Yalkut Shimoni on Torah Reader

The school of Rabbi Ishmael taught: Scripture says "if he cause a blemish" (Leviticus 24:19) -- "giving" means nothing other than money. But then "as he caused a blemish in a man" would also mean money, yet that is bodily injury! The school of Rabbi Ishmael expounds a superfluous verse: since it is written, "and if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor, as he has done... so shall it be done to him," why do I need "so shall it be given"? Learn from it: money. Why do I need "as he caused a blemish in a man"? Since it wished to write "so shall it be given," it also wrote "as he caused a blemish in a man." The school of Rabbi [Hiyya] taught: Scripture says "hand for hand" (Deuteronomy 19:21), a thing given from hand to hand -- and what is that? Money. But then "foot for foot" would also be so, yet [that is bodily]! The school of Rabbi Hiyya expounds a superfluous verse: since it is written, "and you shall do to him as he purposed" (Deuteronomy 19:19), and if it should enter your mind that it is literal, why do I need "hand for hand"? Learn from it: money. Why "foot for foot"? Since it wrote "hand for hand," it wrote "foot for foot." Abaye said: it comes from what the school of Hezekiah taught: "an eye for an eye" -- and not an eye and a life for an eye; for if it should enter your mind that it is a literal eye, sometimes you would find an eye and a life for an eye, for while blinding his eye his soul departs. And what is the difficulty? Perhaps we assess him: if he can withstand it, we do it; if not, we do not. And once we assessed that he can withstand it and we did it and his spirit departed, if he dies, let him die -- did we not learn: if they assessed him and he died under his hand, he is exempt? (Exodus 21:25) Rav Zevid in the name of Rava said: Scripture says "wound for wound," to give pain in place of damage; for if it should enter your mind that it is literal, just as this one had pain, and so on. And what is the difficulty? Perhaps there is a delicate person who has more pain; what is the practical difference? To give him the difference between them. Rav Papa in the name of Rava said: Scripture says "and he shall surely heal" (Exodus 21:19), to give healing in place of damage; for if it should enter your mind that it is literal, just as this one needs healing, and so on. What is the difficulty? Perhaps there is a person whose flesh heals quickly and one whose flesh does not heal quickly; what is the practical difference? To give him the difference between them. Rav Ashi said: it comes by analogy of "in place of" with "in place of": it is written here "an eye in place of an eye," and it is written there "because (in place of which) he humbled her" (Deuteronomy 22:29); just as there it is money, so too here it is money. It was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says: "an eye for an eye" -- literal. Literal, can it enter your mind? Does Rabbi Eliezer not hold like all those Tannaim? Rather, it means that we assess [the value] not by the injured party but by the one who caused the injury. Rabbi Yitzchak said: it says, "if a ransom be laid upon him" (Exodus 21:30), and behold the matter is an inference from minor to major: if where it imposed death it imposed only money, here where it did not impose death, all the more so it should impose only money. Rabbi Eliezer says: "an eye for an eye" -- I might understand, whether intending or not intending, he pays only money; therefore Scripture excludes the one who intends to cause a blemish, that he pays only money, as it is said, "and if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor" (Leviticus 24:19), a general statement; "an eye for an eye," a specific; in a specific-and-general there is in the general only what is in the specific; when it says "as he caused a blemish in a man" (Leviticus 24:20), it generalized again. If general like the first general? You say no; rather it is general-specific-general, and you judge only according to the specific: just as the specific spells out fixed blemishes, chief limbs, visible, and intentional, paying only money, so all such cases; Scripture says "as he cause a blemish," [teaching] until he intends to cause him a blemish.

"A burn for a burn" (Exodus 21:25): It was taught, Rabbi [Judah the Prince] says, the burn is stated first. Ben Azzai says, the bruise is stated first. About what do they disagree? Rabbi holds that "burn" implies one that has a bruise in it, so the Merciful One wrote "bruise" to reveal that the burn under discussion is one without a bruise. Ben Azzai says the bruise is stated first: "burn" implies one without a bruise, so the Merciful One wrote "bruise" to reveal that a burn with a bruise, yes [is liable], and if not, not. And they stand on the conclusion. Alternatively, all agree that "burn" implies one with or without a bruise, and here they disagree about a general and specific that are distant from one another. Rabbi holds that a general and specific distant from one another we do not interpret as general-and-specific; and if you ask why Rabbi needs "bruise, bruise," it is for additional money. Ben Azzai holds that a general and specific distant from one another we do interpret as general-and-specific. "Wound for wound" (written at hint 333). "A burn for a burn": if you say he wounded him and drew his blood, but it already said "wound for wound"; and if you say he made a bruise in him, but it already said "bruise for bruise." What then does "a burn for a burn" teach? Rather, he burned him on the sole of his foot without leaving a mark, or loaded stones on him and caused him suffering, or cast snow on him and chilled his head and caused him suffering -- this one gives him the value of his suffering. But if he was soft, delicate, and pampered, all the more is his suffering doubled; this is the pain spoken of in the Torah, "a burn for a burn."

"And if a man strikes the eye of his slave" and so forth (Exodus 21:26-27). Why was this passage stated? Because it says "and you shall hold them as a possession" and so forth (Leviticus 25:46), I might understand that even if he knocked out the slave's tooth or blinded his eye [there is no consequence]. Therefore Scripture teaches "And if a man strikes the eye of his slave" and so forth, "and if the tooth of his slave" and so forth. So Scripture removes the Canaanite slave from the general rule in order to be lenient to him, that he goes free through the loss of the extremities of his limbs. For this reason the passage was stated. "And if a man strikes the eye of his slave": I have only a man; from where do I learn a woman [who strikes]? Rabbi Ishmael used to say, and so forth. Rabbi Yoshiyah says, and so forth. Rabbi Yonatan says it is not needed, and so forth. Rabbi Eliezer says: Scripture speaks of a Canaanite slave. Or perhaps only of a Hebrew slave? Scripture teaches "of them you may acquire a slave and a maidservant" (Leviticus 25:44). "The eye of his slave": I might understand even if he merely caused a white spot to appear; therefore Scripture teaches "and ruins it" [he must destroy it]. I spoke only of a blow that carries enough to ruin. From here they said: if he struck him over his eye and blinded it, over his ear and deafened it, this one goes free; but [a blow] near his eye so that he cannot see, near his ear so that he cannot hear, this one does not go free. These are the words of Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel, for it says "and if a man strikes" [meaning] not until he performs a [destructive] act. If he knocked out two teeth at once or blinded two eyes at once, this one goes free and takes nothing more, for Scripture teaches "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" (Exodus 21:24). [But if he injured them] one after the other, he goes free on account of the first and collects damages for the second, for Scripture teaches "in place of his eye, in place of his tooth."

It was taught: he goes free through tooth and eye and through the extremities of the limbs that do not regenerate. Granted tooth and eye, for they are written explicitly; but the extremities of the limbs, from where do we learn them? [From the words] "like tooth and eye": just as tooth and eye are blemishes that are visible and do not regenerate, so too any blemish that is visible and does not regenerate. And say that tooth and eye are like two verses that come as one [to teach a single matter], and two such verses do not teach [a general rule]? They are both necessary. For had the Merciful One written only "tooth," I would have said even a milk tooth [which regenerates]; therefore the Merciful One wrote "eye." And had He written only "eye," I would have said: just as the eye is created with him, so too only what is created with him [frees the slave], but a tooth would not; therefore it is necessary. And say: "if he strikes" is a generality, "tooth and eye" is a specification; in a generality and a specification, the generality includes only what is in the specification, so tooth and eye yes, but anything else no. [Scripture continues] "he shall send him free," which returns and generalizes; in a generality, a specification, and a generality, you may infer only what resembles the specification. And say: just as the specification is a visible blemish that disables him from his work and does not return, so too any such; yet why was it taught that if he tore at his beard and dislodged a bone from it the slave goes free? [Rather] "he shall send him free" is an amplification. Our Rabbis taught: in all of these the slave goes free and requires a writ of emancipation; these are the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Meir says he does not require it. Those who decide before the Sages say: the words of Rabbi Tarfon appear correct regarding tooth and eye, which the Torah grants him; and the words of Rabbi Akiva regarding the other limbs, since it is a teaching of the Sages. What is Rabbi Shimon's reasoning? He derives "sending" from "sending" stated of a woman [divorcee]: just as a woman goes out by a document, so too a slave by a document. And Rabbi Meir [reasons]: had it written "he shall send him free" at the end, it would be as you say; now that it writes "to freedom he shall send him," he is as one already free from the start.

Our Rabbis taught: if his master was a physician, and the slave said to him, "paint my eye [with salve]," and he blinded it, or "scrape my tooth," and he knocked it out, [the master] made sport of his lord and [the slave] goes free. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: [the verse says] "and ruins it," [meaning he goes free only] when he intends to ruin it. And the Rabbis, what do they do with this "and ruins it"? They need it for what was taught: Rabbi Elazar says, if he reached his hand into the belly of his maidservant and blinded the fetus within her, he is exempt, for Scripture says "and ruins it," [meaning] only when he intends to ruin it. And the other [authority] does not expound "and he ruined, and ruins it." Rav Sheshet said: if his eye was already blind and he gouged it out, the slave goes free through it. What is the reason? He is now missing a limb. And the Tanna [of a baraita] also taught [a parallel principle]: completeness and maleness apply to a beast [for sacrifice] but completeness and maleness do not apply to birds. One might think that even if its wing dried up, its leg was severed, or its eye was gouged [the bird is still valid]; Scripture teaches "from the bird" and not all of the bird. Our Rabbis taught: there are twenty-four extremities in a person; all of them do not convey impurity by reason of live flesh [in a leprous sign]. And these are they: the tips of the fingers of the hands and feet, the tips of the ears, the tip of the nose, the tip of the membrum, and the tips of the breasts in a woman. Rabbi Yehudah says: in a man as well. And it was taught concerning this: in all of these the slave goes free. Ben Azzai says: even the tongue. Rabbi [Yehudah HaNasi] says: even castration. Castration of what? If we say severing of the membrum, that is the same as the body [already listed]. Rather, [the crushing of] the testicles.

If he blinded his slave's eye and [then] knocked out his tooth, he goes free [on account of the eye] and pays him the value of the tooth. Rabbi Zeira objected to this: say rather, [if] he blinded his eye, let the slave go out on account of his eye; [if] he blinded his eye and knocked out his tooth, let him go out on account of his eye and his tooth [taking nothing extra]. Abaye said to him: Scripture says "in place of his eye" and not in place of his tooth-and-his-eye; "in place of his tooth" and not in place of his eye-and-his-tooth [therefore the second injury is compensated separately]. What is the reason that the slave goes free through tooth and eye? Because it is written "and Ham, the father of Canaan, saw [his father's nakedness] and told" and so forth (Genesis 9:22).

"He shall send him to freedom": I might understand he must write him a writ of emancipation; Scripture teaches "in place of his eye." Rabbi Eliezer says: "sending" is stated here, and so forth. I have only one who is able to be sent away; one who is unable to be sent away, from where? Scripture teaches "to freedom he shall send him in place of his eye," in any case. Rabbi Ishmael says: since the Torah spoke of one who sends and spoke of one who is sent, if you have learned of the sender that only one who is an adult sends, one might think that the one sent away likewise need only be an adult; Scripture teaches "to freedom he shall send him in place of his eye," in any case. Rabbi Ishmael says: a Canaanite slave has no redemption ever and goes out only by his master's will, as it says "and you shall hold them as a possession" (Leviticus 25:46). According to our method we have learned that a Canaanite slave is like a hereditary field forever; but if his master was disciplining him and knocked out his tooth or blinded his eye or [destroyed] one of all the visible extremities, this one acquires himself through suffering. And the matter is an inference from minor to major: if regarding a thing of flesh and blood a person acquires himself through suffering, how much more so regarding a thing of Heaven. And so it says "the LORD has chastened me sorely, but He has not given me over to death" (Psalms 118:18); and it says "happy is the man whom You chasten, O LORD, and teach out of Your Torah" (Psalms 94:12). An inference from minor to major from tooth and eye: if tooth and eye, which are but one of a person's limbs, free the slave, then sufferings that scour a person's whole body, how much more so. And this is what Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: a covenant is stated regarding salt and a covenant is stated regarding sufferings; just as the covenant stated regarding salt sweetens [makes acceptable] the whole offering, so too the covenant stated regarding sufferings scours a person's whole body.

"If an ox gores" (Exodus 21:28). Our Rabbis taught: "if an ox gores a man," goring is only with the horn. And so it says "and Zedekiah son of Kenaanah made for himself horns of iron and said, Thus says the LORD, with these you shall gore Aram" (1 Kings 22:11). And it says "his firstling bull, majesty is his, and his horns are the horns of a wild ox" and so forth (Deuteronomy 33:17). What is [the force of] "and it says"? In case you should say, we do not derive words of Torah from words of tradition [the Prophets and Writings], come and hear: "his firstling bull, majesty is his." But is that a derivation? It is merely the disclosure of a matter, that goring is with the horn. Rather, [the verse is needed] lest you say: when the Merciful One distinguished between an innocuous ox and a forewarned one, this applies to a detached [horn], but with an attached [horn] say it is all forewarned. Come and hear: "his firstling bull, majesty is his." What is a derivative of the horn? Shoving, biting, lying down [upon], kicking. Why is goring singled out and called a primary category, since it is written "if it gores"? Shoving too is written "if it strikes" (Exodus 21:35); that striking is goring. For it was taught: "if it strikes" Scripture opened with striking and concluded with goring, to tell you this is goring, this is striking. Why is it written regarding a man "if it gores" and regarding a beast "if it strikes"? A man, who has a guardian fortune [mazal], it is written "if it gores"; a beast, which has no guardian fortune, it is written "if it strikes." And in passing Scripture teaches us that one forewarned toward men is forewarned toward beasts, but one forewarned toward beasts is not forewarned toward men.

Our Rabbis taught: "ox," "ox," [stated] seven [times], to include the ox of a woman, the ox of orphans, the ox of guardians, the ownerless ox, the ox of the Sanctuary, and the ox of a convert who died leaving no heirs; [all of these] are liable to [the penalty of] death. Rabbi Yehudah says: the ownerless ox, the ox of the Sanctuary, and the ox of a convert who died leaving no heirs are exempt, because they have no owners. Furthermore Rabbi Yehudah said: even if it gored and afterward [its owner] declared it ownerless, he is exempt, for it says "and warning was given to its owner and it killed" (Exodus 21:29), [meaning] until the death, the standing in judgment, and the verdict are all alike [with the ox having an owner]. Our Rabbis taught: from the implication of what is said "the ox shall surely be stoned," do I not know that it is carrion, and carrion is forbidden to eat? What does Scripture teach by saying "its flesh shall not be eaten"? Scripture tells you that even if he slaughtered it [properly] after its verdict was sealed, it is forbidden to eat. I have only [a prohibition against] eating; from where [a prohibition against] benefit? Scripture teaches "and the owner of the ox is clear [naki]" [literally, clean]. What is the implication? Shimon ben Zoma says: like a person who says to his fellow, so-and-so went out clean [naki] of his property and has no benefit from it at all. And say: where he slaughtered it after its verdict was sealed it is permitted to eat, and this "shall not be eaten" refers to where he stoned it, that it is forbidden in benefit, in line with what Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: wherever it says "it shall not be eaten," "you shall not eat," "you shall not eat," both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit are implied, until Scripture specifies for you as it specified regarding carrion, [permitted] to the resident alien by gift and to the foreigner by sale. They said: this applies where the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit issue from one verse; but here, where the prohibition of eating issues from "shall surely be stoned," if it enters your mind that "shall not be eaten" is a prohibition of benefit, let the Merciful One write "he shall not benefit." Rav said: one who betroths a woman with the dung of a stoned ox, she is betrothed [the dung has value]; with the dung of calves of idolatry, she is not betrothed. "And nothing of the devoted thing shall cling to your hand" (Deuteronomy 13:18). There [regarding idolatry] all is forbidden in benefit; here, "its flesh shall not be eaten," its flesh is forbidden but its dung is permitted. And it was necessary [to write] "the owner of the ox is clear," lest you say only its flesh is forbidden but its hide is permitted. As it was taught: Shimon HaAmsoni, and some say Nechemiah HaAmsoni, used to expound every [instance of the word] "et," and so forth.

Our Rabbis taught: "and the owner of the ox is clear." Rabbi Eliezer says: clear of half the ransom [kofer]. Rabbi Akiva said to him: but he himself is paid only from the body [of the ox]; bring it to court and it will pay you. He said to him: Akiva, is this how I seem in your eyes, that my ruling concerns one [an ox] that is liable to death? My ruling concerns only when it killed a person on the testimony of one witness or on the owner's own admission; [for] on the owner's admission, he is one who concedes to a fine and is exempt. He holds that ransom is atonement. Another teaching: Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, is this how I seem in your eyes, that my ruling concerns one that is liable to death? My ruling concerns only one who intended to kill the beast and killed the person, [or aimed] at nonviable offspring and killed a viable being. Another teaching: "and the owner of the ox is clear," Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: clear of the value of [miscarried] offspring. Rabbi Akiva said to him: behold it says "and if men strive" (Exodus 21:22), men and not oxen. Rabbi Akiva spoke well. Rav Adda bar Ahavah said: it was necessary, lest you think: men, when they intended [to strike] one another, even though there is a fatal outcome to the woman they are punished [with payment for offspring]; but had they intended the woman herself they would not be punished, and oxen, even if they intended the woman would be punished; therefore the Merciful One wrote "the owner of the ox is clear," that they are exempt. Another teaching: "and the owner of the ox is clear," Rabbi Akiva says: clear of the value of a slave. Rava said: it was necessary, lest you think: since I am stricter regarding a slave than a free man, for a free man worth a sela one pays a sela, while a slave worth a sela one pays thirty, [the owner] is also paid from his superior property; therefore the Merciful One wrote "the owner of the ox is clear," that he is exempt.

"And if an ox gores a man" (Exodus 21:28). The ox too was already included in the general rule, for it is said, "He who strikes a man so that he dies" (Exodus 21:12). Why then did Scripture remove it from the general rule? To deal more strictly with it, namely that the ox be put to death by stoning. For this reason this passage was stated. "And if an ox gores": from this I know only of an ox. From where do I learn to treat every domestic animal like an ox? I reason thus. "Ox" is said here and "ox" is said elsewhere (at Sinai). Just as the ox spoken of at Sinai made every animal subject to the same law as an ox, so the ox spoken of here makes every animal subject to the same law as an ox. From where do I learn to treat all forms of killing like goring? I reason: since the forewarned ox is stoned and the harmless ox is stoned, if you have learned of the forewarned ox that all forms of killing are treated like goring, the harmless ox too should be so treated. No: if you say this of the forewarned ox, which pays ransom, will you say it of the harmless ox, which pays no ransom? Therefore Scripture teaches "a man or a woman," which is stated only to draw an analogy and to derive a gezeira shava [a verbal-comparison inference]. Just as there all forms of killing are treated like goring, so here it is right that all forms of killing be treated like goring. From where do I learn to treat minors like adults? I reason: since the forewarned ox is stoned and the harmless ox is stoned, if you have learned of the forewarned ox that minors are treated like adults, the harmless ox too should be so. No: if you say this of the forewarned ox, which pays ransom, and so on. Therefore Scripture teaches "or gores a son," which is stated only as a free expression, to draw an analogy and derive a gezeira shava. "Gores" is said here and "gores" is said elsewhere: just as there it treated minors like adults, and so on. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai says: Why is it stated? Lest one say, I can derive it by reasoning: if in a case where Scripture did not treat minors like adults regarding those who slay, it did treat minors like adults regarding those who are slain, then here, where it did treat minors like adults regarding those who slay, is it not right that it treat minors like adults regarding those who are slain? No: if you say this elsewhere, where it treated the unintending like the intending regarding damages, and therefore treated minors like adults regarding those slain, will you say it here, where it did not treat the unintending like the intending regarding damages, and therefore did not treat minors like adults regarding those slain? Therefore Scripture teaches "gores" for a gezeira shava, and so on. "Its flesh shall not be eaten" (Exodus 21:28). From this I know only the prohibition of eating. From where that benefit from it is also forbidden? You say a fortiori: if the heifer whose neck is broken, which atones for bloodshed, is forbidden for benefit, then the ox that is stoned, which sheds blood, surely it is right that it be forbidden for benefit. Or take the opposite: if the stoned ox, which sheds blood, were permitted for benefit, then the heifer whose neck is broken, which atones for bloodshed, is it not right that it be permitted for benefit? Therefore Scripture teaches, "And they shall break the heifer's neck there" (Deuteronomy 21:4). I reasoned and reversed and the reversal collapsed; I am entitled to argue as at first, and so on. Rabbi Yitzchak says: This is unnecessary. If the heifer whose neck is broken, which does not defile the land nor drive away the Divine Presence, is forbidden for benefit, then the stoned ox, which defiles the land and drives away the Divine Presence, surely it is right that it be forbidden for benefit. Rabbi says: If the bulls that are burned, which come only for atonement, are forever forbidden for benefit, then the stoned ox, which does not come to atone, surely it is right that it be forever forbidden for benefit. From this I know only its flesh; from where its hide? Rabbi Yishmael used to say: You argue a fortiori: if the sin-offering, whose flesh is permitted when slaughtered, has its hide forbidden when it dies of itself, then the stoned ox, whose flesh is forbidden even when slaughtered, surely it is right that its hide be forbidden when slaughtered. The carcass shall prove otherwise, for its hide is permitted when the animal dies of itself; it proves regarding the stoned ox that although its flesh is forbidden in slaughter, it is right that its hide be permitted when it dies. One of Rabbi Yishmael's students said: No: if you say this of the carcass, which is permitted for benefit and therefore its hide is permitted at death, will you say it of the stoned ox, which is forbidden for benefit, so that its hide should be forbidden when it dies? "Its flesh shall not be eaten": why is it stated? To include its blood, its fat, and its hide. "And the owner of the ox shall be clear" (Exodus 21:28). Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: clear from the hand of Heaven. For by reasoning one might think: since the forewarned ox is stoned and the harmless ox is stoned, if you have learned of the forewarned ox that even though its owners have escaped the court of flesh and blood the owners have not escaped the court of Heaven, the harmless ox should be the same. Therefore Scripture teaches, "And the owner of the ox shall be clear," clear from the hand of Heaven. Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai says: clear from half-damages. Rabban Gamliel says: clear from the value of a slave. Rabbi Akiva says: clear from the value of the unborn, and so on.

"But if the ox was prone to goring in time past" (Exodus 21:29-30). Which is a forewarned ox? Any concerning which witnesses testified for three days. And a harmless one? One that ceased goring for three days; these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: a forewarned ox is one concerning which they testified three times; and a harmless one is one that children may handle and it does not gore. What is Rabbi Yehuda's reason? Abaye said: "yesterday" is one, "in time past" is two, "the day before" is three, and "its owner did not guard it" refers to a fourth goring. Rava said: "yesterday" and "in time past" are one and the same, and this is what it means: if it was so the day before and the owner did not guard it now, he is liable. And Rabbi Meir, what is his reason? As it was taught, Rabbi Meir said: an inference a fortiori. If when its gorings were spread apart the owner is liable, when its gorings were close together how much more so. Rava said to him: the case of the zav [a man with a flux] disproves it, for if his sightings were spread apart he is impure, and if his sightings were close together he is pure. He said to him: Scripture says, "And this shall be his impurity in his flux" (Leviticus 15:3) it is a decree of Scripture and we do not learn from it. Rav Nachman said in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava: the law follows Rabbi Yehuda, since Rabbi Yose agrees with him, and Rabbi Yose's reasoning is always sound. As it was taught: which is a forewarned ox? Any concerning which witnesses testified for three days. A harmless one? One that children may handle and it does not gore these are the words of Rabbi Yose. Rabbi Shimon says: a forewarned ox is one concerning which they testified three times, and they said "three days" only with regard to its ceasing. "But if the ox was prone to goring": Scripture comes to distinguish between the harmless ox and the forewarned ox. Five matters lie between the harmless ox and the forewarned ox. The forewarned ox requires witnesses; the harmless ox does not require witnesses. The forewarned ox pays ransom; the harmless ox is exempt from ransom. The forewarned ox pays thirty shekels; the harmless ox does not pay thirty shekels. The forewarned ox pays full damages; the harmless ox pays half damages. The forewarned ox pays from the owner's best property; the harmless ox pays from its own body. "In time past, and warning was given to its owner" this tells that he is not liable until they warned him for three days.

"And warning was given to its owner" the Torah said: let the owner of the ox come and stand over his ox. The servant of King Yannai killed a person. Shimon ben Shetach said to the judges: set your eyes upon him and let us judge him. He sent word to the king: your servant has killed a person. The king sent the servant to them. They sent word back to him: come here yourself as well, for the Torah said, "and warning was given to its owner" let the owner of the ox come and stand over his ox. He came and sat down. Shimon ben Shetach said to him: King Yannai, stand on your feet and let them testify against you. It is not before us that you stand, but before the One who spoke and the world came into being, as it is said, "And the two men between whom the dispute lies shall stand before the LORD" (Deuteronomy 19:17). The king said to him: not as you say, but as your colleagues say. Shimon ben Shetach turned to his right; they pressed their faces to the ground. To his left; they pressed their faces to the ground. He said to them: you are masters of scheming thoughts let the Master of thoughts come and exact payment from you. Gabriel came and struck them to the ground. At that moment they declared: a king does not judge and is not judged, does not testify and is not testified against.

"And its owner did not guard it." If the owner tied it with a rope and shut it in properly, yet it got out and caused damage whether harmless or forewarned he is liable; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: for a harmless ox he is liable, but for a forewarned ox he is exempt, as it is said, "and its owner did not guard it" and this was indeed a guarding. Rabbi Elazar says: it has no proper guarding except the knife [slaughter]. What is Rabbi Meir's reason? He holds that oxen in general are not presumed to be guarded, and the Merciful One said the harmless ox's owner is liable so that he should provide it lesser guarding; then the Merciful One repeated "and its owner did not guard it" regarding the forewarned ox, so that he should provide it superior guarding and he learns goring for the harmless from goring for the forewarned. Rabbi Yehuda holds that oxen in general are presumed to be guarded, and the Merciful One said the harmless ox pays so that he should provide superior guarding; then the Merciful One repeated, and so on this is one amplification after another, and an amplification after an amplification serves only to limit, so the Merciful One limited the requirement of superior guarding. And if you say that goring for the harmless and goring for the forewarned should be compared, the Merciful One limited it with "and its owner did not guard it" for this one and not for another. But is this phrase not needed for the prohibition itself? If so, let the Merciful One have written "and he did not guard"; what does "and its owner did not guard it" teach? For this one and not for another. It was taught, Rabbi says: whether harmless or forewarned, if they guarded it with lesser guarding, the owner is exempt. What is his reason? He holds like Rabbi Yehuda, who said that lesser guarding suffices for the forewarned ox, learning goring for the harmless from goring for the forewarned.

Rabbi Elazar says: it has no proper guarding except the knife. As it was taught, Rabbi Natan says: from where do we learn that a person should not raise a vicious dog inside his house, nor set up a shaky ladder inside his house? As it is said, "You shall not bring bloodguilt upon your house" (Deuteronomy 22:8). "And its owner did not guard it" this comes to include an unpaid bailee. "And its owner did not guard it" as is fitting for it. From here they said: if he guarded it as is fitting he is exempt; if not as is fitting he is liable. "And it killed a man or a woman" Scripture equated a woman to a man.

Rabbi Akiva said: what does this come to teach us? If to make one liable for a woman as for a man, it has already been said, "And if an ox gores a man or a woman" (Exodus 21:28). Rather, it comes to compare a woman to a man: just as a man's damages go to his heirs, so a woman's damages go to her heirs. But did Rabbi Akiva hold that the husband does not inherit her? Was it not taught: "and he shall inherit it" (Numbers 27:11), from here that the husband inherits his wife these are the words of Rabbi Akiva? Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Akiva said this only regarding ransom, since it is paid only after death, so it is merely an expectancy, and a husband does not take an expectancy as he takes that which is already held. What is the reason? Because the verse says, "The ox shall be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death. If a ransom be laid upon him" (Exodus 21:29-30) [the ransom is contingent on death]. And regarding damages did Rabbi Akiva not say her damages go to her heirs? Was it not taught: if one struck a woman and her offspring came out, he gives the damage and the pain to the woman and the value of the offspring to the husband; and if there is no husband he gives it to his (the husband's) heirs, not to her heirs. If she was a freed maidservant or a convert, he keeps it. Rabbah said: this speaks of a divorced woman, and so said Rav Nachman: of a divorced woman. They said: a divorced woman too should share in the value of the offspring. Rav Pappa said: the Torah granted the value of the offspring to the husband even if he came to her in licentiousness. What is the reason? As it is written, "as the woman's husband shall lay upon him" (Exodus 21:22).

"The ox shall be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death" (Exodus 21:29). Our Rabbis taught: an ox that killed if before its verdict was rendered the guardian returned it to its owner, it is considered returned; if after its verdict was rendered he returned it, it is not considered returned. The Rabbis hold that one does not render its verdict except in its presence, for the owner could say: had you returned it to me, I would have led it off to the marsh, but now you have handed my ox over into a power against which I cannot plead its case in court. And Rabbi Yaakov holds that one does render its verdict even in its absence. The reason of the Rabbis: "the ox shall be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death" as the death of the owner, so the death of the ox; just as the owner is judged in his presence, so the ox in its presence. And Rabbi Yaakov holds: granted the owner can plead, but is the ox a creature that can plead? If it intended to kill an animal and killed a man, it is exempt. But if it intended to kill this one and killed that one, it is liable. The Mishnah does not accord with Rabbi Shimon, for it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says, even if it intended to kill this one and killed that one, it is exempt. What is Rabbi Shimon's reason? As it is written, "the ox shall be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death" as the death of the owner, so the death of the ox; just as the owner is liable only when he intends, so too the ox the verse says, "and it lay in wait for him" until it intends him specifically.

"The ox shall be stoned" and likewise a domestic animal, a wild animal, and a bird, in the same manner. For one derives "ox" here from "ox" stated regarding the Sabbath. And they have already testified concerning a rooster that was stoned in Jerusalem because it killed a human soul.

An ox that is to be stoned is judged by twenty-three judges, as it is said, "the ox shall be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death" (Exodus 21:29) - as the death of the owner [is judged by a court of twenty-three], so is the death of the ox. Abaye said to him: From where [do you know] that "and its owner also shall be put to death" comes to teach a death like that of the owner? Say it means actual death [of the owner himself]! [The reply:] If so, let Scripture write "and its owner also," and be silent. If it were written that way, I would have said [the owner is put to death] by stoning. [But] stoning should not enter your mind: if he killed [a person] by the sword [the death penalty for an actual murderer], shall his property [the ox, which only indirectly killed] be put to death by stoning [a graver form]? And perhaps what the Merciful One wrote, "shall be put to death," comes to be lenient toward him, to shift him from the sword to strangulation? This works well for the one who says strangulation is more severe, but for the one who says strangulation is more lenient, what can be said? [The reply:] It should not enter your mind [that the owner is liable to court-imposed death at all], for it is written, "if a ransom is laid upon him" (Exodus 21:30) - if it should enter your mind that he is liable to execution, behold it is written, "you shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer" (Numbers 35:31). On the contrary [one might argue], from that very verse: one who actually killed - it is not enough for him to pay money, but only execution suffices; one whose ox killed - let him redeem his life with money [implying he too deserves death and merely escapes it by ransom]. Rather, Hezekiah said: Scripture states, "the murderer shall surely be put to death" (Numbers 35:21) - for his own act of murder you put him to death, but you do not put him to death for his ox's act of murder.

Rava said: An ox that is itself a tereifah [mortally afflicted and unable to survive] which killed [a person] is liable [to be stoned]. An ox belonging to a man who is a tereifah, which killed, is exempt, for Scripture says, "the ox shall be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death" (Exodus 21:29) - wherever you can read in the verse "and its owner also shall be put to death," you can read "the ox shall be stoned," and so on [but where the owner could not in principle be liable to death, neither is the ox]. Rav Ashi said: Even an ox that is itself a tereifah which killed is also exempt. Since, were the owner [in such a comparable case] exempt, the ox too, when it kills, is exempt.

"The ox shall be stoned" (Exodus 21:29) - why is this stated? So that one should not say, I have grounds to argue from logic: if the innocuous ox [tam, one not previously known to gore] is liable to stoning, should the forewarned ox [mu'ad, one already known to be dangerous] not all the more be liable to stoning? No! If you argued thus regarding the innocuous ox - it is because its owner does not pay the ransom, therefore it is stoned; you might say regarding the forewarned ox - since its owner does pay the ransom, therefore it should not be stoned. [To prevent this reasoning,] Scripture teaches, "the ox shall be stoned."

Another interpretation: It [the case of the goring ox] was included in the general rule [of capital cases], and it went out to be treated as a new matter, and [yet Scripture] returned it to its general category. "And its owner also shall be put to death" (Exodus 21:29) - [this means] at the hand of Heaven. Or perhaps it means only at the hand of man [by the court]? When it says, "if a ransom [is laid upon him]" (Exodus 21:30), [we learn that] ransom is given for those who are put to death at the hand of Heaven. Or perhaps it is only for those put to death at the hand of man? When it says, "you shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer" (Numbers 35:31), [we learn] that no ransom is given for those who are to be put to death at the hand of man.

"If a ransom is laid upon him" (Exodus 21:30) - and let a man [who himself kills] be liable to ransom by an a fortiori argument: if an ox, which is not liable for four categories [of damages a person must pay an injured party], is nonetheless liable for ransom, then a man, who is liable for the four categories, is it not logical that he should be liable for ransom? [To refute this,] Scripture says, "if a ransom is laid upon him" - upon him [the ox's owner in this case], and not upon a man [who himself kills, who instead is executed]. Our Rabbis taught: "and he shall give the redemption of his life" (Exodus 21:30) - [this means] the monetary value of the victim. Rabbi Ishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says: the monetary value of the one who caused the damage. Shall we say they dispute this: that the Rabbis hold the ransom is monetary [compensation], while Rabbi Ishmael holds the ransom is atonement? Rav Pappa said: No, all agree the ransom is atonement, and here is what they dispute: the Rabbis hold we assess by the victim. What is the reason of the Rabbis? "Laying" is said above ["if a ransom is laid upon him"] and "laying" is said below; just as there it refers to the victim, so here it refers to the victim [gezeira shava, a verbal analogy linking the two verses]. And Rabbi Ishmael holds, "the redemption of his life" is written [meaning the life of the one who caused the harm]. And the Rabbis [reply]: yes, "the redemption of his life" is written, but when we assess, we assess by the victim.

Rabbi Akiva says: it is the ransom of the soul of one who is to be put to death. And so we find that we do not give ransom for those condemned to death by human hands; in every case where they are liable to death by the court, they have no ransom, as it is said, "Anything devoted to destruction" and so forth (Leviticus 27:29). Rabbi Yishmael says: Come and see how great are the mercies of the Holy One, blessed be He, upon flesh and blood, that a person can ransom himself with money from the hand of Heaven, as it is said, "When you take the sum" and so forth, "a ransom for his soul" (Exodus 30:12); and it says, "each man the ransom of his soul, according to his valuation" (2 Kings 12:5); and it says, "Therefore, O king, let my counsel be acceptable to you" and so forth (Daniel 4:24); and it says, "If there be for him an angel" and so forth (Job 33:23); and it says, "and He is gracious to him and says, Deliver him" and so forth (Job 33:24). We are found to learn: consecrated things have redemption, [other] consecrated things have no redemption; things forbidden in eating have redemption, things forbidden in eating have no redemption; things forbidden in benefit have redemption, things forbidden in benefit have no redemption; fields and vineyards have redemption, fields and vineyards have no redemption; male and female slaves have redemption, male and female slaves have no redemption; those liable to death by the court have redemption, those liable to death by the court have no redemption. Even in the time to come they have redemption: Scripture teaches, saying, "No man can by any means redeem his brother, nor give to God a ransom for him; for the redemption of their soul is costly" and so forth (Psalms 49:8-9). Beloved are Israel, for the Holy One, blessed be He, gave the Egyptians as a payment in exchange for their souls, as it is said, "I have given Egypt as your ransom" (Isaiah 43:3). For what reason? "Because you are precious in My eyes" and so forth (Isaiah 43:4).

"Whether it gores a son or gores a daughter" and so forth (Exodus 21:31), why is this said? Because it says, "and it killed a man or a woman" (Exodus 21:29), I would know only of adults; from where do I derive minors? Scripture teaches, saying, "whether it gores a son or gores a daughter." I would know only a fully developed son or daughter; from where do I derive one of indeterminate sex and a hermaphrodite? Scripture teaches, saying, "whether it gores a son" and so forth. I would know only the son or daughter of another; from where do I derive his own son or daughter? Scripture teaches, saying, "according to this judgment it shall be done to him." I would know only an Israelite; from where do I derive converts? Scripture teaches, saying, "according to this judgment it shall be done to him."

It is taught in another source: "whether it gores a son or gores a daughter" comes to make one liable for minors as for adults. But could this not be derived by logic? Since a person is liable for harm done to a person, and an ox is liable for harm done to a person, just as when a person is liable for a person you did not distinguish between minors and adults, so too when an ox is liable for a person you should not distinguish between minors and adults. And furthermore, it is an a fortiori argument: if regarding a person harming a person, where you did not equate minors with adults [in all respects], he is nevertheless liable for minors as for adults, then regarding an ox harming a person, where you did equate minors with adults, is it not logical that he is liable for minors as for adults? No: if you said so regarding a person harming a person, who is liable for four things, would you say so regarding an ox harming a person, which is not liable for four things? Scripture teaches, saying, "whether it gores a son," to make one liable for minors as for adults. I would know only of a forewarned ox; from where do I derive a tame ox? It is logical: since the owner is liable regarding a man and a woman, and liable regarding a son and a daughter, just as when liable regarding a man and a woman you did not distinguish between tame and forewarned, so too when liable regarding a son and a daughter you should not distinguish between tame and forewarned. And furthermore an a fortiori argument: if regarding a man and a woman, whose claim for damages is weaker, you did not distinguish between tame and forewarned, then regarding a son and a daughter, whose claim for damages is stronger, is it not logical that you should not distinguish between tame and forewarned? You said: but do we reason from the lenient to the stringent in order to be stringent upon it? If the Torah was stringent regarding the forewarned, the stringent case, shall we be stringent regarding the tame, the lenient case? And furthermore, if you said so regarding a man and a woman, who are obligated in the commandments, would you say so regarding a son and a daughter, who are exempt from the commandments? Scripture teaches, saying, "whether it gores a son or gores a daughter": goring for the tame, goring for the forewarned; goring for death, goring for damages. Our Rabbis taught: "according to this judgment it shall be done to him," just as the law of an ox goring an ox, so is the law of an ox goring a person; just as an ox goring an ox, when tame, pays half damages, and when forewarned pays full damages, so too an ox goring a person, when tame, pays half damages, and when forewarned pays full damages. Rabbi Akiva says: "according to this judgment" means like the lower case and not like the upper case. One might think he pays from the best of his property; Scripture teaches, saying, "it shall be done to him": he pays from the ox's body and does not pay from the best of his property. And the Rabbis, why do they need this "it shall be done to him"? To exempt him from the four things. And Rabbi Akiva derives this from "a man against his fellow" (Leviticus 24:19), and not an ox against his fellow. And the Rabbis: from that verse I might have said only pain, but for healing and loss of work I might say they are like damage and should be given to him; therefore it teaches us this.

"If the ox gores a male slave or a female slave" (Exodus 21:32). The male slave and the female slave were also included [in the general rule], as it is said, "and it killed a man or a woman" (Exodus 21:29); yet Scripture removes them from the general rule, to be lenient toward the owner in that even if the slave was worth one hundred maneh, he pays thirty selas, and to be stringent toward him in that even if the slave is worth only a dinar, he pays thirty selas. "If it gores a male slave" and so forth, to make one liable for this one on its own and for that one on its own. "If a slave": Scripture speaks of a Canaanite slave. Or is it perhaps only a Hebrew slave? When it says "thirty shekels of silver" and so forth, behold, Scripture speaks of a Canaanite slave. "Thirty shekels of silver" and so forth, the same for a man and the same for a woman. Another interpretation: "the ox shall be stoned," why is this said? Because it was included in the general rule and went out to be treated as a new matter, Scripture restored it to its general rule.

Resh Lakish said: An ox that killed the slave unintentionally is exempt from the thirty shekels, as it is said, "he shall give thirty shekels of silver to his master, and the ox shall be stoned" (Exodus 21:32): at the time when the ox is subject to stoning, the owners pay thirty shekels; when the ox is not subject to stoning, the owners do not pay thirty shekels.

Rava said: An ox that killed a free person without intent exempts its owner from the ransom payment, for it is said (in the verse above, 21:29), "the ox shall be stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death." If there is to be a ransom, then at the time when the ox is liable to stoning the owners pay ransom; when the ox is not liable to stoning the owners do not pay ransom. When Rav Dimi came he said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: regarding ransom, what does the verse teach by saying "if ransom"? It comes to include a ransom incurred without intent as equal to a ransom incurred with intent. When Rav Dimi came he said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: regarding a slave, what does the verse teach by saying "if a slave"? It comes to include the case of a slave killed without intent as equal to a slave killed with intent. And Reish Lakish holds: "a slave," "if a slave" is not expounded, because it is not written in the place of payments; "ransom," "if ransom" is expounded, because it is written in the place of payments.

"The ox shall be stoned" (Exodus 21:29) - why is this said? So that one should not say: I have a claim from logic. Since a man is subject to death for killing his own male slave or his own female slave, and his ox is subject to death for killing his male slave or his female slave, and another's ox is subject to death for killing his male slave or his female slave - if you have learned that Scripture distinguished between his own ox and another's ox regarding death for his male slave or his female slave, let us also distinguish between his own ox and another's ox regarding his male slave or his female slave. Therefore the verse teaches, "the ox shall be stoned." Scripture informs us that even though it distinguished between his own ox and another's regarding death for his male slave or his female slave, we do not distinguish between his own ox and another's ox regarding his male slave or his female slave.

(Exodus 21:33-34) "If a man opens a pit." Rabbi Elazar said: Two things are not within a person's possession, yet Scripture treated them as though they were within his possession, and these are they: a pit in the public domain, and leavened bread from the sixth hour onward. Rabbi Elazar said, and some report it was taught in a baraita: Four things the Torah reduced concerning their safeguarding, and these are they: pit and fire, tooth and foot. Pit, as it is written, "if a man opens a pit and does not cover it" - thus if he covered it he is exempt. Fire, as it is written (Exodus 22:5), "the one who kindled shall surely make restitution" - he is liable only when he acts in the manner of one who kindles. Tooth, as it is written, "and it consumed" - he is liable only when it acts in the manner of consuming. Foot, as it is written (there), "and let loose" - he is liable only when it acts in the manner of letting loose.

"If a man opens a pit" - I have only "a man"; from where do I include a woman, and so forth? Rabbi Yonatan says, and so forth. Rabbi Yitzchak says, and so forth. "If a man opens a pit" - why is this said? So that one should not say: I have a claim from logic. Since the pit is his property and the ox is his property, if you have learned that he is liable on account of his ox, he should not be liable on account of his pit, and so forth. Therefore the verse teaches, "or if he digs" - thus, because I did not prevail from logic, Scripture needed to bring it explicitly.

Another interpretation: "if a man opens" - to make him liable for this one on its own and for that one on its own.

Another interpretation: "if a man opens" - I have only one who opens; from where do I include one who digs? The verse teaches, "or if he digs." So that one should not say: I have a claim from logic - if the one who opens is liable, the one who digs should not be liable? Now if you had said so, you would have imposed a penalty by logic. Therefore it is said, "if he digs," to teach you that we do not impose a monetary penalty by logic.

Another interpretation: it compared the one who opens to the one who digs, and the one who digs to the one who opens. Just as the one who opens is exempt when he has permission, so too the one who digs is exempt when he has permission; and just as the one who digs is liable only at the requisite depth, so too the one who opens is liable only at the requisite depth. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beteira says: the case of the one who opens is not like the case of the one who digs, and the case of the one who digs is not like the case of the one who opens. The feature common to both is: whatever a person is obligated to safeguard, he is liable for its damage; so too anything a person is obligated to safeguard, he is liable for its damage. I have only one who opens and one who digs; from where do I include one who plasters it or shapes it? The verse teaches, "and does not cover it" - thus it was not the opening or the digging that caused it, but rather the failure to cover. "And does not cover it" comes to include an unpaid custodian.

Another interpretation: "he shall cover it" - as is fitting for it. From here they said: if he covered it fittingly he is exempt; if not fittingly he is liable. If he covered it and another uncovered it, the one who uncovered it is liable. Partners who covered the pit - if one of them uncovered it, the one who uncovered it is liable. If it became uncovered and one of them knew of it, the one who knew of it is liable and the one who did not know of it is exempt. "And there falls into it an ox or a donkey" - an ox, and not an ox with its gear; a donkey, and not a donkey with its gear. For it would have followed by logic: if in a place where one is not liable for the animal one is liable for the gear, here where one is liable for the animal is it not right that one be liable for the gear? Therefore the verse teaches, "and there falls into it an ox or a donkey" - an ox, and not an ox with its gear; a donkey, and not a donkey with its gear. "And there falls into it an ox" - in the manner of its walking. From here they said: if it fell forward from the sound of the digging, he is liable; backward from the sound of the digging, he is exempt. But concerning the pit itself, whether forward or backward, he is liable.

The owner of the pit shall make restitution in every case. "He shall restore money to its owner" (Exodus 21:34). I have here only money; from where do I learn that he may pay with an animal? You reason thus: it says here, "and the dead beast shall be his" (Exodus 21:34), and it says elsewhere, "and the dead beast shall be his" (Exodus 21:36). Just as there it speaks of an animal, so here it speaks of an animal; and just as there it speaks of money, so here it speaks of money. "And the dead beast shall be his" - this refers to the one who suffered the damage. Or does it perhaps refer only to the one who caused the damage? You answer: if that were so, what need would there be for Scripture to say "and the dead beast shall be his"? Rather, Scripture tells you that we assess the value of the carcass and deduct it from what he owes for the damage.

"And an ox or a donkey falls into it, and the dead beast shall be his" (Exodus 21:33-34) - the Rabbis hold as settled that the pit causes death in ten handbreadths. In nine handbreadths it causes injury but does not cause death. A derivative of the category of the pit is one's stone, one's knife, or one's load that he set down in the public domain and they caused damage, since from the start they were made in a way that causes harm, and they are one's property, and their safekeeping is upon you. "And an ox or a donkey falls in there" - an ox and not a person, a donkey and not vessels. From here they said: if an ox with its gear fell in and the gear was broken, or a donkey with its gear and the gear was torn, he is liable for the animal but exempt for the vessels. To what is this comparable? To one's stone, knife, or load set down in the public domain that caused damage. Therefore, if he flung down his flask, he is liable. The first ruling exempts and the latter holds liable. Rav resolves it according to his own view: in what case is the exemption stated? When he renounced ownership of them; but if he did not renounce ownership, he is liable, and therefore if he flung down his flask he is liable. And Samuel resolves it according to his own view: now that you have said one's stone, knife, and load are like one's pit, according to Rabbi Judah, who holds one liable for damage to vessels by a pit, if he flung down his flask against a stone he is liable.

Rav said: a pit, for which the Torah imposes liability, is liable for its foul air but not for its impact, since he holds that the impact is the ground of the world that injured him. And Samuel said: it is liable for its foul air, and all the more so for its impact. And if you should say it is liable for its impact but not for its foul air - the Torah testified concerning the pit even if it were filled with sponges of wool. What is the difference between them? Between them is the case of one who built a mound in the public domain. According to Rav he is not liable for the height, while according to Samuel he is also liable for the height. What is Rav's reason? "And an ox falls in there" - until it falls into a hollow. And Samuel said: "and it falls" implies anything at all. One who digs a pit in the public domain, and an ox or donkey falls into it and dies, is liable. The same applies to one who digs a pit, a ditch, a cave, trenches, or wedge-shaped cuts. If so, why is "pit" stated? Just as a pit that has enough depth to kill is ten handbreadths, so too anything with enough depth to kill is ten handbreadths. If they were less than ten handbreadths, and an ox or donkey fell in and died, he is exempt; but if it was injured there, he is liable. A pit is round. A ditch is long and narrow. A cave is rectangular and roofed. Trenches are not roofed and are not wider above than below. Wedge-shaped cuts are wider above than below. It was taught: Rabbi Judah says he is liable for damage to vessels in a pit. What is the Rabbis' reason? Scripture said "and an ox falls in there" - an ox and not a person, a donkey and not vessels. And Rabbi Judah holds that "or" comes to include vessels. And the Rabbis hold that "or" is needed to divide the cases. And Rabbi Judah derives the division from "and it falls," which implies one. And the Rabbis hold "and it falls" implies many. One might say: "and it falls" is a generalization, "an ox or a donkey" is a specification; in a generalization-and-specification the generalization includes only what is in the specification, so an ox and a donkey but nothing else. They said: "the owner of the pit shall make restitution" returns and generalizes again, and in a generalization-specification-generalization you may derive only things like the specification. Just as the specification names living creatures, so all living creatures are included. One might say: just as the specification names a thing whose carcass conveys impurity by contact and by carrying, but not birds - if so, let the Torah write only one specification. Which should it write? Had the Torah written "ox," I would say one that is offered on the altar yes, one not offered no. And had the Torah written "donkey," I would say one sanctified as a firstborn yes, one not sanctified as a firstborn no. Rather, Scripture said "he shall restore money to its owner" - anything that has an owner. If so, even vessels and a slave and a maidservant should make him liable; Scripture said "ox" and not a person, "donkey" and not vessels. And according to Rabbi Judah, who includes vessels, granted that "ox" excludes a person, but what does "donkey" exclude? Rather, Rava said: the donkey of the pit according to Rabbi Judah, and the sheep of a lost item according to all opinions, is difficult. One ox and any animal are alike regarding falling into the pit.

Our Rabbis taught: one who digs a pit in a private domain and opens it onto the public domain is liable; this is the pit spoken of in the Torah, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: one who renounced ownership of his ground but did not renounce ownership of his pit - this is the pit spoken of in the Torah. Rabbah said: regarding a pit in the public domain, all agree he is liable, as it is written "if a man opens" and "if a man digs": if he is liable for opening, all the more so for digging - rather, liability comes to him through the act of opening and through the act of digging. They differ only about a pit in his own domain. Rabbi Akiva holds he is liable even for a pit in his own domain, as it is written "the owner of the pit shall make restitution" - the Merciful One speaks of a pit that has an owner. And Rabbi Ishmael holds "the owner of the pit shall make restitution" means the owner of the hazard, of whom the Merciful One spoke. Then what is "this is the pit spoken of in the Torah" that Rabbi Akiva said? This is the pit with which Scripture began the discussion of payment. And Rav Joseph said: regarding a pit in a private domain, all agree he is liable; what is the reason? "The owner of the pit" said the Merciful One, one who has an owner. They differ only about a pit in the public domain. Our Rabbis taught: if he dug and opened and handed it over to the public, he is exempt. Such was the practice of Nehunya the digger of cisterns. And when the matter came before the Sages, they said: this man has fulfilled this law as well. Our Rabbis taught: it happened that the daughter of Nehunya the digger of cisterns fell into a great pit. They came and informed Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa. In the first hour he said to them: "Peace." In the second he said to them: "Peace." In the third he said to them: "She has come up." He said to her: "My daughter, who brought you up?" She said to him: "A ram chanced to meet me, and an old man was leading it." They said to him: "Are you a prophet?" He said to them: "I am no prophet, nor the son of a prophet, but I said: shall the very thing in which that righteous man toiled bring a stumbling block to his offspring?" Rabbi Zeira said: even so, his son died of thirst, as it is said: "and around Him it storms mightily" (Psalms 50:3) - this teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, is exacting with those around Him even to a hair's breadth. Our Rabbis taught: a person should not clear stones from his own ground into the public domain. It happened that a certain man was clearing stones from his ground into the public domain. A certain pious man found him and said to him: "Empty one, why do you clear stones from a domain that is not yours into a domain that is yours?" He mocked him. In time that man had need and sold his field, and he was walking through that same public domain and stumbled over those very stones. He said: "Well did that pious man say to me, why do you clear stones from a domain that is not yours into a domain that is yours." Our Rabbis taught: if one digs a pit nine handbreadths deep and another comes and completes it to ten, the last is liable. Rabbi says: the last is liable for death, and both are liable for injury. What is the Rabbis' reason? It is written "if he opens" and "if he digs": if he is liable for opening, all the more so for digging - rather, this comes to include a digger after a digger, who removed the first one's act. And Rabbi says to you: those verses are each needed as we said. Then what is the Rabbis' reason? Scripture said "if a man digs a pit" - one and not two. And Rabbi holds that verse is needed for "if a man digs a pit" - and not an ox that digs a pit. And the Rabbis hold "a man, a pit" is written twice. And Rabbi holds that since it wrote the one it wrote the other. And as for the Rabbis, from where do they know to hold the latter liable; perhaps it holds the first liable? It cannot enter your mind, for Scripture said "and the dead beast shall be his" - the Merciful One spoke of the one who caused the death. And this "and the dead beast shall be his" is needed for Rava's teaching, for Rava said: a disqualified consecrated ox that fell into a pit, he is exempt, as it is said "and the dead beast shall be his," one whose dead beast is his own, excluding this one whose dead beast is not his own. They said: do you not learn this on your own, since we are dealing with one who caused the death?