Yalkut Shimoni on Torah Reader

Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: "And she shall go out free, without money" (Exodus 21:11) means there is no money for this master, but there is money for another master [the verse teaches that the maidservant who has been freed without payment may still be acquired in marriage by another with money]. But does this "and she shall go out free" really come for that lesson? That phrase is needed for what was taught: "And she shall go out free" - these are the days of full maturity; "without money" - these are the days of girlhood [a maidservant goes free when she reaches these stages without her master receiving payment]. Ravina said: If so, let the verse write "without money" [spelled defectively]; what is the force of the fuller spelling of "without"? It teaches there is no money for this master and so forth. And from where do we know that we expound in this way? As it was taught: "And she has no child" (Leviticus 22:13) - I have only her child; from where do I include her child's child? Scripture says "and she has no child" - examine her case in any event [the extra letter signals an expansion to descendants]. But you have already used that for her child's child! The child's child does not require a verse, for grandchildren are like children, and the verse is needed only for unfit offspring. And the very teacher who expounds in this way, from where does he learn it? They said: It is written "my brother-in-law refuses" (Deuteronomy 25:7) and "Balaam refused to go with us," and there the word is written without a yod, whereas here it is written with a yod; learn from this that it comes for an exposition. "And she shall go out free" - these are the days of maturity. "Without money" - these are the days of girlhood. But let the Merciful One write only girlhood and not require maturity! Rava said: This one came and taught about that one, just as in the case of the resident and the hired laborer, as it was taught: "a resident" (Exodus 12:45 and elsewhere) - this is one acquired as a permanent possession, and so forth. Abaye said to him: Are the cases comparable? There you have two separate bodies, but here, once she leaves girlhood, what need is there of maturity beside it? Mar bar Rav Ashi said: It is needed only for the essential validity of the sale of a barren woman incapable of bearing children. You might have thought that if she develops the signs of girlhood the sale is a valid sale, and if she does not develop the signs of girlhood the sale is not a valid sale; the verse therefore teaches us otherwise.

"One who strikes a man so that he dies shall surely be put to death" (Exodus 21:12). Why is this said? Because it says "And a man who strikes any human life," I might hear that even if he merely slapped him with a slap he is liable; Scripture therefore says "and one who strikes a man so that he dies," that he is not liable until the soul departs. "One who strikes a man so that he dies" - I have only a man who struck a man; from where do I include one who struck a woman or a minor? Scripture says "And a man who strikes any human life," to bring in the man who struck a woman or a minor. A woman who killed her fellow woman or a minor, from where? Scripture says "he is a murderer" (Numbers 35:16); it comes for its own instruction. "One who strikes a man" - even a minor victim. Or perhaps only a grown man, as it sounds plainly? Scripture says "And a man who strikes any human life." I might hear that even a child of eight months is included; Scripture says "and one who strikes a man," telling that he is not liable until he kills a viable child. "He shall surely be put to death" - with forewarning by witnesses. Or perhaps even without forewarning by witnesses? Scripture says "by the mouth of two witnesses" (Deuteronomy 17:6). "He shall surely be put to death" - by a court. Or perhaps even not by a court? Scripture says "the murderer shall not be put to death until he stands" before the assembly. "He shall surely be put to death" - by the sword. Or perhaps only by strangling? You may reason thus: it says here "he shall surely be put to death," and it says "he shall surely be put to death" regarding the adulterer (Leviticus 20:10); just as there it is by strangling, so here by strangling. You compare him to the adulterer, but I compare him to the blasphemer: it says here "he shall surely be put to death," and it says of the blasphemer "he shall surely be put to death" (Leviticus 24:16); just as there it is by stoning, so here by stoning. Scripture therefore says "whoever sheds the blood of man" and so forth (Genesis 9:6). Still I might say: let one open a vein from two of his limbs and let him die that way. Scripture says "and they shall break the heifer's neck there in the valley" (Deuteronomy 21:4) and "and you shall remove the innocent blood" (Deuteronomy 21:9); shedders of blood are compared to the heifer whose neck is broken: just as the heifer's neck is broken by severing the head, so all shedders of blood are executed by severing the head. We have heard the punishment; we have not heard the warning. Scripture says "You shall not murder."

"And one who did not lie in wait, but God brought it to his hand" (Exodus 21:13). As the proverb of the ancients says: "From the wicked comes forth wickedness" (1 Samuel 24:13). Of what does Scripture speak? Of two people who each killed a person, one who killed unintentionally and one who killed intentionally, and for this one there are no witnesses and for that one there are no witnesses. So the Holy One, blessed be He, arranges for both of them to come to a single inn. The one who killed intentionally sits beneath a ladder, and the one who killed unintentionally comes down the ladder and falls upon him and kills him. It turns out that the one who killed intentionally is killed, and the one who killed unintentionally goes into exile [to a city of refuge]. Thus each receives his due measure without human witnesses. "And I will appoint for you a place" - "and I will appoint for you," in your lifetime. "A place," in your own place. "To which he may flee" - this teaches that the Israelites went into exile in the wilderness. To where did they go into exile? To the camp of the Levites. From here they said: a Levite who killed goes into exile from one district to another. And if he went into exile within his own district, his own district takes him in. Rav Acha the son of Rav Ika said: What is the verse for this? "For in the city of his refuge he shall dwell" (Numbers 35:28) - for it had already taken him in before.

"And one who did not lie in wait" - this excludes one who intended to throw a stone two cubits and threw it four [an unforeseeable distance, which is treated differently]. "And I will appoint for you a place" - but I have not heard where. You may reason thus: a refuge is mentioned for the moment and a refuge is mentioned for the generations; just as the refuge mentioned for the generations means the cities of the Levites take in the killer, so the refuge mentioned for the moment means the camps of the Levites take him in. Issi ben Yaakov says: "And I will appoint for you a place" - why is this said? Because it says "let each man stay in his place" and so forth - this means two thousand cubits; or perhaps only four cubits? You may reason thus: it says "place" here and it says "place" further on; just as the "place" mentioned further on means two thousand cubits, so the "place" mentioned here means two thousand cubits.

"And if a man acts with intent" (Exodus 21:14). The school of Hezekiah taught: a man acts with intent and can father children, but a minor cannot act with intent and father children. And from where do we know that this word "acts with intent" is a term of cooking or ripening? As it is written, "and Jacob cooked a stew" (Genesis 25:29). Rava said: a minor does not beget, as it says "and if the man has no redeemer" (Numbers 5:8) - and is there a person in Israel who has no redeeming kinsman? Rather, the verse speaks of robbing a convert. And the Merciful One said "a man" - him you must investigate to see whether he has kinsmen or not; a minor you need not investigate, for it is known that he has no offspring to redeem. Abaye raised an objection to him: "a man" (Leviticus 19:20) - I have only a man; from where a boy of nine years and one day with regard to intercourse? Scripture says "and a man." He said to him: he has the capacity but does not produce seed, like grain that has not yet reached a third of its ripening. "And if a man acts with intent" - why is this said? Because it says "And a man who strikes any human life," I might think this includes the intentional and the unintentional killer alike, and others, and the physician who killed, and one who strikes by authority of the court, and one who disciplines his son or his student; Scripture says "and if a man acts with intent," to exclude the unintentional killer; "a man," to exclude the minor; "his fellow," to exclude the others. Issi ben Akiva says: before the giving of the Torah we were warned against the shedding of blood. After the giving of the Torah, instead of being made stricter, they were made more lenient. In truth they said: he is exempt from the laws of flesh and blood, and his judgment is handed over to Heaven. "To kill him by cunning" - to exclude a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who do not act with cunning, and to exclude the physician who killed, one who strikes by authority of the court, and one who disciplines his son or his student; for although they act with intent, they do not act with cunning.

Ulla said: From where do we know forewarning from the Torah? As it is written, "And a man who takes his sister, the daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother, and sees her nakedness" (Leviticus 20:17) - and does the matter depend on seeing? Rather, it means until they show him the gravity of the matter [that is, warn him]. If the verse is not needed for the penalty of excision, apply it to the penalty of lashes. The school of Hezekiah taught: "And if a man acts with intent against his fellow to kill him by cunning" - that they forewarned him and he is still acting with intent. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: "those who found him gathering wood" (Numbers 15:33) - that they forewarned him and he is still gathering. The school of Rabbi taught: "because she did not cry out in the city" (Deuteronomy 22:24) - concerning matters of speech [her failure to protest implies she could have been warned]. And all three are necessary. For had the Merciful One written only regarding his sister, I would have said: those liable to lashes, yes, but those liable to court-imposed death, no; the Merciful One therefore wrote "and if a man acts with intent." And had the Merciful One written only "and if a man acts with intent," I would have said: these words apply to death by the sword, which is lenient, but to stoning, which is severe, say it does not apply; therefore it is necessary. Why are two cases needed among those who are stoned? According to Rabbi Shimon, to include those who are burned; according to the Sages, a matter that comes by an inference from minor to major Scripture nevertheless takes the trouble to write out explicitly.

"From My altar you shall take him to die" (Exodus 21:14) - this teaches that they interrupt the service in his hands, and he goes out to be executed. "From My altar you shall take him to die" - the verse comes to teach that the prosecution of murder overrides the Temple service. For by logic it would be otherwise: if the Sabbath, which the service overrides, is not overridden by execution for murder, then the service, which overrides the Sabbath, surely should not be overridden by execution for murder; Scripture therefore says "from My altar," the verse comes to teach that execution for murder overrides the service. And should execution for murder then override the Sabbath by inference from minor to major? If the service, which overrides the Sabbath, is itself overridden by execution for murder, then the Sabbath, which the service overrides, surely should be overridden by execution for murder. No: in the case of the service, the burial of a neglected corpse overrides it, therefore execution overrides it; but you cannot say so of the Sabbath, which the burial of a neglected corpse does not override. A student of Rabbi Yishmael said: it says "you shall not kindle fire" and so forth (Exodus 35:3). Was not burning included in the general rule of court-imposed deaths? It went out to teach: just as burning, which is one of the court-imposed deaths, does not override the Sabbath, so all other court-imposed deaths do not override the Sabbath. "From My altar you shall take him to die" - to die, and not to be judged, not to be flogged, not to be exiled. "From My altar you shall take him to die" - we find that the Sanhedrin sat beside the altar. And although there is no proof of the matter, there is a hint of it, as it says, "And Joab fled to the tent of the LORD and took hold of the horns of the altar" (1 Kings 2:28).

Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Akiva, Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, and Rabbi Yose the Galilean were once walking on the road, and Levi the arranger and Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah were walking behind them. This question was asked before them: From where do we know that saving a life overrides the Sabbath? Rabbi Yishmael answered and said: "If the thief is found breaking in and is struck so that he dies" (Exodus 22:1) - if this one, where there is doubt whether he came over property or came over lives, and bloodshed defiles the land and causes the Divine Presence to depart from Israel, yet permission was given to save oneself at the cost of his life, then how much more so does saving a life override the Sabbath. Rabbi Akiva answered and said: "from My altar you shall take him to die" - from My altar, but not from upon My altar; and they taught this only with regard to putting to death, but to keep alive, one may take him even from upon My altar; and if this one, where there is doubt whether there is substance to the accusation against him, and yet the service overrides the Sabbath, how much more so does saving a life override the Sabbath. Rabbi Elazar answered and said: if circumcision, which repairs one of a person's limbs, overrides the Sabbath, how much more so does saving his entire body override the Sabbath. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: "only you shall keep My Sabbaths" (Exodus 31:13) - I might think for all; Scripture says "only," it made a distinction. Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says: "for it is holy to you" - it is handed over into your hands, and you are not handed over into its hands. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: "to keep the Sabbath for your generations" (Exodus 31:16) - the Torah said: profane one Sabbath on his behalf so that he may keep many Sabbaths. Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: had I been there I would have said something better than all of them: "which a man shall do and live by them" (Leviticus 18:5) - and not that he should die by them. Rava said: all of them have a refutation except for the teaching of Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel, which has no refutation. As for Rabbi Yishmael's, perhaps it is as Rabbah said: what is the reason for the law of the burglar? There is a presumption that a man does not restrain himself over his money, and this thief knows the owner will stand against him and has resolved, if he stands against me I will kill him, and the Torah said: if one comes to kill you, rise early to kill him first. So we have found this where the danger is certain; where it is only a doubt, from where? As for Rabbi Akiva's, perhaps it is as Abaye said: we hand the accused over to a pair of rabbis to learn whether there is substance to his words; if there is, we put him to death, and if not, we do not. So again we have found certainty; where it is doubt, from where? But Shmuel's teaching certainly has no refutation. This is what people say: better one sharp pepper than a whole basketful of pumpkins.

"And one who strikes his father or his mother shall surely be put to death" (Exodus 21:15). Because Scripture says "an eye for an eye," and here the verse removes this case from the general rule to be more severe with him, that he should be punished with death, therefore this passage was stated. "And one who strikes his father or his mother": I know only of one who strikes both his father and his mother together. As for his father but not his mother, or his mother but not his father, from where do we learn this? You may reason: since one who strikes is liable and one who curses is liable, just as for cursing he is liable for each parent on his own, so too for striking he should be liable for each one on his own. Not so. If you have said this concerning one who curses, who is liable for cursing the dead as for the living, and is therefore liable for each one separately, would you say the same of one who strikes, who is not liable for striking the dead as for the living, and therefore should not be liable for each one separately? Scripture teaches, "and one who strikes his father or his mother," meaning he is liable even for striking one of them. These are the words of Rabbi Yoshiyah. Rabbi Yonatan says: the phrase implies both of them as one, and it implies each one on his own, until Scripture specifies for you "together." Rabbi Yitzchak says: did the mention of his mother come only to be more severe with him, or also to be lenient with him? Not because it was made more severe in his case is it to be made lenient in his case. "And one who strikes his father or his mother": a blow that produces a wound. Or perhaps even a blow that produces no wound? You said: if in the realm of damages, which is broader, one is not liable until he produces a wound, then in the realm of penalties, which is narrower, surely he should not be liable until he produces a wound. So what does Scripture teach by "one who strikes his father or his mother"? A blow that produces a wound. "He shall surely be put to death": by strangulation. Or perhaps by one of the other forms of death stated in the Torah? You said: this is a principle stated in the Torah, that any death stated in the Torah without specification you are not permitted to interpret stringently but only leniently. These are the words of Rabbi Yoshiyah. Rabbi Yonatan says: not because it is the lenient one, but because it is stated without specification, and any death stated without specification is by strangulation. Rabbi says: it is like the death stated as being at the hand of Heaven; just as death at the hand of Heaven leaves no mark, so too the death stated here leaves no mark. From here they said: the death of strangulation was carried out by sinking the condemned man into refuse up to his knees, placing a hard cloth within a soft one, winding it about his neck, and then one witness pulled in one direction and the other pulled in the other direction until his soul departed. This is the order of strangulation. We have heard the penalty, but we have not heard the prohibition. Scripture teaches, "forty stripes he may give him, he shall not exceed" (Deuteronomy 25:3). And behold, these things are an argument from minor to major: if one who is commanded to strike is nevertheless warned not to strike beyond measure, then one who is commanded not to strike, it is only right that he be warned not to strike.

"And one who strikes his father or his mother shall surely be put to death" (Exodus 21:15): by strangulation. Should I say he is not liable to be killed until he actually kills the parent? That cannot enter your mind, for if he killed another person it would be by the sword, while killing his father is by strangulation. This works well for the one who holds that strangulation is the lighter death; but for the one who holds that strangulation is the more severe death, what can be said? Rather, from what is written "one who strikes a man so that he dies" (Exodus 21:14) and "he struck him so that he died" (Numbers 35:16), learn from this that wherever "striking" is written without specification, it means mere striking that is not death. And should I say he is liable even though he produced no wound? Why then did we learn in the Mishnah "one who strikes his father or his mother" is not liable until he produces a wound in them? Scripture says "and one who strikes the life of an animal shall make it good" (Leviticus 24:18); if this is not needed for the matter of an animal's life, since if he struck it with stones he is liable even though he produced no wound, apply it to the matter of a human life. And why do I need the analogy at all? "One who strikes the life of a man" and "one who strikes an animal" (Leviticus 24:17-18): just as one who strikes an animal for the sake of healing is exempt, so too one who strikes a man for the sake of healing is exempt. For we inquired: a son, what is the law concerning his letting blood for his father? Rav Matnah said: "you shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18). Rav Dimi bar Chanina said: "one who strikes a man, one who strikes an animal": just as one who strikes an animal for healing is exempt, so too one who strikes a man for healing is exempt. Rav would not allow his son to remove a thorn from him, and Mar son of Ravina would not allow his son to lance a boil for him; he said: perhaps he will wound and it will turn out to be an inadvertent transgression. If so, the same should apply to another person too. With another, the inadvertent act is of a mere prohibition; with his own son, the inadvertent act is of strangulation. But we learned that a hand needle is permitted to remove a thorn with it on the Sabbath; let us be concerned lest he wound and it become a transgression punishable by stoning. There the act is destructive, and even according to Rabbi Shimon, who says one who destroys by wounding is liable, any labor not needed for its own sake one is exempt for. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: in all cases a son is not made an agent to strike or curse his father, except in the case of one who incites or seduces to idolatry, for the Torah said "you shall not have pity on him nor shall you cover for him" (Deuteronomy 13:9).

"And one who steals a man and sells him" (Exodus 21:16): why is this stated? Because it says "if a man is found stealing a person of his brothers" (Deuteronomy 24:7), I would know only of witnesses to the theft; witnesses to the sale, from where do we learn? Scripture teaches, "and one who steals a man and sells him." "And one who steals a man": I know only of a man who stole a man. One who stole a woman or a minor, from where? Scripture teaches, "if a man is found stealing," to include one who stole a woman or a minor. A woman who stole her fellow woman or a minor, from where? Scripture teaches "and the thief shall die," in any case. "And one who steals a man": even the minor is implied. Scripture teaches "and if a man is found stealing a person," to exclude the minor. "Stealing a person": I might understand that even a child of eight days is implied. Scripture teaches "and one who steals a man," telling us that he is not liable until he steals a viable person. "And sells him": and not one who sold half of him. "And he is found": there is no "finding" except by witnesses. "In his hand": "in his hand" everywhere means only his possession; and although there is no proof for the matter, there is a remembrance of the matter, as it says "and he took all his land from his hand" (Numbers 21:26), and it says "and the servant took ten camels" (Genesis 24:10). "He shall surely be put to death": by strangulation. Or perhaps by one of the other forms of death stated in the Torah? A death that leaves no mark. We have heard the penalty, but we have not heard the prohibition. Scripture teaches, "you shall not steal" (Exodus 20:13).

One who steals a person from Israel is not liable until he brings him into his own domain. Rabbi Yehudah says: not until he brings him into his domain and uses him, as it is said "and he treated him as a slave and sold him" (Deuteronomy 24:7). And the first teacher does not require "use." Rav Acha son of Rava said: the case of "use" worth less than a perutah is the difference between them. Rabbi Yirmeyah inquired: if he stole him and sold him while the victim was asleep, what is the law? Rav Ashi inquired: if he sold a maidservant for the sake of the fetus she carries, what is the law? Let it be derived that there is no "use" at all here. No, it is necessary: the sleeping case is where he leaned upon him, and the maidservant case is where he stood her up against the wind. Is this the manner of "use" or is this not the manner of "use"? Let it stand unresolved.

It was taught: "if a man is found stealing a person" (Deuteronomy 24:7): whether one steals a man, or steals a woman, or a convert, or a freed slave, or a minor, he is liable. If he stole him but did not sell him, or sold him but the victim was still in his domain, he is exempt. If he sold him to his own father, or to his brother, or to one of the relatives, he is liable. One who steals slaves is exempt. A reciter taught before Rav Sheshet. He said to him: I teach it thus: Rabbi Shimon says, "from his brothers," meaning he is not liable until he takes the victim out of the domain of his brothers; yet you said he is liable? Teach instead: exempt. For the anonymous Sifrei follows Rabbi Shimon. One who steals his own son: Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka holds him liable, and the sages exempt him. What is the reasoning of the sages? It is written "and he is found in his hand shall surely be put to death," excluding one already found present. Therefore those teachers of young children, and those who instruct the rabbis, are like ones already found in his hand, and are exempt. If one stole a person who is half slave and half free: Rabbi Yehudah holds him liable, and the sages exempt him. Rabbi Yehudah reasons: "from his brothers" excludes slaves, and "the children of Israel" excludes one who is half slave; this is a restriction after a restriction, and a restriction after a restriction serves only to expand. And the sages hold: "from his brothers" to exclude slaves does not imply itself to them, for he is a brother in the commandments; "the children of Israel," "from the children of Israel," one phrase to exclude slaves and one to exclude one who is half slave.

"Any man who curses his father" (Leviticus 20:9): what does Scripture teach by saying "any man, any man"? To include the one of indeterminate sex and the one of double sex. "Who curses his father": I know only of his father and his mother together. His father but not his mother, his mother but not his father, from where? Scripture teaches, "his father he cursed, his mother he cursed," in any case. These are the words of Rabbi Yoshiyah. Rabbi Yonatan says: the phrase implies both of them as one, and it implies each one on his own, until Scripture specifies for you "together." Our rabbis taught: "his father and his mother he cursed": even after death. For I might have thought: since he is liable for striking and liable for cursing, and just as with striking he treated the one not of your people like one of your people, is it not right that he should not be liable after death? Scripture teaches, "his father and his mother he cursed." This works well for Rabbi Yonatan, for whom the verse "his father and his mother" is extra; but for Rabbi Yoshiyah, what can be said? And the other one needs it to include the one of indeterminate sex and the one of double sex. But let him derive that from "any man, any man." The Torah spoke in the language of human beings.

"And one who curses his father or his mother" (Exodus 21:17), why is this said? Because it says, "For any man who curses" (Leviticus 20:9), I would know only of a man; from where do I derive a woman? Scripture teaches, saying, "And one who curses his father or his mother." [This refers to cursing] by the Explicit Name. Or is it perhaps even by a substitute appellation? Scripture teaches, saying, "When he pronounces the Name [of the LORD]" (Leviticus 24:16), for that verse need only be said in order to include the one who curses his father and mother, teaching that he is not liable until he curses them by the Explicit Name. These are the words of Rabbi Acha bar Yoshiyah. Rabbi Chananyah ben Idi says: Since the Torah said "swear" and "do not swear," "curse" and "do not curse": just as swearing is by the Name, so too "do not swear" is by the Name; and just as cursing is by the Name, so too "do not curse" is by the Name. "He shall surely be put to death" (Exodus 21:17), by stoning. Or is it perhaps by one of the other deaths stated in the Torah? You reason thus: it says here "his blood is upon him" (Leviticus 20:9), and it says elsewhere "their blood is upon them"; just as there the death is by stoning, so too here it is by stoning. We have heard the punishment, but we have not heard the prohibition. Scripture teaches, saying, "You shall not curse a judge" (Exodus 22:27). If your father is a judge, he is included in "You shall not curse a judge." If your father is a prince, he is included in "and you shall not curse a prince among your people" (Exodus 22:27). If he is neither judge nor prince, you reason by constructing a principle from both of them: a judge is not exactly like a prince, and a prince is not exactly like a judge, yet the common factor in both is that they are among your people and you are warned against cursing them; so too your father, who is among your people, and you are warned against cursing him. A judge you are commanded regarding his ruling; a prince you are commanded regarding rebellion against him; so too I will bring your father, who is among your people, and you are commanded regarding cursing him. What is distinctive about the common factor in them? That their greatness brought this upon them. Scripture teaches, saying, "You shall not curse the deaf" (Leviticus 19:14); Scripture speaks of the wretched among your people. What is distinctive about the deaf? That his deafness brought this upon him. The prince and the judge will prove the point. What is distinctive about the prince and the judge? That their greatness, and so forth. What is distinctive about the common factor in them? That they are exceptional. If so, let Scripture write either "a judge and a deaf person" or "a prince and a deaf person." Why do I need "a judge" [in the sense of God or ruler]? If it is not needed for its own matter, apply it to the matter of his father. This works well for the one who says "Elohim" [in Exodus 22:27] means a secular judge; but according to the one who says "Elohim" means the sacred Name, what can be said? As it is taught, and so forth. These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: this is the prohibition against one who blesses [a euphemism for blasphemes] the Name, and so forth. It works well for the one who says "Elohim" means secular, for he derives the sacred from the secular; but according to the one who says "Elohim" means sacred, how does he derive the secular from the sacred? Perhaps Scripture warned only regarding the sacred and did not warn regarding the secular. If so, let Scripture write "Elohim you shall not treat lightly"; what is "you shall not curse"? Learn from this two matters.

"And if men quarrel" (Exodus 21:18): why is this stated? Because it says "an eye for an eye" (below, verse 24), but as for loss of work and healing we have not heard. Scripture teaches, "and if men quarrel, if he rises again," the verse comes to teach the additional matters lacking in it. "And if men quarrel": I know only of men; women, from where? Rabbi Yishmael says: since all the laws of damages in the Torah are stated without specification, and Scripture specified in one of them that it treated women like men, so too I specify all the laws of damages in the Torah to treat women like men. Rabbi Yoshiyah says: "a man or a woman" (below, verse 28): why is it stated? Because it says "and if a man opens a pit" (below, verse 33), I know only of a man; a woman, from where? Scripture teaches, "a man or a woman," the verse comes to equate the woman with the man in all the laws of damages in the Torah. Rabbi Yonatan says: it is unnecessary, for it already says "the owner of the pit shall pay" (below, verse 34), and "he shall surely pay, the one who kindles the fire" (Exodus 22:5); so why does Scripture say "a man or a woman"? It comes for its own instruction. "And he struck a man": to make him liable for this one on its own and for that one on its own. "With a stone or with a fist": this tells us that a stone and a fist are instruments capable of causing death. You say it comes for this purpose, or does it come only to teach that if he struck him with a stone or a fist he is liable, but with anything else he would be exempt? Scripture teaches "if with a stone," telling us he is not liable until he strikes with something capable of killing and on a spot where it is capable of killing. Rabbi Natan says: it compared the stone to the fist and the fist to the stone; just as the stone must be capable of killing, so too the fist must be capable of killing; and just as the fist is of known size, so too the stone must be of known size; thus if it became mixed with other stones, he is exempt. "And he does not die but falls to bed": this tells us that the wasting illness brings on death. "And he does not die but falls to bed": thus if he struck him a blow capable of causing death, he is exempt from loss of work and from healing.

It was taught: "And if a man strike his fellow with a stone or with his fist" (Exodus 21:18). Shimon the Timnite says: just as a fist is distinctive in that it can be observed by witnesses, and so on, this comes to exclude the case where a stone flew from beneath the hands of the witnesses [a stone whose throwing the witnesses did not actually watch]. Rabbi Akiva said to him: and did he strike him in the presence of witnesses, that they should know with what he struck him and where he struck him, whether he struck him on his thigh or on the bird of his soul [a vital spot]?

Another interpretation: take the case of one who pushed his fellow from the top of a tower and he died. Do we bring the court to the tower, or does the tower go to the court?

Another interpretation: if it fell, one returns and rebuilds it. Rather, just as a fist is distinctive in that it can be observed by witnesses, so too anything that can be observed by witnesses [is included]; this excludes the case where a stone flew from beneath the hand of the one who struck, in which case he is exempt.

"If he rise again and walk abroad" (Exodus 21:19). I might hear that this means within the house; therefore Scripture says "abroad." If "abroad," I might hear it even if he is wasting away; therefore Scripture says "if he rise again and walk abroad upon his staff" [meaning] in his full strength. This is one of three matters that Rabbi Yishmael would expound in the Torah as a kind of figure of speech. Similarly, "if the sun has risen upon him" (Exodus 22:2): does the sun rise upon him alone? Does it not rise upon the whole world? Rather, just as the sun means peace in the world, so too here: if it is known that the intruder departed from him in peace [with no intent to kill] and yet the householder killed him, he is liable. Similarly, "and they shall spread out the garment" (Deuteronomy 22:17): they clarify the matters as clear as a garment.

One who strikes his fellow, whether with a stone or with a fist, and they assessed him as likely to die, and then he improved from his prior condition, and afterward he grew worse and died: [the striker] is liable. But Rabbi Nechemiah says he is exempt. Our Rabbis taught: Rabbi Nechemiah expounded this verse: "if he rise again and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that struck him be clear" (Exodus 21:19). Now could it enter your mind that this man walks on his feet in the marketplace and yet that man [the striker] is put to death? Rather, this refers to one whom they assessed as likely to die, and he improved from his prior condition, and afterward grew worse and died, that [the striker] is exempt. And the Rabbis, this phrase "then shall he that struck him be clear," what do they expound from it? It teaches that they imprison him. And Rabbi Nechemiah, from where does he derive imprisonment? He learns it from the wood-gatherer. And the Rabbis: the wood-gatherer was certainly liable to death, and it was only Moses who did not know what his sentence was; this excludes our case, where we do not know whether he is liable to death at all. And Rabbi Nechemiah learns it from the blasphemer, where it was not known that he was liable to death, and they imprisoned him. And the Rabbis: the blasphemer was a ruling for that hour only, as it was taught: Moses our teacher knew that the wood-gatherer was subject to death, as it is said "those who profane it shall surely be put to death" (Exodus 31:14), but he did not know by which death he was to be killed, as it is said "for it had not been declared what should be done to him" (Numbers 15:34); but concerning the blasphemer it says only "to declare," for Moses our teacher did not know whether he was liable to death at all. Granted according to Rabbi Nechemiah, this is why two assessments are written, one [where] they assessed him as likely to die and he lived, and one [where] they assessed him as likely to die and he improved; but according to the Rabbis, and so on. And Rabbi Nechemiah: a case where they assessed him as likely to live and he died needs no verse, for he had already left the court innocent.

"Then shall he that struck him be clear" (Exodus 21:19), namely from death. I might hear that he is also clear from [paying for] loss of time and from healing; therefore Scripture says "only he shall pay for his loss of time and shall surely heal him" (Exodus 21:19), [meaning] apart from what is given to him as the value of his limbs, they give him the value of his loss of time. "Only he shall pay for his loss of time": I might hear forever; therefore Scripture says "and shall surely heal him": just as healing is on account of the blow, so too loss of time is on account of the blow. Or, just as healing is not divided into categories, so too loss of time should not be divided into categories, that just as he is bound to heal this one, so he gives loss-of-time payment to that one; therefore Scripture says "only he shall pay for his loss of time," which tells that loss of time is divided into a category [of its own]. "And shall surely heal him": if he was healed and then needed healing again, even four or five times, he is obligated to heal him; therefore Scripture says "and shall surely heal him" [the doubled verb]. If growths arose around the wound: if on account of the blow, he is liable; if not on account of the blow, he is exempt. And when the Torah said "he shall pay for his loss of time and shall surely heal him," [it means] just as loss of time is on account of the blow, so too healing is on account of the blow.

Another interpretation: the verse comes to teach you proper conduct from the Torah, "only he shall pay for his loss of time and shall surely heal him" (Exodus 21:19).

Our Rabbis taught: take one who transgressed the words of the physician and ate honey and all kinds of sweet things, which are harmful to a wound, and his wound developed gangrenous growths. One might think [the striker] is obligated to heal him; therefore Scripture says "only." What is "gargotni"? A spreading sore. Our Rabbis taught: from where do we learn that if growths arose on him on account of the blow and the wound reopened, that [the striker] is obligated to heal him and obligated to give him the value of his lost time? Therefore Scripture says "only he shall pay for his loss of time and shall surely heal him" (Exodus 21:19). One might think even if not on account of the blow; therefore Scripture says "only." Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Yehudah says: even on account of the blow, as it says "only." There are those who say: even on account of the blow he is entirely exempt, so he said. And if you wish to say: even on account of the blow he is exempt from loss of time but liable for healing. It was taught: and all of these are paid in the place of [together with the payment for] the injury. From where are these matters derived? Rav Papa said in the name of Rava: the verse says "and shall surely heal him," to give healing in the place of the injury. But this is needed for the teaching of the school of Rabbi Yishmael: "and shall surely heal him," from here that permission was given to the physician to heal. If so, let the verse write "and a physician shall heal." Still it is needed for what we said, to repeat the matter of healing in the verse [the doubled verb]. Let it write "or surely heal," and so on. What is "and shall surely heal"? Learn from it: to give healing in the place of the injury.

Rav Zevid, in the name of Rava, said: the verse states (below, verse 25) "a wound for a wound" (Exodus 21:25), in order to require payment for pain in addition to payment for damage. But surely this clause is needed to teach that one who acts unintentionally is treated like one who acts intentionally, and one who acts under compulsion like one who acts willingly? If so, let Scripture write "a wound for a wound" [using the simple preposition]; what does the wording "a wound in place of a wound" add? Learn from this two teachings [both the equating of unintentional with intentional and the separate payment for pain]. How can you find a case of pain in a place where there is also damage [so that pain is paid for on its own]? Consider how much a person would be willing to pay to have his hand, already condemned to be cut off by royal decree, severed with a drug rather than by the sword. [The added suffering of one method over another is the measure of pain, paid for over and above the loss of the limb itself.]

(Exodus 21:20-21) "And when a man strikes his slave." The slave and the bondwoman were also included in the general rule (above, verse 14) "and one who strikes a man so that he dies" [and would be liable to death], yet Scripture took them out of that general rule to be lenient with the master, so that he is judged by the rule of "a day or two" [escaping the death penalty if the slave survives that long]. For this reason this passage was stated. "And when a man strikes": I have only a man; from where do I learn a woman who strikes? Rabbi Ishmael used to say so [it is included], and Rabbi Yoshiyah said so, and Rabbi Yonatan said: "his slave or his bondwoman" comes to make him liable for this one on its own and for that one on its own. Rabbi Eliezer says: Scripture speaks of a Canaanite slave. Or does it speak only of a Hebrew slave? The teaching states "of them you shall acquire a slave and a bondwoman" (Leviticus 25:44-46): just as a slave whose status as slave holds both in his maturity and in his youth, so too a bondwoman whose status holds both in her maturity and in her youth. This excludes the Hebrew slave, for although in his maturity he is a slave, in his youth he is not a slave; and it excludes the Hebrew bondwoman, for although in her youth she is a bondwoman, in her maturity she is not. Rabbi Yitzhak said: I might hear that even a slave belonging to two partners, and a slave who is half slave and half free, are included. The teaching states "his slave and his bondwoman": just as his slave who is wholly his, so too his bondwoman who is wholly his. This excludes a slave of two partners and a slave who is half slave and half free, who is not wholly his. Rabbi Ishmael says: Scripture speaks of a Canaanite slave. Or is it only a Hebrew slave? The teaching states "he shall not be avenged, for he is his money": just as money, whose acquisition is a permanent acquisition and whose ownership of it is complete, so this excludes the Hebrew, for although ownership of him is complete, his acquisition is not permanent; and it excludes a slave of two partners and a slave who is half slave and half free, for although the acquisition is permanent, ownership of him is not complete. "With a rod": I might hear, whether there is enough in it to kill or there is not enough in it to kill. The teaching states (Numbers 35:18) "or with a wooden hand-tool by which one may die"; this tells that he is not liable unless he strikes him with a thing that has enough in it to kill and upon a place where a blow is enough to kill. Before this is even stated, I could derive it by reasoning: if regarding an Israelite, where the law is more stringent (for there is no "day or two" leniency), one is not liable unless he strikes with a thing that has enough in it to kill and upon a place where a blow is enough to kill, then regarding a Canaanite, where the law is more lenient (for there is a "day or two" leniency), is it not logical that one should not be liable unless he strikes with a thing that has enough in it to kill and upon a place where a blow is enough to kill? But if you say so, you would be inflicting punishment by mere reasoning. Therefore it states "with a rod," for one does not inflict punishment by reasoning alone. Rabbi [Yehudah haNasi] says: why is "with a rod" stated? Before it is said, I could argue: if regarding an Israelite, where the law is more stringent, and so on. So what does "with a rod" teach? Rather, it is left free [from being needed for its plain sense] in order to be compared by an analogy of identical wording (gezeira shava): "rod" is stated here and "rod" is stated elsewhere ("the rod"); just as the "rod" stated elsewhere comes to exclude the purchased animal and that of partners, so too the "rod" stated here comes to exclude the purchased and that of partners. "And he dies under his hand": that his striking and his death must both be within the master's domain. Thus if he struck him and then sold him to another and he died, the master is exempt. "He shall surely be avenged": this means death by execution. You say execution; or does it mean only a monetary penalty? Rabbi Natan used to say: vengeance is stated here and vengeance is stated elsewhere (Leviticus 26:25) "and I will bring a sword upon you," and so on; just as there it is by the sword, so here it is by the sword. Rabbi Akiva says: vengeance is stated here, and vengeance is stated elsewhere (Numbers 31:2) "avenge the vengeance of the children of Israel"; just as there it is by the sword, so here it is by the sword; and just as there it is by a court, so here it is by a court.

It was taught: "He shall surely be avenged" (Exodus 21:20). I do not yet know what this vengeance is. When Scripture says, "And I will bring upon you a sword that avenges the vengeance of the covenant" (Leviticus 26:25), and so forth, you learn that vengeance means by the sword. But say it means he should be split apart? Scripture writes, "by the edge of the sword" (Deuteronomy 13:16). But say he should be cut into pieces? Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: the verse states, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18) [choose for him a kind death]. We have found that a free man who killed a slave is put to death by the sword; from where do we learn the case of a slave who killed a free man? Is it not an inference from the lesser to the greater: if one is executed by the sword for killing a slave, surely so for a free man, by strangulation. This works for the one who holds strangulation is the lighter death; but for the one who holds strangulation is the more severe death, what can be said? It is derived from what we learned: "And you shall purge the innocent blood" (Deuteronomy 21:9) [from your midst]. Those who shed blood were compared to the heifer whose neck is broken: just as there it is by the neck, so too here at the neck. If so, just as there it is with a cleaver and from the back of the neck, so too here with a cleaver from the back of the neck? Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" [therefore] choose for him a kind death.

"But if he survives a day or two" (Exodus 21:21). I might understand this according to its plain sense; Scripture therefore says, "but if a day." How can the two verses be reconciled, the "day" that is like "two days" and the "two days" that is like a "day"? It means a full twenty-four-hour period, measured from one hour to the corresponding hour. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: I might understand it according to its plain sense; Scripture therefore says "but," which divides the matter. "He shall not be avenged," and so forth: this is what Rabbi Ishmael used to say, that Scripture speaks of a Canaanite slave. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai says: why is this stated? Before it was said, I could have argued from logic, since his own ox is liable to death for killing his male or female slave, and another's ox is liable to death for killing his male or female slave, and he himself is liable to death for killing his male or female slave, and another person is liable to death for killing his male or female slave; if you have learned that no distinction is drawn between his own ox and another's ox regarding death for killing his slave, let us likewise draw no distinction between himself and another regarding death for killing his slave. Scripture therefore says, "he shall not be avenged, for he is his money." Scripture teaches that, even though no distinction was drawn between his own ox and another's ox regarding death for killing his slave, a distinction is drawn between himself and another regarding death for killing his slave. So what does Scripture teach by saying, "he shall not be avenged, for he is his money," and so on.

It was taught: one who sells his slave to another and stipulates with him that the slave shall continue to serve him for thirty days. Rabbi Meir says: the first owner falls under the law of "a day or two" [exemption from execution if the slave dies], because the slave is under him; the second owner does not fall under the law of "a day or two," because the slave is not under him. He holds that acquisition of usufruct is like acquisition of the body itself. Rabbi Yehudah says: the second owner falls under the law of "a day or two," because the slave is his money; the first owner does not, because the slave is not his money. He holds that acquisition of usufruct is not like acquisition of the body. Rabbi Yose says: both fall under the law of "a day or two," this one because the slave is under him, and that one because the slave is his money. He is in doubt whether acquisition of usufruct is like acquisition of the body or not, and a doubt concerning capital cases is resolved leniently. Rabbi Elazar says: neither falls under the law of "a day or two," this one because the slave is not his money, and that one because the slave is not under him. What is Rabbi Elazar's reasoning? "For he is his money" means the money exclusively his. Who is the author of what the Rabbis taught: one who is half slave and half free, and likewise a slave belonging to two partners, do not go free on account of the loss of the tips of the limbs? In accordance with whom? In accordance with Rabbi Elazar. Did not Rabbi Elazar say "his money exclusively his"? Here too, his slave exclusively his.

"And if men strive together" (Exodus 21:22-23). Why was this passage stated? Because Scripture says, "And if a man comes presumptuously," and so forth, we have heard only of one who intended to strike his enemy and struck him, that he is liable to death; but one who intended to strike his enemy and struck the one he loved, we have not heard. Scripture therefore says, "And if men strive together... and if harm follows," and so forth: the verse comes to teach you that one who intended to strike his enemy and struck the one he loved is liable to death. For this reason the passage was stated. Rabbi says: even one who intended to strike one person and struck another would by strict law be exempt; rather, the verse comes to teach you that injury to a wife belongs to her husband, and the value of the offspring belongs to the husband, and anyone liable to death is exempt from monetary payment. Rabbi Yitzchak says: even one who intended to strike one and struck another is exempt, unless he says, "I am striking so-and-so"; Scripture says, "And he lies in wait for him and rises against him" (Deuteronomy 19:11), and so forth. And why does Scripture say "And if men strive together"? Because it says, "And a man who strikes down any human life," I might think even an eight-month infant is included; Scripture therefore says, "And if men strive together," teaching that he is not liable until he strikes a viable child. "And if men strive together": I have only men; from where do I include women? Rabbi Ishmael used to say, and so on. Rabbi Yoshiyah says, and so on. Rabbi Yonatan says, and so on.

It was taught: Rabbi Yonatan says, a pursuer who was chasing after his fellow to kill him, and the rescuer could have saved the victim by maiming one of the pursuer's limbs yet did not, but killed him, is himself liable for the pursuer's death, as it is written, "And if men strive together" (Exodus 21:22). And Rabbi Elazar said the verse speaks of a quarrel involving danger to life, and it is written, "And if harm follows, you shall give a life for a life." Yet even so the Merciful One said, "And if no harm follows... he shall surely be fined." Granted, if you say that when one could save the victim by maiming a limb he is not permitted to save him by killing the pursuer, then you find a case where he is fined, namely where he could have saved by maiming a limb. But if you say that even when he could save by maiming a limb he may also save by killing, why should he be fined? Granted, according to the Rabbis who say that one who intended to kill this man and killed that man is liable, this fits what is written, "And if men strive together," which Rabbi Elazar said speaks of a quarrel involving danger to life, as it is written, "And if harm follows, you shall give a life for a life." But according to Rabbi Shimon, what does he do with it? He needs it for monetary payment, in accordance with Rabbi, "you shall give a life for a life" meaning money. Rav Acha said: the teaching of the school of Chizkiyah departs from both Rabbi and the Rabbis, for the school of Chizkiyah taught "one who strikes a man" and "one who strikes a beast" (compare Leviticus 24:21): just as with one who strikes a beast you drew no distinction, and so on. What is meant by "who does not intend"? If we say one who does not intend at all, that is simply an accident. Rather, one who does not intend to strike this one but another; and it teaches, not to make him liable for money but to exempt him from money, for if he were subject to death, why would he need to be exempted from money? Rather, learn from this that he is neither subject to death nor subject to monetary payment.

"And they strike a pregnant woman" (Exodus 21:22). Abba Chanan in the name of Rabbi Eliezer says: what does Scripture teach by this? Since it says, "and her offspring come out," we have already learned that she is pregnant; so what does Scripture teach by saying "pregnant"? Rather, if he struck her on her head or on one of her other limbs, I might think he should be liable for the offspring; Scripture therefore says "pregnant," teaching that he is not liable until he strikes her in the place of her pregnancy.

Another interpretation: since it says, "as the woman's husband shall impose upon him" (Exodus 21:22), I might think this applies even though the pregnancy is not his; Scripture therefore says "pregnant," teaching that he pays only the husband to whom the pregnancy belongs. A person who intended to strike his fellow but struck the woman, and her offspring came out, pays the value of the offspring. How? We assess the woman, how much she was worth before she gave birth and how much she is worth after she gave birth. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel said: if so, once a woman gives birth she increases in value! Rather, we assess the offspring, how much they are worth, and give it to the husband. If she has no husband, it is given to the heirs. If she was a maidservant who was freed, or a convert, he is exempt. Rav Pappa said: an ox that gored a maidservant and her offspring came out pays the value of the offspring. What is the reason? It is a pregnant donkey that he damaged, for the verse says, "Stay here with the donkey" (Genesis 22:5), a people resembling a donkey. Should it not say the increase in value of the offspring rather than their value? Rav Yehudah said: how does he pay the value of the offspring and the increase of the offspring? We assess the woman, how much she was worth before she gave birth and how much she is worth after she gave birth. What does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel mean? Rava said he means this: is she really more valuable before she gives birth than after, when surely a woman is more valuable after giving birth, since she is freed from the danger of childbirth? Rather, we assess the offspring and give it to the husband. So too it was taught. Rabbah said he means this: is the woman valued only for the one who will sire offspring, with nothing of her own in the increase of the offspring? Rather, we assess the offspring and give it to the husband, and the increase of the offspring they divide. So too it was taught: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says, and so on. There is a difficulty between one statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and another; it is no difficulty: here she is a first-time mother, there she is not. And the Rabbis say the increase of the offspring also goes to the husband, for it was taught: from the implication of "and her offspring come out" do I not know she was pregnant? Rather, it tells you the increase of the pregnancy belongs to the husband. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel needs that word "pregnant" for what was taught: he is never liable until he strikes her opposite the place of the pregnancy. Rav Pappa said: do not say literally opposite the place of the pregnancy, but wherever the swelling of the fetus rises, excluding a hand or a foot.

"And her offspring come out" (Exodus 21:22): the minimum of "offspring" is two. And from where that even one is included? Scripture says "pregnant," in any case. "And no harm follows" (Exodus 21:22), to the woman; "he shall surely be fined," for the offspring. Or perhaps "and no harm follows" means neither to the woman nor to the offspring? Scripture therefore says, "And if harm follows" (Exodus 21:23). So what does Scripture teach by "and no harm follows"? If you say so, he would also need to give the cost of a midwife. So what does Scripture teach by "and no harm follows to the woman, he shall surely be fined"? It refers to the offspring. "He shall surely be fined" means money. Or perhaps it means death? Here it says "he shall surely be fined," and there it says "fined" [a fixed monetary penalty, Deuteronomy 22:19]; just as there it is money, so too here it is money.

"As the woman's husband shall lay upon him" (Exodus 21:22): Scripture comes to teach that the injury done to the woman belongs to her husband, and the value of the lost offspring belongs to the husband. And anyone who is liable to death is exempt from monetary payments.

Another interpretation: "As he shall lay upon him" (Exodus 21:22). I might understand this to apply even though the pregnancy is not his; therefore Scripture says "with child," [restricting it to his own]. Another interpretation: "As he shall lay upon him" -- I might understand he may impose whatever he wishes; therefore Scripture says "and he shall pay as the judges determine" (Exodus 21:22), telling us that he pays only according to the judges. As it is said, "and he shall pay as the judges (pelilim) determine" -- these are the judges, as it is said, "and our enemies being judges (pelilim)" (Deuteronomy 32:31); and it says, "If a man sin against a man, the judges (Elohim) shall judge him" (1 Samuel 2:25).

One who has relations with his daughter, with his daughter's daughter, with his son's daughter, or with his wife's daughter, there is no fine for them, because he is liable with his life, since his death is at the hands of the court; and anyone liable with his life does not pay money. As it is said, "and yet no harm follow, he shall surely be fined" (Exodus 21:22) -- but if there is harm, he is not fined. But is this derived from here? It is derived from there: "according to his wickedness" (Deuteronomy 25:2) -- for one wickedness you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two wickednesses. One case concerns death and money, and one concerns lashes and money; and both are needed. For if it taught only death and money, [I might think the rule applies] because there is loss of life, but as for lashes and money, where there is no loss of life, say it does not apply; and if it taught only lashes and money, [I might think] because the prohibition is not severe, but as for death and money, where the prohibition is severe, say it does not apply -- therefore both are needed. And for Rabbi Meir, who says he is lashed and pays, why are two needed? One concerns death and money, and one concerns death and lashes; and both are needed. For if it taught death and money, [I might think] because one is upon his body and one upon his property we do not do both, but as for death and lashes, where both are upon his body, say death is a prolonged matter and we may impose it on him; and if it taught death and lashes, that two upon his body we do not do, but as for death and money, where one is on his body and one on his property, say we may impose it -- therefore both are needed. It was taught: if he struck the woman and her children came out, he gives damages and pain to the woman, and the value of the offspring to the husband; and if there is no husband, he gives it to his heirs. Rav Papa said: the Torah granted the value of the offspring to the husband even if he came upon her in fornication, as it is written, "as the woman's husband shall lay upon him" (Exodus 21:22).

"But if harm follow" (Exodus 21:23) -- "harm" means nothing other than death. And although there is no proof of the matter, there is a hint of the matter: "and harm befall him by the way" (Genesis 42:38). "Then you shall give life for life" (Exodus 21:23) -- he pays a life in place of a life, but he does not pay money in place of a life.

Another interpretation: "life for life" -- he pays a life in place of a life, but he does not pay a life and money in place of a life. Rabbi [Judah the Prince] says: "then you shall give life for life" -- money. Or is it nothing other than [literal] death? You must reason thus: it says here "shall lay" and it says elsewhere "shall lay," just as there it means money, so too here it means money. It was taught: Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKanah used to treat the Day of Atonement like the Sabbath [regarding liability]: just as on the Sabbath one is liable with his life and exempt from payments, so too on the Day of Atonement one is liable with his life and exempt from payments. What is Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKanah's reason? Abaye said: "harm" is stated regarding [death] at the hands of Heaven and "harm" is stated regarding [death] at the hands of man; just as the harm stated at the hands of man exempts from payment, so too the harm stated at the hands of Heaven exempts from payment. And Jacob warned about all matters -- about the cold, about traps, about the lion, and about thieves. Rava said: Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKanah's reason is from here: "and if the people of the land do at all hide their eyes... then I will set my face against that man" (Leviticus 20:4-5). The Torah said: My excision (karet) is like your death; just as your death exempts from payment, so too My excision exempts from payment.

"An eye for an eye" (Exodus 21:24). One who injures his fellow is liable to him on account of five things: for damage, for pain, for healing, for loss of work, and for humiliation. For damage, how so? If he blinded his eye, cut off his hand, or broke his leg, we view the injured man as though he were a slave being sold in the market, and we assess how much he was worth before and how much he is worth now. Pain, how so? If he burned him with a spit or a nail, even on his fingernail, in a place that does not produce a wound, we assess how much a person like this would be willing to take to endure such pain. Healing: if he struck him, he is obligated to heal him. If sores erupted on him because of the blow, he is liable; if not because of the blow, he is exempt. If the wound healed and then reopened, he is obligated to heal him; if it healed completely, he is no longer obligated to heal him. Loss of work: we view him as though he were a watchman of cucumbers, since he has already paid him the value of his hand and the value of his leg. Humiliation: all is according to the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated. Why? "An eye for an eye" the Merciful One said, an actual eye! It should not enter your mind, for it is taught: One might think that if he blinded his eye we blind his eye, if he cut off his hand we cut off his hand, if he broke his leg we break his leg; Scripture teaches, saying, "one who strikes a man" and "one who strikes an animal" (Leviticus 24:21): just as one who strikes an animal pays, so too one who strikes a man pays. And if you still wish to object, it says, "You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer" (Numbers 35:31), implying: for the life of a murderer you may not take a ransom, but you may take a ransom for the limbs of the head that do not regenerate. Which "one who strikes"? If we say "one who strikes the life of an animal shall pay for it, and one who strikes a man shall be put to death" (Leviticus 24:21), that verse is written about killing. Rather, from here: "and one who strikes the life of an animal shall pay for it" (Leviticus 24:18), and adjacent to it, "and if a man inflicts a blemish on his fellow" (Leviticus 24:19), and this latter is not phrased as "striking." Rather, we say it is a verbal analogy of "striking" and "striking": "striking" is stated regarding a man and "striking" is stated regarding an animal; just as there it is payment, so too here it is payment. What is "if you still wish to object"? The following difficulty troubled him: what did you see to learn from "one who strikes an animal"? Let it be learned from "one who strikes a man" [implying actual retaliation]. They say: we judge damages from damages, and we do not judge damages from death. On the contrary, we judge a man from a man, and we do not judge a man from an animal. This is why he said, "if you still wish to object, it says, You shall not take a ransom," and so forth. This phrase "You shall not take a ransom" is needed for its own teaching, that the Merciful One said: do not do two things to him, do not take money from him and also kill him. That teaching is derived from "according to his wickedness" (Deuteronomy 25:2): for one wickedness you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two wickednesses. And still it is needed to teach that you should not take money from him and exempt him from death. If it came only for that, let the verse say "You shall not take a ransom for one who is wicked" and so forth; why do I need "for the life of a murderer"? Learn from this two matters. And since it is written, why do I need this "one who strikes, one who strikes"? If from that verse alone, I would say: if he wishes he gives the eye itself, and if he wishes he gives the value of his eye and redeems himself; therefore it teaches "one who strikes, one who strikes": just as one who strikes an animal pays, so too one who strikes a man pays. It is taught: Rabbi Dostai ben Yehudah says: "An eye for an eye" means money. Or is it perhaps an actual eye? You say: behold, if this man's eye was large and that one's eye was small, how can I apply "an eye for an eye"? And if you say, in such a case we take money from him, the Torah said, "There shall be one law for you" (Leviticus 24:22), a law that is equal for all of you. They say: what is the difficulty? Perhaps the Merciful One said: he took the light of an eye from him, let us take the light of an eye from him; for if you do not say so, how do we execute a small person who killed a large one, or a large person who killed a small one, when the Torah said, "There shall be one law for you"? Rather, he took a soul from him, we take a soul from him, and so forth. And it is taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai says: "An eye for an eye" means money. Or is it perhaps an actual eye? You say: behold, if a man was already blind and he blinded another, or was maimed and maimed another, how can I apply "an eye for an eye," when the Torah said "one law" and so forth? And what is the difficulty? Perhaps where it is possible it is possible, and where it is not possible it is not possible; for if you do not say so, what do we do with a terminally wounded person who killed a sound person? Rather, where it is possible, and so forth.