation: what of the unpaid bailee, who pays the double payment when he falsely pleads that a thief took it? And the one who does not refute holds that principal without an oath is preferable to double payment with an oath. Rava said: do not state misappropriation regarding either the paid or the unpaid bailee, and derive it from a borrower — for if a borrower, who acts with the owner's knowledge, is liable when he misappropriates, then the unpaid and paid bailees all the more so. Why then was it stated? One instance to tell you that misappropriation does not require a diminishment, and the other so that you should not say "it is enough for the law derived by inference to be like its source" [meaning: just as a borrower is exempt when the owner is in his service, so too the bailees are exempt in that case]. And for the one who holds that misappropriation does require a diminishment, why are these two instances of misappropriation needed? One so that you should not say "it is enough," and the other for what was taught: "And the master of the house shall come near to the judges (the Elohim)" (Exodus 22:7) — for an oath. You say for an oath, or perhaps only for judgment? Misappropriation is stated below and misappropriation is stated above [a verbal analogy, gezeira shava]: just as there it is for an oath, so here it is for an oath. Rabbi Yishmael says: by thirteen principles the Torah is expounded — from a fortiori inference, and from verbal analogy. It is stated of a paid bailee "if he has not laid his hand," and it is stated of an unpaid bailee "if he has not laid his hand": just as the paid bailee of whom "if he has not laid his hand" is stated is exempt from a claim brought by the heirs, so too the unpaid bailee of whom "if he has not laid his hand" is stated is exempt from a claim brought by the heirs.

"For any matter of trespass" (Exodus 22:8). We learned: "For any matter of trespass" is a generalization. "For an ox, for a donkey, for a sheep, for a garment" is a specification. "For any lost thing" — it then generalized again. A generalization, a specification, and a generalization: you may judge only as the specification indicates. Just as the specification is explicit — a movable item whose body has intrinsic monetary value — so too anything that is a movable item whose body has monetary value. Excluded are lands, which are not movable; excluded are slaves, who are likened to land; excluded are documents, for though they are movable their body has no intrinsic monetary value; excluded is consecrated property, for the Merciful One said "his fellow's" (Exodus 22:8) and not consecrated property. Say it should apply only to living creatures: just as the specification is explicit — a thing whose carcass conveys impurity by contact and by carrying, and so forth — but not birds. Rather, "any" is an amplification. But concerning the tithe, where it is written "all" and we expound it by generalization and specification — as it was taught: "And you shall give the money for whatever (bekhol) your soul desires" (Deuteronomy 14:26), etc. They say: "bekhol" is a generalization, "kol" is an amplification. And if you wish, say: "kol" is a generalization, etc. And what is different here? If it should enter your mind that "for any matter of trespass" comes for a generalization-and-specification, behold a generalization, specification, and generalization was already written earlier — "when a man gives to his fellow" is a generalization, "money or vessels" is a specification, "to keep" then generalized. And if it should enter your mind that this "any" also comes for a generalization-and-specification, let the Merciful One have written these specifics beside that first generalization-and-specification; why repeat them with another generalization? Learn from this that it is for amplification. If for amplification, why are all these specifics needed? One to exclude lands, one to exclude slaves, one to exclude documents; "garment" to exclude a thing that is not defined [lacking identifying marks]; "for any lost thing" for the teaching of Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: one who falsely pleads that a thief took a lost object that he had found pays the double payment, as it is said "for any lost thing."

"For any matter of trespass" — any matter of negligence. (This is written in remez 281.) One who merely intends to lay a hand on a deposit: Beit Shammai hold him liable, and Beit Hillel say he is not liable until he actually lays a hand upon it. From where are these matters derived? As the Rabbis taught: "For any matter of trespass" — Beit Shammai say: this teaches that one is liable for the intention as for the deed. And Beit Hillel say: he is not liable until he lays a hand upon it, as it is said "if he has not laid his hand" (Exodus 22:7). Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: but is it not already stated "for any matter of trespass"? Beit Hillel said to them: but is it not already stated "if he has not laid his hand"? If so, what does the verse "for any matter of trespass" come to teach? That you might think I have only the bailee himself; from where do I include one who told his slave or his agent to misappropriate? The verse therefore states "for any matter of trespass." "For any matter of trespass" is a generalization, etc. Excluded are lands, which are not movable, etc. And there is no double-payment or fourfold-and-fivefold payment for them: "fourfold and fivefold payment" said the Merciful One, and not "threefold and fourfold payment."

"For a sheep, for a garment" (Exodus 22:8). The garment too was included in "every lost item of your brother's" (Deuteronomy 22:3), so why was it singled out? To draw an analogy to it and tell you: just as a garment is distinct in that it has identifying marks and has claimants, so too anything that has identifying marks and has claimants — one is obligated to announce it. Rava said: why did the Merciful One need to write ox and donkey, sheep and garment? They are all necessary. For if the Merciful One had written only "garment," I would have said this applies only with witnesses to its body, or alternatively with identifying marks on its body, but a donkey we would not return by the identifying marks of its saddle. Therefore the Merciful One wrote "donkey," to teach that we return it even by the identifying marks of its saddle. "Ox," to teach that we return it even by the shearing of its tail, etc. Why then is "sheep" needed? A donkey serves the law of the pit according to Rabbi Yehuda, and a sheep serves the law of a lost object according to all opinions — this is difficult.

Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: one who falsely pleads that a thief took a lost object that he had found pays the double payment. What is the reason? "For any lost thing of which one says" (Exodus 22:8). They raised an objection against him: "When a man gives" (Exodus 22:6) — the giving of a minor is nothing. And I have only the case where he gave it to him while he was a minor and claimed it from him while he was a minor; from where do I include where he gave it while a minor and claimed it after he had grown up? The verse states "the matter of them both shall come before the judges (the Elohim)" — meaning the giving and the claiming must be as one. And if it were so [that a found object incurs liability like a deposit], let it be like a lost object [which does not require a valid act of giving]. With what are we dealing here? Where he consumed it while he was a minor. Rav Ashi said: they are not comparable. A lost object comes into one's hand through the power of a person of legal competence [the finder], whereas this [a deposit given by a minor] does not come through the power of a person of legal competence.

The father of Rabbi Apturiki taught: "I have a maneh [a hundred zuz] in your hand," and the other says "you have nothing of yours in my hand," and witnesses testify that he holds fifty — you might think he must swear concerning the rest. The verse states "for any lost thing of which one says, this is it" (Exodus 22:8): upon his own admission you impose an oath, but you do not impose an oath upon him through the testimony of witnesses. And Rabbi Chiyya is a Tanna and may disagree. But the verse states it! That verse he requires for an admission to part of the claim. And the father of Rabbi Apturiki would say to you: it is written "it (hu)" and it is written "this (zeh)" — one for admission to part, and one for admission of the same kind as the claim. And the other holds there is no requirement that the admission be of the same kind as the claim, holding like Rabban Gamliel; as we learned: if one claimed wheat from him and he admitted to barley, he is exempt, but Rabban Gamliel holds him liable. Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: one who falsely pleads that a thief took a deposit is not liable until he denies part and admits part, for the verse says "this is it." And this differs from Rabbi Chiyya bar Yosef, who said: there is a mixing of passages written here, and when "this is it" is written it is written concerning a loan. And why is a loan different? As Rabbah explained: why did the Torah say that one who admits to part of a claim must swear? There is a presumption that a person will not be brazen before his creditor. This one would have wished to deny it all, and the reason he admitted is that a person will not be brazen; and he would have wished to admit all of it, and the reason he denied part is that he reasoned, "if I admit all of it he will sue me at law; let me evade him for now until I have the means and repay him." Therefore the Merciful One imposes an oath upon him, so that he will admit the whole to him. Rami bar Chama taught: all four bailees require denial of part and admission of part. What is the reason? The unpaid bailee — it is written explicitly "this is it." The paid bailee — derives "giving, giving" from the unpaid bailee. The borrower — "and when one borrows," the conjunctive "and" adds to the earlier subject. The renter — if according to the one who says he is like an unpaid bailee, that is the unpaid bailee; and if according to the one who says he is like a paid bailee, that is the paid bailee.

"For any matter of trespass" — Scripture speaks of one guardian compared to another. Or perhaps it comes only to distinguish between money and vessels and animal? The verse states "garment": the garment was in the general category and was singled out to teach — just as the garment is distinct, Scripture speaks of one guardian compared to another, etc.; hence it did not come to distinguish between money and vessels and animal. "Of which one says, this is it" — that this one says "this is it" and that one says "it is not it." From here they said: the admission must be of the same kind as the claim. "And the master of the house shall come near to the judges (the Elohim)" — from here they said: monetary cases are judged by three. Rabbi says: by five, so that the verdict is concluded by three. "He shall pay double to his fellow" — Rabbi Yishmael says: I apply here "he shall pay double to his fellow," and I apply elsewhere "he shall repay it in its principal and add a fifth to it" (Leviticus 5:24). How are these two verses upheld together? Everyone who pays the principal is obligated to pay the fifth, and everyone who does not pay the principal is exempt from the fifth. "He shall pay double to his fellow" — and not to the Temple. "To his fellow" — and not to others.

"When a man gives to his fellow a donkey or an ox or a sheep" (Exodus 22:9-10) is a specification, "or any animal" is a generalization, "to keep" then specified again — a specification, a generalization, and a specification. You may judge only as the specification indicates: just as the specification is a movable item whose body has monetary value, this excludes slaves and lands and documents. It was taught in another baraita: "when a man gives to his fellow" is a generalization, "a donkey or an ox" is a specification, "and any animal to keep" then generalized. Just as the specification is explicit, etc.

"If a man gives to his neighbor a donkey" and so forth (Exodus 22:9). Rabbi Yishmael says: he is not liable until the owner formally deposits it with him, saying to him, "Here, guard this for me." But if he merely said to him, "Keep an eye on it," then this man is exempt. "A donkey, or an ox, or a sheep" (Exodus 22:9): from this I would know only of a donkey, an ox, and a sheep; from where do I learn the rest of every kind of beast? Scripture states, "every beast." Then I would read only "every beast" - so why does Scripture say "a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep"? Because had I read only "every beast," I might understand that one is not liable until the owner deposits every kind of beast with him at once; therefore Scripture says "a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep," to impose liability for each one individually. And why does Scripture add "every beast"? The verse comes to teach that whenever a general term is added to a specific list, everything is included in the general term. "And it dies" (Exodus 22:9): that its death is by the hand of Heaven. "Or is hurt": that a wild animal broke it. "Or is driven away": that brigands carried it off. I might still say that breakage and capture, whether he could have rescued it or could not, are exempt; therefore Scripture says "and it dies" - a particular kind of death that he could not possibly prevent exempts from payment, so too anything that he could not possibly rescue exempts from payment. These are the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Akiva said to him: you are deriving the possible from the impossible! For death can only come by the hand of Heaven, but breakage and capture can come either by the hand of Heaven or by the hand of man. So he went back and reasoned that they fall under the category of theft. Rabbi Yishmael says regarding "he shall not pay for that which was torn" (Exodus 22:12): there is a torn animal for which he does pay, and there is a torn animal for which he does not pay.

"And no one sees" (Exodus 22:9) - Scripture speaks of a case where there are no witnesses. "No one seeing - an oath of the LORD shall be between the two of them" (Exodus 22:9-10): but if there are witnesses, the householder is exempt from everything. These are the words of Issi ben Yehudah. There was a certain man who was carrying a barrel of wine for his fellow through the market street of Mechoza. It broke in a crowded spot of Mechoza. He came before Rabbah, who said to him: the market street of Mechoza is a place where people are commonly found - go and bring witnesses that you were not negligent, and you will be exempt. Rav Yosef his son said to him: according to whom is this ruling? According to Issi? He said to him: yes, according to Issi, and we hold like him. There was a certain man who gave money to his fellow to buy him four hundred jars of wine. He said to him: I bought them for you, and they turned sour. He came before Rava, who said to him: when four hundred jars of wine turn sour it makes a public report - go and bring witnesses, and you will be exempt. Rav Yosef said to him: according to whom? According to Issi, and so forth. As for Rabbah bar bar Chanah, certain porters broke a barrel of his, and so forth.

"An oath of the LORD shall be between the two of them" (Exodus 22:10): one who is suspect regarding oaths - his opponent swears and collects. If both of them were suspect, the oath returns to its place. These are the words of Rabbi Yose. Rabbi Meir says: they divide. To where does it return? Rabbi Ami said: our rabbis in Babylonia said the oath returns to Sinai; our rabbis in the Land of Israel said the oath returns to the one obligated in it. "Our rabbis in Babylonia" - this is Rav and Shmuel. "Our rabbis in the Land of Israel" - this is Rabbi Abba. Rava said: it stands to reason like Rabbi Abba, for Rabbi Ami taught: "an oath of the LORD shall be between the two of them" - and not between the heirs. What is the case? If we say it is where the claimant said to the heir, "my father had a maneh in your father's keeping," and the heir said, "of fifty he has, and of fifty he does not," then what difference is there between him and his own father? Rather it must be where the claimant said, "my father had a maneh in your father's keeping," and the heir said, "of fifty I know, and of fifty I do not know." If you say his own father in such a case would be liable, then the verse was needed to exempt the heir; but if you say his own father in such a case is exempt, why would I need a verse to exempt the heir? And how do Rav and Shmuel expound "an oath of the LORD shall be between the two of them"? They need it for what was taught: it teaches that the oath falls upon both of them. Rav Chiyya bar Yosef said: one who pleads the claim of a thief regarding a deposit is not liable until he himself lays a hand upon it. What is the reason? The verse says, "an oath of the LORD shall be between the two of them - if he has not laid his hand" (Exodus 22:10), which tells us we are dealing with a case where he did lay his hand upon it.

"An oath of the LORD shall be between the two of them" (Exodus 22:10) - with the Tetragrammaton [the divine name spelled yod-heh]. From here you derive a rule for every oath in the Torah: since all the oaths in the Torah were stated without specification, and Scripture specified in one of them that it is only with the divine name, I specify regarding all the oaths in the Torah that they are only with the divine name. "Between the two of them" - to exclude the heir. "Between the two of them" - to exclude the case where his opponent is suspect regarding oaths. "Between the two of them" - that the judge may not impose the oath upon him against his will. "If he has not laid his hand" (Exodus 22:10): for its own need. You say for its own need, or perhaps for its need and not for its need? Behold I reason: "laying on of a hand" is stated here and "laying on of a hand" is stated elsewhere (Exodus 22:7); just as here it involves an oath, so too there; just as here with the divine name, so too there; just as there in court, so too here; just as there for its own need, so too here; just as there it concerns "the matter of trespass" (Exodus 22:8), so too here. "An oath of the LORD shall be between the two of them": that it does not budge from between the two of them. If the one administering the oath imposes it falsely, it will ultimately come out against him; and if the one who swears swears falsely, it will ultimately come out against him. There was an incident with a certain woman who went in to knead dough at her neighbor's house, and three dinars were tied in her wrap. She took them and placed them on a kerchief, and they got kneaded into the dough. She baked bread and went off. Her husband said to her, "Give me the three dinars." She went searching for them at her neighbor's. She said to her, "Perhaps you have seen these three dinars?" That woman had three sons. She said, "May that woman [meaning herself] bury a son if she knows anything about them." Her sins caused it, and she buried him. That woman said, "Had she not been suspicious of me, she would not have buried her son." She went again, and so forth. The woman said, "May she bury another son if she knew anything about them." Her sins caused it, and another son died. Another time she said to her, "I have found the three dinars." She said, "May that woman bury a third son if she knows anything about them." Her sins caused it, and she buried him. Her husband said to her, "Will you not go to comfort this neighbor of yours?" She took two loaves of bread and went to comfort her. When they cut the loaves, those three dinars fell out of one of them. This is what people mean when they say: whether innocent or guilty, do not enter into oaths.