Yalkut Shimoni on Torah Reader

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: they did not dispute about a case involving a single prohibition, that he is liable. About what did they dispute? About a case involving two distinct prohibitions, where Rabbi Eliezer obligates a sin-offering and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts. Rabbi Yehuda says: even in a case of a single prohibition Rabbi Yehoshua would exempt him. How so? His two wives were menstruant and his two sisters were with him in the house, and he intended to lie with this one but lay with that one. Figs and grapes lay before him and he intended to pick figs but picked grapes, or grapes but picked figs, or black ones but picked white, or white but picked black; Rabbi Eliezer obligates a sin-offering and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts. I am astonished if Rabbi Yehoshua would exempt in such a case; if so, why is it said "in it"? To exclude one who acts without intent. "And he shall bring" (Leviticus 4:23) means even after the Day of Atonement. "His offering" means he discharges his obligation with his own offering and not with his father's offering. One might think he cannot discharge it with his father's offering that the father set aside from a lighter category for a graver one or from a graver for a lighter, but that he can discharge it with an offering the father set aside from a lighter for a lighter or from a graver for a graver; therefore Scripture teaches "his offering," he discharges it with his own and not with his father's. One might think he cannot discharge it with an animal his father set aside even from lighter to lighter or graver to graver, since a man cannot complete his naziriteship by shaving over his father's animal, but he can discharge it with money his father set aside, even from graver to lighter or lighter to graver, since a man may complete his naziriteship over his father's money when it is unspecified though not when it is specified; therefore Scripture teaches "his offering," he discharges it with his own and not with his father's. One might think he cannot discharge it even with money he himself set aside from lighter to lighter or graver to graver, but that he can discharge it with an offering he set aside for himself from lighter to lighter and graver to graver; therefore Scripture teaches "his offering... for his sin," his offering must be for the sake of his particular sin. One might think he cannot discharge it with an animal he set aside for himself from lighter to graver and graver to lighter and lighter to lighter and graver to graver, since if he set aside an animal for the matter of forbidden fat and brought it for blood, or for blood and brought it for fat, he has not misappropriated and has not atoned; but he can discharge it with money he set aside for himself across these categories, since if he set aside money for forbidden fat and brought it for blood, or for blood and brought it for fat, he has misappropriated and has atoned; therefore Scripture teaches (below, verse 35) "for his sin," his offering must be for the sake of his particular sin.

"A male goat" (Leviticus 4:23), and not a female goat, and not its substitute. Now is this not a matter for logical inference? If the ordinary individual, whose offering is not the same for all the commandments as it is for the offering of the Day of Atonement, nonetheless has it the same for all the commandments as it is for the offering of a single distinct commandment; then the ruler, whose offering is the same for all the commandments as it is for the offering of the Day of Atonement, should certainly have his offering be the same as that of a single distinct commandment. The anointed priest disproves this, for his offering is the same for all the commandments as it is for the Day of Atonement offering, yet his offering for all the commandments is not the same as that of a single distinct commandment. But you may answer: it is not so. If you spoke of the anointed priest, who brings neither this nor that from the flock, will you say the same of the ruler, who brings both this and that from the flock, so that since he brings both from the flock, his offering for all the commandments is the same as for a single distinct commandment? Therefore Scripture teaches "a male goat," and not a female goat, and not its substitute. "Male" and not female. "Unblemished" and not one with a defect.

(Leviticus 4:24) "And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat" comes to include the goat of Nachshon for the laying on of hands, the words of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: it comes to include the goats brought for idolatry for the laying on of hands, for Rabbi Shimon would say: every communal sin-offering whose blood enters within the Sanctuary requires the laying on of hands. "And he shall slaughter it," and not its substitute. When it says below "and he shall slaughter it" (in the feminine), this excludes its substitute, and its offspring, and its exchange. From here Rabbi Yishmael would say: five sin-offerings are left to die. The offspring of a sin-offering, the substitute of a sin-offering, a sin-offering whose owner has died, one whose owner has gained atonement through another, and one that has passed its first year. And you cannot speak of the offspring of a sin-offering in the case of the congregation, for the congregation does not bring a female. Nor is there a substitute of a sin-offering in the congregation, for the congregation does not make substitutions. Nor a sin-offering whose owner has died, for the congregation does not die. As for one whose owner has gained atonement through another and one that has passed its year, one might think these would be left to die in the case of the congregation; you say no. Let the unspecified cases be learned from the specified ones: just as the specified cases, the offspring of a sin-offering, the substitute of a sin-offering, and a sin-offering whose owner has died, are spoken of regarding the individual and not the congregation, so too one whose owner has gained atonement and one that has passed its year are spoken of regarding the individual and not the congregation.

"And he shall slaughter it in the place where the burnt-offering is slaughtered." Where is the burnt-offering slaughtered? In the north; so too this one in the north. But do I learn it from here? Surely it is already said (Leviticus 6:18) "in the place where the burnt-offering is slaughtered, the sin-offering shall be slaughtered." Why then does the present verse come? To establish that if it was not slaughtered in the north it is disqualified. You say it comes for this; or does it come only to teach that no other offering requires the north? Therefore Scripture teaches (below, verse 33) "in the place where he slaughters," to include all sin-offerings, that their slaughter must be only in the north. Or does it include only one similar to this? Just as this one is a male sin-offering, fixed, atoning, coming from the flock, and brought for a known sin, so I include only what resembles it. What do I include? The goats brought for idolatry, which are male sin-offerings, fixed, atoning, from the flock, and brought for a known sin. When it says "shall be slaughtered," it includes the goats of the festivals, which are sin-offerings, fixed, atoning, from the flock, brought for a known sin, but are not male. Or the goats of the Day of Atonement, which are male sin-offerings, fixed, atoning, from the flock, but not for a known sin; it is balanced, so let both be included. When it says "shall be slaughtered," it includes the sin-offering for defiling the Sanctuary, which is an atoning sin-offering from the flock for a known sin, but is neither male nor fixed; or the nazirite's sin-offering, which is a fixed atoning sin-offering from the flock, but is not male and not for a sin. It is balanced, so let both be included. When it says "shall be slaughtered," it includes the leper's offering, which is not a fixed sin-offering, though atoning. After we have included things similar and things not similar, why then does the verse single this one out? To establish that if it was not slaughtered in the north it is disqualified. One might think only this one is disqualified if not slaughtered in the north, but all other sin-offerings, though it is a command to slaughter them in the north, would be valid if not so slaughtered; therefore Scripture teaches "and he shall slaughter the sin-offering in the place of the burnt-offering," a governing principle for all sin-offerings, that if they were not slaughtered in the north they are disqualified. "A sin-offering" means all its rites must be for the sake of a sin-offering, excluding one slaughtered not for its own sake. (Leviticus 4:25) "With his finger and he shall take" teaches that he receives the blood with his right hand. "With his finger and he shall place" teaches that he places it with his right hand. Rabbi Shimon said: was the word "hand" stated here? Since "hand" was not stated, if he received it with the left hand it is valid. "And he shall place it on the horns of the altar of burnt-offering," and not on the horns of the inner altar. Now is this not a matter for logical inference? The anointed priest is set apart from the individual and the ruler is set apart from the individual; just as the anointed priest's sin-offering blood enters within, so too the ruler's sin-offering blood should enter within. Therefore Scripture teaches "and he shall place it on the horns of the altar of burnt-offering," and not on the horns of the inner altar.

"And its blood he shall pour out at the foundation of the altar of the burnt offering" (Leviticus 4:25) and not at the foundation of the inner altar. Rabbi Ishmael said: If the remnants of a sin offering, which do not effect atonement, are placed upon the foundation, then the first blood of the burnt offering, which does effect atonement, surely it is fitting that it be placed upon the foundation. If so, why is it stated "at the foundation of the altar of the burnt offering"? It means the foundation that is on the side of the altar where the burnt offering is offered. "At the foundation of the altar of the burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting" - this is the southern foundation. One might think it is the western foundation. You say no: just as we find when he comes out from the Sanctuary he places the blood only on the foundation nearest to him, so too when he comes down from the altar he places the blood only on the foundation nearest to him, and which is that? The southern foundation. "And all its fat he shall burn upon the altar like the fat of the sacrifice of peace offerings" (Leviticus 4:26): just as is specified for the peace offering - the fat that covers, the membrane that is peeled off, the two kidneys and the lobe - so too here, the fat that covers, the membrane that is peeled off, the two kidneys and the lobe.

"And he shall make atonement for him" - that the atonement be for his own sake, that one not atone for two as one; and that a priest may atone for himself. "And he shall be forgiven" - we do not leave anything over for him until the Day of Atonement. One might think that even if he sat and did not bring the offering he is forgiven; the verse teaches "for him" [only the one who brings it]. "If a soul shall sin" (Leviticus 4:27): "a soul shall sin," "one shall sin," "in doing it shall sin" - these are restrictive terms. The one who acts on his own judgment is liable, but not one who acts according to the ruling of a court. How so? If a court ruled to transgress one of all the commandments stated in the Torah, and the individual went and acted inadvertently according to their ruling - whether they acted and he acted with them, whether they acted and he acted after them, or whether they did not act and he acted - one might think he is liable; the verse teaches "a soul shall sin," "one shall sin," "in doing it shall sin," these are restrictive terms: the one who acts on his own judgment is liable, but not one who acts according to the ruling of a court. Rabbi Shimon adds: if a court ruled and knew that they had erred and retracted, whether after they had brought their atonement or before they had brought their atonement, and the individual went and acted according to them, he is exempt. Rabbi Meir holds him liable. Rabbi Elazar says: it is doubtful. Sumchos says: it is suspended. "In doing it": the one who relies on himself is liable; the one who relies on the court is exempt. How so? If a court ruled and one of them knew that they had erred, or a seasoned disciple worthy of ruling, like Shimon ben Azzai, was sitting before them, and he went and acted according to them - one might think he is exempt; the verse teaches "in doing it," the one who relies on himself is liable. Do you say these restrictive terms were stated for this purpose - "a soul shall sin," "one shall sin," "in doing it shall sin" - or rather only that the individual who acts is liable while two who act are exempt? The verse teaches "the common people" - even many. And still I might say a minority of the congregation who acted are liable, since the court does not bring a bull on their behalf, but the majority of the congregation who acted are exempt, since the court does bring a bull on their behalf; the verse teaches "the common people" - even its majority and even all of it.

"The common people" - excluding the prince [king]; "of the common people" - excluding the anointed [high] priest. And if you should say, the anointed priest has already been singled out to be judged with a bull and the prince with a he-goat - for one might think, since for a forgotten matter together with an inadvertent act he brings a bull, then for an inadvertent act alone he should bring a ewe-lamb or a she-goat; the verse teaches "the common people," excluding the prince, "of the common people," excluding the anointed priest. The anointed priest fits, since he brings for a forgotten matter; but the prince brings for an inadvertent act - [how exclude him?]. Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: here we are dealing with a case where he ate an olive's-bulk of forbidden fat while he was a commoner, and was then appointed, and afterward it became known to him. You might have thought he should bring a ewe-lamb or a she-goat; therefore it teaches us [otherwise]. This works for Rabbi Shimon, who follows the awareness, but for the Rabbis who follow the sinning, what can be said? Here we are dealing with one who ate half an olive's-bulk of forbidden fat while a commoner, was appointed, and completed it [eating the second half], and afterward it became known to him. You might have thought the two halves combine and he should bring a ewe-lamb or she-goat; therefore it teaches us [otherwise]. "Of the common people" - excluding the apostate. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehudah says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: why does the verse state "which may not be done in error" (Leviticus 4:22)? One who returns from his awareness brings an offering for his inadvertence; this excludes the apostate, who does not return from his awareness. What is the difference between them? Rav Hamnuna said: the case of one who is an apostate regarding eating forbidden fat yet brings an offering for [forbidden] blood is the difference between them. One master holds: since he is an apostate regarding fat, he is also an apostate regarding blood. The other master holds: regarding blood at least, he does return from his awareness. Rava said: all agree that an apostate regarding fat is not an apostate regarding blood; rather, here they dispute the case of one who is an apostate to eat forbidden fat out of appetite, and forbidden fat was switched for him with permitted fat and he ate it. One master holds: since he eats out of appetite, he is intentionally an apostate. The other master holds: since he could find permitted food, he would not leave the permitted and eat the forbidden, so he is not an apostate. "In doing it" - the one who does all of it and not the one who does part of it. How so? Two who hold a sickle and reap together, or who hold a weaver's shuttle and beat, or a quill and write, or a reed, and they carried it out into the public domain - one might think they are liable; the verse teaches "in doing it," the one who does all of it and not the one who does part of it. Regarding a round cake of pressed figs that two carried out into the public domain, Rabbi Yehudah says: if one alone could not carry it out and the two carried it, they are liable. Rabbi Shimon says: even if one alone could not carry it and the two carried it, they are exempt. One who carries out a loaf into the public domain is liable. If two carried it out, Rabbi Meir holds them liable; Rabbi Yehudah says: if one alone could not carry it and the two carried it, they are liable, but if not, they are exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: even if one alone could not carry it and the two carried it, they are exempt. Rabbi Shimon holds: three restrictive terms are written - "a soul shall sin," "one shall sin," "in doing it shall sin" - one to exclude where this one uproots and that one sets down, one to exclude where this one is able and that one is able, and one to exclude where this one is unable and that one is unable. Rabbi Yehudah holds: one to exclude where this one uproots and that one sets down, one to exclude where this one is able and that one is able, and one to exclude an individual who acted by the ruling of a court. Rabbi Shimon follows his own reasoning, for he says an individual who acted by the ruling of a court is liable. Rabbi Meir holds: two restrictive terms are written - "a soul, one, shall sin," which is the manner of the verse, and "in doing it shall sin" - one to exclude where this one uproots and that one sets down, and one to exclude an individual who acted by the ruling of a court.

"From all the commandments of the LORD" (Leviticus 4:27) - and not the commandment of a king, and not the commandment of a court. The commandments stated regarding the anointed priest, the commandments stated regarding the congregation, the commandments stated regarding the prince, they are the commandments stated here. "From the commandments of the LORD" - and not all the commandments of the LORD, excluding the hearing of a voice [oath of testimony], the utterance of the lips [rash oath], and the defilement of the Sanctuary and its holy things. "Which may not be done" - this teaches that he brings an offering for an inadvertent act. "And he becomes guilty" - this teaches that he brings a suspended guilt offering. "Or if his sin be made known to him" (Leviticus 4:28) - and not that others told him; one might think this is so even though he does not deny it; the verse teaches "his sin which he has sinned therein."

"And he shall bring his offering, a she-goat of the goats" (Leviticus 4:28) - from where do we learn that he brings one in its first year? It is a logical inference: this one brings a sin offering and the leper brings a sin offering; just as the leper's sin offering is in its first year, so too this one is in its first year. No - if you said this of the leper's sin offering, which requires libations, would you say it of this one, which does not require libations? The nazirite's sin offering proves it, for it does not require libations and yet comes in its first year. No - if you said this of the nazirite's sin offering, which has other blood [offerings] with it, would you say it of this one, which has no other blood with it? The sin offering for idolatry proves it, for it has no other blood with it and yet comes in its first year. No - if you said this of the sin offering for idolatry, which is fixed [obligatory], would you say it of this one, which is not fixed; since it is not fixed, perhaps it does not come in its first year? The verse teaches "one law shall there be for you for him who does anything in error" (Numbers 15:29) - thus everyone who acts in error is like idolatry: just as the sin offering for idolatry is in its first year, so too this one is in its first year. If so, just as the sin offering for idolatry is a she-goat - when it says "for you," it comes to include the goats for idolatry; "for you" to include the goats of the festivals; "for him who does" to include the goat of the prince.

"And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the sin offering" (Leviticus 4:29) - to include the sin offering for idolatry in the laying on of hands. "And he shall slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering" - that its slaughter be in the north. "In the place of the burnt offering" and "the priest shall take" (Leviticus 4:30) - that the receiving of its blood be in the north. From here they said: if he slaughtered in the north and received in the south, or in the south and received in the north, it is invalid, until he slaughters in the north and receives in the north. "And all its blood he shall pour out" - above [in an earlier passage] it says "and its blood he shall pour out" (Leviticus 4:25), and below it says "and all its blood he shall pour out." From where do you say that a sin offering whose blood was received in four cups, and he gave from this one a single application and from that one a single application - one might think they all are poured out upon the foundation? The verse teaches "and all its blood he shall pour out." One might think that even if he gave only from one of them the four applications, they all are poured out upon the foundation; the verse teaches "and its blood he shall pour out." How so? That one [the cup used] is poured out upon the foundation, and the others are poured out into the channel. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon says: from where that even if he gave only from one of them the four applications, they all are poured out upon the foundation? The verse teaches "and all its blood he shall pour out."

"And all its fat he shall remove, as the fat was removed from off the sacrifice of peace offerings" (Leviticus 4:31): just as is specified for the peace offering - the fat that covers, the membrane that is peeled off, the two kidneys and the lobe of the liver - so too here. "And he shall make atonement for him" - that his atonement be for his own sake, that one not atone for two as one, and that a priest atone for himself. "And he shall be forgiven" - that one not leave anything over for him until the Day of Atonement; one might think even if he sat and did not bring, the verse teaches "for him." "And if he bring a lamb as his offering for a sin offering" (Leviticus 4:32) - Rabbi Shimon says: lambs precede goats in every place. One of four cries that the Temple court cried out: "Get out of here, Issachar man of Kfar Barkai, who honors himself and profanes the name of Heaven" - for he would wrap his hands in silk and perform the service. And what befell him? A king and queen were sitting at a meal. The king said, "The kid is better," and the queen said, "The lamb is better." They said, "Who shall decide? Let the high priest decide, for he offers sacrifices before the Holy One, blessed be He, every single day." He came and gestured with his hand: "If the kid were better, it would be offered as the daily offering." The king said, "Since he has no fear of royalty, let his right hand be cut off." Issachar gave a bribe and they cut off his left. The king heard and said, "Let them go back and cut off his right." Rav Yosef said: Blessed is the Merciful One, who gave Issachar his recompense in this world. Rav Ashi said: Issachar man of Kfar Barkai did not study the Mishnah, for we learned: Rabbi Shimon says lambs precede goats in every place. One might think it is because they are choicer; the verse teaches "and if he bring a lamb as his offering," teaching that the two are weighed as one. Ravina said: he did not even read Scripture, for it is written "and if a lamb" and it is written "and if a goat be his offering" - if he wishes, let him bring a lamb; if he wishes, let him bring a goat. Why does the verse say "he shall bring," "he shall bring" [twice]? From where do you say that one who set aside his sin offering and it was lost, and set aside another in its place, and did not manage to offer it until the first was found, and now both stand - from where that he brings whichever he wishes? The verse teaches "he shall bring." One might think he brings both; the verse teaches "he shall bring it" - he brings one and not two. "And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the sin offering" (Leviticus 4:33) - to include the nazirite's sin offering, the leper's sin offering, and the sin offering of one who defiles the Sanctuary in the laying on of hands.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish would throw himself down on his belly in the study house and raise a difficulty: if [offerings slaughtered not for their own sake] are fit, let them effect appeasement; and if they do not effect appeasement, why do they come at all? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: I will open the gate for myself - "that which goes out of your lips you shall keep and perform" (Deuteronomy 23:24), etc. But say that one who comes [to bring an offering] in fulfillment of a vow or a freewill gift should come and not effect appeasement, but a guilt offering should not come at all? Abaye said: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish opened from here: "and he shall slaughter it for a sin offering" (Leviticus 4:33) - "it," for its own sake it is fit, not for its own sake it is invalid; thus the other holy offerings, whether for their own sake or not for their own sake, are fit. One might think they effect appeasement; the verse teaches "that which goes out of your lips," etc. But say that one bringing a vow or freewill offering should come and not appease, while a guilt offering should also appease? The verse says "This is the law: for the burnt offering, for the meal offering" (Leviticus 7:37) - Scripture likened them to the peace offering: just as peace offerings slaughtered not for their own sake are fit and do not appease, so too I bring the guilt offering, fit yet not appeasing. And why did you see to liken it to the peace offering rather than to the sin offering? Because the Merciful One restricted with "it." From where do we know that a sin offering slaughtered not for its own sake is invalid? The verse says "This is the law for the burnt offering and the meal offering," etc., Scripture likened it to the peace offering: just as with the peace offering, whether a change of sanctity or a change of owner is for the precept, etc., therefore the precept is from the peace offering. And slaughter is indispensable, from "and he shall slaughter it for a sin offering," that the slaughter be for the sake of a sin offering. Receiving, from "and the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering" (Leviticus 4:34), that the receiving be for the sake of a sin offering. And sprinkling, from "and the priest shall make atonement for him from his sin" (Leviticus 5:6), that the atonement be for the sake of a sin offering. We have found the sin offering for forbidden fat, in which "for a sin offering" is written; the sin offering for idolatry, for the hearing of a voice, for the utterance of the lips, and for defilement of the Sanctuary and its holy things, in which nothing at all is written - from where do we know? The sin offering for idolatry is derived from the sin offering for forbidden fat, since it carries excision just like it. All the rest are derived by the common factor. Beit Shammai say, etc., and in the sin offering two applications [are indispensable]. Beit Hillel say: even a sin offering for which one gave a single application has effected atonement. Rava said: what is the reason of Beit Shammai? "Horns," "horns," "horns" - here are six: four for the precept, two indispensable. And Beit Hillel: "horns," "horns," "horns" - here are four: three for the precept, one indispensable. And say all are for the precept? Atonement for nothing we do not find. And if you wish, say: the written text accomplishes something and the received tradition accomplishes something - the text to add one and the tradition to subtract one. And the Tanna brings it from here, as it is taught: "and he shall make atonement," "and he shall make atonement," "and he shall make atonement" - because of the inference. For is it not a logical inference? Blood is stated below and blood is stated above: just as with the blood stated below, when one gave a single application he atoned, so too with the blood stated above, when they gave a single application he atoned. Or go this way: blood is stated within and blood is stated without; just as with the blood stated within, if he omitted one of the applications he accomplished nothing, so too with the blood stated without, if he omitted one of the applications he accomplished nothing. Let us see which it resembles: we derive an outer matter from an outer matter, and we do not derive an outer matter from an inner one. On the contrary, we derive a sin offering with four horns from a sin offering with four horns, and let the outer offering, which has no sin offering with four horns, not prove it. The verse teaches "and he shall make atonement," "and he shall make atonement," "and he shall make atonement" - because of the inference. "And he shall make atonement" even though he gave only three; "and he shall make atonement" even though he gave only two; "and he shall make atonement" even though he gave only one.

(Leviticus 5:1) Had Scripture said only "and she shall hear," one might think that even one who tells his fellow "go and worship idols" should be liable, and that if the one who speaks is not liable, then surely the one who hears should be liable. But here is a proof that the speaker is not liable while the hearer is: do not be astonished, then, at the case of one who says to his fellow "go and worship idols," for even though the speaker is not liable, the one who hears may yet be liable. Scripture therefore teaches, "and she shall hear the voice of an oath" (Leviticus 5:1), and "oath" here means nothing other than a sworn oath, as it says, "and the priest shall make the woman swear with the oath of cursing" (Numbers 5:21). I might know only of a curse that carries a sworn oath; how do I know to treat a curse without a sworn oath like a curse with one? Scripture says, "and she shall hear the voice of an oath." Rabbi Akiva said: I know only of one who swears falsely on his own initiative and deliberately. From where do I include one who swore on his own initiative in error, or at the bidding of others deliberately, or at the bidding of others in error? Scripture says, "and he is a witness, whether he has seen or known; if he does not tell, he shall bear his iniquity" (Leviticus 5:1), to include them all. If a man sent for witnesses by his son, his servant, or his messenger, or the defendant himself said "I adjure you to come and testify for me," one might think they are liable; Scripture says "and she shall hear the voice of an oath, and he is a witness" - they are not liable until they hear it from the mouth of the claimant himself. What is the textual basis? Rabbi Elazar said: it is written "if lo [to him] he does not tell" - meaning if he does not tell the claimant he bears his guilt, but if he fails to tell another he is exempt. Three times the word "lo" is written in the Torah with aleph-lamed yet read as "to him": "which has no legs" (Leviticus 11:21), "which has no wall" (Leviticus 25:31), and "if he does not tell" here. If one said "I adjure you, so-and-so and so-and-so, to come and testify for me," but they knew only secondhand testimony, or one of them was a relative or otherwise disqualified, one might think they are liable; Scripture says "and he is a witness" - the rule applies only when they are fit to testify, not when they are disqualified from giving testimony. If a man stood in the synagogue and said "I adjure you, if you know testimony for me, to come and testify," one might think the whole congregation is liable; Scripture says "and he is a witness" - he is liable only when he intends a specific person. And if the adjuration came before the testimony rather than after, one is exempt, for liability holds only when the testimony preceded the oath. From where do we know this speaks only of a monetary claim? Rabbi Eliezer derives it by a verbal analogy between the "o" ("or") here and the "o" elsewhere. Rabbi Akiva derives it from "and it shall be when he is guilty in one of these" (Leviticus 5:5) - some of these incur guilt and some do not; if he was claimed for money he is liable, but for another matter he is exempt.

If a man adjured witnesses five times outside the court, and afterward they came into court and admitted the truth, one might think they are liable; Scripture says "if he does not tell" (Leviticus 5:1). The rule applies only where, if this man tells, the other becomes obligated for money - and where is that? In court. From here the sages said: if he adjured them five times outside the court and they denied knowledge, then came into court and admitted the truth, they are exempt. If they admitted the truth outside but denied it in court, they are liable. If he adjured them five times before the court and they denied knowledge, they are liable only once. Rabbi Yishmael said: what is the reason? Because they can no longer retract and confess. If both witnesses denied together, they are liable. If one after the other, the first is liable. If one denied and the other confessed, the one who denied is liable. If there were two sets of witnesses and the first set denied and then the second set denied, both are liable, because the testimony could have been established through either of them. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: they are not liable until they deny knowledge in court. If so, even the oath itself must be in court - in court yes, outside court no? That cannot enter your mind, for it was taught that "in one" (Leviticus 5:5) comes to make one liable for each and every oath. But we learned: if he adjured them five times in court and they denied, they are liable only once - and Rabbi Shimon said the reason is that they can no longer retract and confess. Learn from this, then, that the oath may be outside the court while the denial must be in court.

How do we know the oath of testimony is valid in any language? It is written, "and a soul that sins and hears" (Leviticus 5:1) - in whatever language she hears. And the oath of deposit in any language? It is derived by the verbal analogy "sins... sins" from the oath of testimony. If one said "I adjure you" by the name spelled yod-heh, by aleph-dalet, by Shaddai, by Tzevaot, by the Gracious One, by the Merciful One, by the Long-Suffering One, by the Abundant in Kindness, by any of the divine titles - they are liable. As for cursing: "one who curses by any of them is liable," the words of Rabbi Meir; but the sages exempt him. They raised a contradiction: "the LORD make you a curse and an oath" (Numbers 5:21) - what does this teach? Has it not already said "and the priest shall make the woman swear with the oath of cursing"? Because it says "and she shall hear the voice of a curse" here, and "curse" is said there, just as here it is a sworn oath, so there; and just as here it is by the Name, so there it is by the Name. Abaye said: there is no difficulty. One view is Rabbi Chanina's, the other the sages'. For it was taught, Rabbi Chanina says: since the Torah said swear and do not swear, curse and do not curse, just as one swears by the Name, so one is forbidden to swear by the Name; just as one curses by the Name, so one is forbidden to curse by the Name. And the sages: if they had a verbal analogy, they would require the unique Name; and if they had no verbal analogy, how do we know that "curse" means a sworn oath? It comes from what was taught: "curse" means nothing other than a sworn oath, as it says "with the oath of cursing," and from where do we treat a curse without a sworn oath like one with it? Scripture says "and she shall hear the voice of a curse." And they are liable for a deliberate oath of testimony. From where? It was taught: in all the other cases "and it is hidden" is said, but here "and it is hidden" is not said, to make one liable for the deliberate act as for the inadvertent.

It was taught: their testimony does not combine unless the two of them saw the event together. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha says: even one after the other. In what do they differ? You may say it is a matter of reasoning, or you may say it is a matter of Scripture. As reasoning: one master holds that the sum to which this one testifies is not the sum to which that one testifies; the other holds that both testify about the sum in general. As Scripture: "and he is a witness, whether he has seen or known" - and it was taught, from the implication of "a witness shall not stand up" (Deuteronomy 19:15), do I not know that he is one? What does "one" teach? It is a governing principle: wherever "witness" is said, two are meant, unless Scripture specifies one for you. So the Merciful One expressed it in the singular to say they must see as one. The other reads "and he is a witness, whether he has seen or known" as applying in any case. And their testimony does not combine unless both testify as one. Rabbi Natan says: we hear the words of this one today, and when his fellow comes tomorrow we hear his words. In what do they differ? As reasoning: one master holds that a single witness comes only to impose an oath, not to obligate money. The other holds: when two come together, do they really testify with one mouth? Rather we combine them; here too we combine them. As Scripture: "if he does not tell, he shall bear his iniquity" - and here the dispute is whether we liken the telling to the seeing: one master holds we do, the other holds we do not.

"And he is a witness, whether he has seen" (Leviticus 5:1): if a man knew testimony before he became the litigant's son-in-law and then became his son-in-law, or was clear-minded and became deaf, sighted and became blind, sane and became insane, he is disqualified. But if he knew the testimony before becoming son-in-law and then became son-in-law and the man's daughter died, or was clear-minded and became deaf and then recovered his hearing, or was sane and became insane and then recovered his sanity, he is fit. This is the rule: whoever is fit at the beginning and at the end is fit. For Scripture says "whether he has seen or known; if he does not tell" - the Merciful One made it depend on perception, and that is present. Then why is "he" needed? For what was taught: if a man saw a group of people standing with his witnesses among them, Scripture says "and he is a witness" - the rule does not apply, since he did not single out his witnesses. There was an incident of a man going out to be executed, who said: "If this sin is truly in me, let my death not atone for all my sins; and if this sin is not in me, let my death atone for all my sins. The court and all Israel are innocent, but the witnesses shall never have forgiveness." When the sages heard of the matter they said: to bring him back is impossible, for the decree has already gone forth; rather let him be executed, and let the chain of guilt hang upon the neck of the witnesses. Is this within their power? The case was where the witnesses retracted. But what does it matter if they retract - once a witness has testified, he cannot retract and testify again? The case was where they gave a reason for their words, as in the incident of the one who sought the cup.

"Do not be a witness for nothing against your neighbor, and would you deceive with your lips?" (Proverbs 24:28). Reuben knew testimony for Shimon. Shimon said, "Come, testify this testimony for me." He said, "Yes." But when they entered the court, he retracted. The Holy Spirit says to him: "and would you deceive with your lips?" - you brought him into court and then turned back. Tomorrow Reuben will need a witness against Shimon; what will Shimon do, as he did to him? "Do not say, As he did to me so will I do to him; I will repay the man according to his work" (Proverbs 24:29) - for the Torah already gave its verdict: "and he is a witness, whether he has seen or known; if he does not tell, he shall bear his iniquity." "One who shares with a thief hates his own soul; he hears the curse and tells nothing" (Proverbs 29:24). There was an incident with a certain governor who would execute the receivers of stolen goods but release the thieves, and everyone murmured that he was not acting rightly. What did he do? He proclaimed throughout the province, "Let all the people gather." He brought weasels and set portions of food before them, and they carried the food off to their holes. The next day he again proclaimed a gathering, brought weasels, set food before them, but stopped up the holes; the weasels, finding the holes blocked, carried the food back to its place - to show that all theft depends on the receivers. "Do not let a false oath be light in your eyes." Zechariah saw it: "I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold, a flying scroll" (Zechariah 5:1). What is "flying"? Soaring, as in "and one of the seraphim flew to me." "He said to me, What do you see? I said, I see a flying scroll" (Zechariah 5:2). Rabbi Abbahu said: even the hide of an elephant or a camel is not of this measure, and you say this? "This is the curse that goes out over the face of all the earth" (Zechariah 5:3). From where did it go out? From the doorway of the Hall, for we learned the doorway of the Hall was forty cubits long and twenty cubits wide. Rabbi Aibu said: why do they make a man swear over a Torah scroll and bring before him inflated wineskins? To say: yesterday this skin was full of sinews and bones, and now it is empty of them all; so one who makes his fellow swear will in the end go out empty of his money. Rabbi Asi said: only for a false oath. Rabbi Abba says: even for a true one. Rabbi Yannai was sitting and teaching on the saying of Rabbi Yonah; Rabbi Simon said: an oath is not entrusted to one suspected concerning oaths, nor is the oath given to one who runs after it. There was a case with Bar Telamyon that supports the sages: a man deposited a hundred dinars with Bar Telamyon, then came to claim them. Bar Telamyon said, "What you deposited with me I returned into your hand." The man said, "Swear to me." What did Bar Telamyon do? He took a hollow reed, hid the dinars inside it, and leaned on it. He said, "Hold this cane in your hand until I swear to you." When he reached the synagogue he said, "Master of this house, what you handed to me I handed back into your hand." The other, from its weight, set the cane down on the ground; it broke, the dinars scattered, and Bar Telamyon began gathering them. He said, "Gather, gather - it is from your own that you are gathering." "An oath of the LORD shall be between the two of them" (Exodus 22:10) - it does not depart from between the two of them. "I have brought it out... and it shall enter the house of the thief" (Zechariah 5:4). Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachman said: the angels of destruction have no shortcuts, as it says "from roaming the earth and walking up and down in it" (Job 1:7), yet of the oath it is written "and it shall lodge in the midst of his house." Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: things that fire does not consume, a false oath destroys. The way of fire is to consume wood, but here "and it shall consume it, its timbers and its stones." Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina interpreted the verse of the wayward wife. "A soul that sins" - she sinned against her husband who feeds and supports her, while she goes and corrupts herself with another. "And she hears the voice of a curse" - "the priest shall make the woman swear with the oath of cursing." "And he is a witness" - "and there is no witness against her." "Or has seen" - "and she was secluded and defiled." "Or has known" - "and it was hidden from the eyes of her husband." "If she does not tell, she shall bear her iniquity" - if she does not tell the priest, "her belly shall swell and her thigh shall fall." Rabbi Pinchas interpreted the verse of Israel. "A soul that sins" - "and I saw, and behold, you had sinned against the LORD your God" (Deuteronomy 9:16). "And she hears the voice of a curse" - "and his voice we heard from the midst of the fire." Rabbi Yochanan said: agreements were set between them, that He would not renounce them and they would not renounce Him. Rabbi Yitzchak said: one who makes his legions swear does so only by the sword, to say, whoever transgresses these terms, let this sword pass over his head. He swore to them, "and I swore to you and entered into a covenant with you" (Ezekiel 16:8), and they swore to Him, "to enter into the covenant of the LORD your God and into His oath." When Israel transgressed the condition, the Holy One, blessed be He, said to them, "I also will do this to you... and I will bring a sword upon you." "And he is a witness" - these are Israel: "you are My witnesses, says the LORD" (Isaiah 43:12). "Or has seen" - "you have been shown to know" (Deuteronomy 4:35). "Or has known" - "and you shall know... and take it to your heart." "If he does not tell, he shall bear his iniquity" - the Holy One, blessed be He, said: if you do not proclaim My Godhood among the nations, I will exact punishment from you. When? When they say "seek out the necromancers," if they do not say of such a thing that it has no dawn. Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish said: the Holy One, blessed be He, said: if Israel does not say to the idolaters that such a thing has no dawn of its own - one that cannot give light to itself, how can it shine light upon others? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: darkness and gloom served in this world, as it is written "there was darkness and gloom" (Exodus 10:22), but chaos and void did not serve in this world. Where are they destined to serve? In the great city, as it is written "He will stretch over it the line of chaos and the stones of void" (Isaiah 34:11). The sages said: of the idolaters, who did not keep the Torah given from the midst of darkness, He says "for behold, darkness shall cover the earth and thick darkness the peoples"; but of Israel, who kept the Torah given from the midst of darkness, as you say "when you heard the voice from the midst of the darkness" (Deuteronomy 5:20), of them He says "and the LORD shall shine upon you, and His glory shall appear over you."

(Leviticus 5:2-3) "Or a soul that touches any unclean thing." The early elders said: one might think that even one who touched through a secondary degree of impurity should be liable; Scripture says "the carcass of a wild beast, the carcass of a domestic animal, the carcass of a creeping thing" - just as these are distinguished as primary sources of impurity, so a thing that is not a primary source is excluded. Rabbi Akiva said: one might think that even one who touched foodstuffs, liquids, or earthenware vessels should be liable; Scripture says "animal" - just as an animal is distinguished as a primary source of impurity, so these, which are not primary sources, are excluded. And in a matter you learn for one direction, you learn for all the directions it contains. Just as an unclean animal is distinguished in that its touch is separated from its carrying, a primary source of impurity that defiles a person and defiles garments, so I include only what is similar to it. What do I include? I include the lesser quantity of waters of purification and the saddle, whose touch is separated from their carrying, made primary sources that defile a person and defile garments. When Scripture says "any unclean thing," it comes to include the greater quantity of waters of purification, and the couch, whose touch is equal to its carrying, made primary sources that defile a person and defile garments. When Scripture says "any unclean thing," it comes to include one who burns the red cow and the bulls and one who sends away the scapegoat, who defile garments. When Scripture says "any unclean thing," it comes to include the wrappings, the loosened hairs, and the wall - the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

"The carcass of a wild beast" - what does "unclean" teach? That one might think I have liability only for the whole carcass; from where do I include an olive's bulk of it? Scripture says "unclean." "The carcass of a domestic animal" - what does "unclean" teach? That one might think I have only the carcass itself; from where its horn, its hair, and what is joined to it? Scripture says "unclean." "The carcass of a creeping thing" - what does "unclean" teach? That one might think I have only its flesh; from where its blood, its hide, what is joined to it, and what is mixed with it? Scripture says "unclean." Rabbi Eliezer says: "a creeping thing, and it is hidden from him" - for the forgetting of the creeping thing he is liable, but he is not liable for the forgetting of the sanctuary. Rabbi Akiva says: "and it is hidden from him, and he is unclean" - for the forgetting of the impurity he is liable, but not for the forgetting of the sanctuary. Rabbi Yishmael says: "and it is hidden from him" is said twice, to make one liable for the forgetting of the impurity and for the forgetting of the sanctuary. What is between them? Chizkiyah said: a creeping thing and a carcass are between them. Rabbi Eliezer holds we require that he know whether he was defiled by a creeping thing or by a carcass. Rabbi Akiva holds we do not require it: since he knows he was defiled, he needs no more. Ulla raised a contradiction between Rabbi Eliezer and himself: did Rabbi Eliezer say we require knowing whether he was defiled by a creeping thing or a carcass? Yet Rabbi Eliezer said: either way - if he ate forbidden fat he is liable, if leftover sacrifice he is liable, if he profaned the Sabbath he is liable, if Yom Kippur he is liable, if he lay with his menstruant wife he is liable, with his sister he is liable. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: behold it says "his sin which he sinned" (Leviticus 4:23) - until you know wherein he sinned. The answer there: "which he sinned" the Merciful One said, meaning any sin at all; but here, since it is written "any unclean thing, or the carcass of an unclean creeping thing," why is it needed? Learn from it that we require he know whether he was defiled by a creeping thing or by a carcass. And Rabbi Akiva? Since the verse needed to write "domestic animal" and "wild beast" for Rabbi's teaching, it also wrote "creeping thing," as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: any passage that was stated and then repeated was repeated only for some new matter introduced in it. And Rabbi Eliezer - what does he do with this "in it"? It excludes one who acts without intent. Rabbi Yochanan said: there is a difference between them in the implications they draw. Rav Sheshet reverses Rabbi Eliezer for Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Akiva for Rabbi Eliezer.

"Or if he touches the uncleanness of a man" (Leviticus 5:3). "A man" - this refers to a corpse. "The uncleanness of a man" - this is the uncleanness of the dead. "Of any uncleanness of his" comes to include those with a flux, women with a flux, menstruants, and women after childbirth. I have learned only the grave [longer-lasting] days; from where do I learn the lighter days? Scripture teaches, saying "of any uncleanness of his." "By which he may be defiled" comes to include one who lies with a menstruant. "By it" comes to include one who swallows the carcass of a clean bird. If the lighter cases were stated, why were the graver cases stated? For had the lighter cases been stated and not the graver ones, I would have said: for the lighter cases one brings a sliding-scale offering, but for the graver ones a fixed offering. And had the graver cases been stated and not the lighter ones, I would have said: for the graver cases one is liable, but for the lighter ones one is exempt. Therefore it is necessary to state the graver cases and necessary to state the lighter cases.

From where do we know that Scripture speaks only of the impurity of the Sanctuary and its holy things? It is a matter of reasoning: since the Torah warned and punished concerning impurity, and obligated an offering concerning impurity - just as when it warned and punished concerning impurity it warned only concerning impurity of the Sanctuary and its holy things, so too when it obligated an offering concerning impurity it obligated only concerning impurity of the Sanctuary and its holy things. But say it refers to terumah, concerning which it also warned and punished! We do not find a sin punishable by death for which an offering is imposed. Then say these words apply to a fixed offering, but let a sliding-scale offering come, as in the case of "hearing a voice" and "uttering with the lips." Scripture says "by it," to exclude terumah. But say "by it" excludes the Sanctuary, for which a sliding-scale offering does not suffice until one brings a fixed offering! Rava recited concerning Rabbi [Judah the Prince]: "He draws water from deep wells," for it was taught: Rabbi says, I might read this of a wild animal; why is a domestic animal mentioned? It says here "unclean beast" and it says elsewhere "unclean beast" - just as there it refers to impurity of holy things, so too here it refers to impurity of holy things. We have found impurity of holy things; from where do we learn impurity of the Sanctuary? The scholars of Nehardea said in the name of Rava: the threefold mention of "by it" is a limitation after a limitation, and a limitation after a limitation serves only to include.

From where do we know that the flesh of a corpse defiles whether moist or dry? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Scripture says "of any uncleanness of his" - to include all forms of impurity that separate from him. And Rabbi Yochanan said: "or by a bone" (Numbers 19:16) - it is comparable to a bone: just as a bone is dry, so too here even when dry. The practical difference between them is the case where the flesh has crumbled. Just as a bone was created with the body and its stock does not regenerate, so too anything created with the body whose stock does not regenerate; this excludes teeth, which were not created with the body, and excludes hair and nails, whose stock regenerates. Yet at the time they are joined to the body, all is impure. From where do we know that one is not liable until there is awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end with a lapse of forgetting in between? Scripture teaches "and it is hidden from him" twice - these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi says: "and it is hidden from him" implies that there had been awareness, and "and he knew" - behold, two acts of awareness. Regarding the oath: One might think that one who vows to be a Nazirite or to bring an offering should bring this offering; Scripture says "or if a person swears" (Leviticus 5:4) - he is liable for the oath, not for vowing as a Nazirite or to bring an offering. One might think that one who merely meditates in the heart is liable; Scripture says "with the lips" - and not one who merely meditates. One might think I should exclude one who completes the matter in his heart; Scripture says "to pronounce."

One might think that one who swore to nullify a commandment and did not nullify it should be liable; Scripture says "to do evil or to do good" (Leviticus 5:4) - just as doing good is optional, so doing evil is optional. I therefore exclude one who swore to nullify a commandment and did not nullify it, who is exempt. One might think one who swore to fulfill a commandment and did not fulfill it should be liable; Scripture says "to do evil or to do good" - just as doing evil is optional, so doing good is optional. One might think one who swore to harm himself and did not is exempt; Scripture says "to do evil or to do good" - just as good is optional, so evil is optional; so I include one who swore to harm himself, for the matter is within his power. One might think one who swore to harm others and did not should be liable; Scripture says "to do evil or to do good" - I exclude one who swore to harm others, for that is not within his power. From where do we include benefiting others? Scripture says "or to do good." And what is harming others? "I will strike so-and-so and split his skull." From what do we know the verses are written about an optional matter, and not perhaps about a matter of commandment? It cannot enter your mind, for he compares harm to benefit and benefit to harm: just as benefiting is not the nullifying of a commandment, so harming is not the nullifying of a commandment - for harming is itself a kind of benefit; and just as harming is not the keeping of a commandment, so benefiting is not the keeping of a commandment - for benefiting is itself a kind of harm. As for Rabbi Yoshiya, he holds like Rabbi Akiva, who expounds by inclusion and limitation.

In what way is a vow more stringent than an oath? If one says "konam be the sukkah that I make, the lulav that I take, the tefillin that I lay," by a vow he is forbidden, but by an oath he is permitted, for one does not swear to nullify a commandment, as it is said "he shall not profane his word" (Numbers 30:3) - his own word he shall not profane, but he may profane it concerning the things of Heaven. What is the difference? Of a vow it is written "if a man vows a vow... he shall not profane his word," but of an oath too it is written "or swears an oath... he shall not profane his word." Abaye said: in one case he says "the benefit of the sukkah is forbidden to me," and in the other he says "I swear that I will not benefit from the sukkah." Rava said: were the commandments given for benefit? Rather, in one case he says "sitting in the sukkah is forbidden upon me," and in the other "I swear that I will not sit in the sukkah." Rabbi Yehudah ben Beteira says: one who swore to fulfill a commandment and did not fulfill it is liable, and it is a matter of reasoning: if for an optional matter, for which he is not bound from Sinai, he is liable, then for a commandment, for which he is bound from Sinai, is it not right that he be liable? They said to him: no - if you say so of an oath about an optional matter, where a negative oath is like an affirmative one, will you say so of an oath about a commandment, where a negative is not like an affirmative? One might think one who swore to nullify a commandment and did not is liable; Scripture says "to do evil or to do good" - just as doing good is optional, so doing evil is optional, excluding one who swore to nullify a commandment, for that is not within his power. Why must a master force his ward to a Nazirite vow, but need not force him to other vows or to an oath? Because Scripture says "to do evil or to do good" - excluding harming others, which is not within his power.

If one said "I swear that I will give to so-and-so," "that I will not give," "that I gave," "that I did not give," "that I will sleep," "that I will not sleep," "that I slept," "that I did not sleep," "that I will throw a stone into the sea," "that I will not throw," "that I threw," "that I did not throw" - Rabbi Yishmael says he is liable only for the future, as it says "to do evil or to do good." Rabbi Akiva said to him: I have only matters that involve doing evil or good; from where do I learn matters that involve neither? Scripture says "or if a person swears to pronounce with the lips." I have only the future; from where the past? Scripture says "whatever a person utters in an oath." Rabbi Yochanan said: Rabbi Yishmael, who served Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKaneh who expounded the whole Torah by general-and-particular, also expounds by general and particular. Rabbi Akiva, who served Nahum of Gamzu who expounded by amplification and limitation, also expounds by amplification and limitation: "or if a person swears" amplifies, "to do evil or to do good" limits, "whatever a person utters" amplifies again - amplification, limitation, amplification includes everything. What does it include? Every matter. What does it limit? It limits a matter of commandment. The Rabbis taught: "the person in an oath" excludes one under compulsion; "and it is hidden" excludes one who acts deliberately; "from him" excludes one from whom the oath was hidden. One might think it means the object was hidden from him; Scripture says "in an oath and it is hidden from him" - he is liable for forgetting the oath, not for forgetting the object. They mocked this in the West: when is the oath forgotten but not the object? As when he says "I swear I will not eat wheat bread" and thinks he is permitted to eat, for he forgot the oath but remembers the object. Rabbi Elazar said: this case and that are one and the same.

Shmuel said: if one resolved in his heart, he must bring it out with his lips, as it says "to pronounce with the lips." They objected: "with the lips" - and not in the heart; from where one who resolved in his heart? Scripture says "whatever he utters." Rava said: resolve the difficulty thus - "with the lips" excludes one who resolved in his heart to say wheat bread but said barley bread; from where one who resolved in his heart to say wheat bread but said bread without qualification? Scripture says "whatever he utters." They objected from "the utterance of your lips" (Deuteronomy 23:24): I have only what he brought out with his lips; from where one who resolved in his heart? Scripture says "everyone whose heart is willing" (Exodus 35:22). Let us learn from there! Because terumah and consecrated things are two verses that come as one, and two such verses do not teach. And according to the one who says they do teach, what can be said? It is a case of unconsecrated and consecrated, and we do not derive the unconsecrated from the consecrated. Rabbi Ami said: any oath that the judges impose carries no liability for an oath of utterance, as it says "or if a person swears to pronounce with the lips" - she swears of herself, in line with Resh Lakish, who said "ki" serves four meanings: if, perhaps, rather, because. And this differs from Rabbi Yirmeyah, who said: sometimes both are in a sin-offering and sometimes both are in a guilt-offering.

From where do we know that one is liable for each and every instance? Scripture says "for one" - to make him liable for each and every one. One might think that for defilement of the Sanctuary and its holy things, which carries excision, he is liable for each by itself, but for hearing a voice and uttering with the lips, which do not carry excision, he is liable only once for both; Scripture says "for one," to make him liable for each and every one. How so? If he became impure, knew, then forgot the impurity, entered the Sanctuary, left, and knew - from where that he is liable for each? Scripture says "for one." If five men demanded of him, saying "come and testify that so-and-so holds for us a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost item," and he said "I swear I do not know testimony for you," "not for you and not for you" - from where that he is liable for each? Scripture says "for one." Even if one man said "come and testify that I have with so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost item" - Scripture says "for one," to make him liable for each. From where that he brings one offering for many matters? Scripture says "one for his sin which he sinned." How so? If he said "I swear I will not eat" and ate many foods, from where that he is liable only once? Scripture says "one for his sin." This is the general rule: when he speaks in general he is liable only once; when he specifies he is liable for each, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Akiva says: "of these" - there are among these for which one is liable and among these for which one is exempt.

"And it shall be, when one shall be guilty" (Leviticus 5:5-6) - what does the guilty person do? "And he shall bring." From where do we learn that the offering requires confession? Scripture teaches, saying, "and he shall confess." From where do we learn that the confession is made over the living animal? Confession is stated here, and confession is stated elsewhere; just as the confession stated elsewhere is over the living animal, so too the confession stated here is over the living animal. From where do we learn that the offering requires laying on of hands? It says here "upon it" and it says elsewhere "upon it"; just as "upon it" stated elsewhere requires laying on of hands, so too "upon it" stated here requires laying on of hands. "And he shall bring" - even after the Day of Atonement. "His guilt offering" - it says here "his guilt offering" and it says elsewhere "his guilt offering"; just as the surplus of "his guilt offering" stated elsewhere becomes a freewill gift, so too the surplus of the guilt offering stated here becomes a freewill gift. "A female" - and not one of doubtful sex nor one of double sex. "From the flock" - this wording comes to include even a deaf woman, even a mentally incapable woman, even a dwarf woman as obligated, but not the animal of intermediate age. "A ewe-lamb or a female goat for a sin offering" - what does this come to teach us? If one did not find a ewe-lamb, he brings a female goat. Is this not an inference from minor to major? If the sin offering that comes for transgressing commandments has no bird-substitute, yet has a goat-substitute, is it not logical that this offering should have a female-goat substitute? The case of the leper proves otherwise, for he has a bird-substitute yet has no goat-substitute. No: if you argued thus about the leper's sin offering, which has no tenth-of-an-ephah substitute, you cannot argue the same here; for if the offering descends to a tenth of an ephah, it should not descend merely to a goat. If so, why does it say "a ewe-lamb or a female goat for a sin offering"? Because by strict reasoning one might have brought a burnt offering with it. For is this not a logical argument: this person brings according to his means, and the leper brings according to his means; just as the leper brings two offerings, so too this person should bring two. Scripture therefore teaches, saying, "a ewe-lamb or a goat" - he brings one and does not bring two. "From his sin" and "upon his sin" (Leviticus 5:10) - what does Scripture teach by this? From where do you say that one may bring, from the funds consecrated for a ewe-lamb, a goat; from funds consecrated for a goat, a ewe-lamb; from funds consecrated for a goat and a ewe-lamb, turtledoves and young pigeons; and from funds consecrated for turtledoves and young pigeons, a tenth of an ephah? How so: if he set aside a ewe-lamb or a goat and became poor, he brings a bird; if he became poorer still, he brings a tenth of an ephah. If he set aside a tenth of an ephah and became rich, he brings a bird; if he became richer, he brings a ewe-lamb or a goat. If he set aside a ewe-lamb or a goat and it became blemished, he may, if he wishes, bring a bird with its value. But if he brought a bird and it became unfit, he may not bring a tenth of an ephah with its value, for a bird offering has no redemption. Therefore it says "from his sin" and "upon his sin."

"And if his means do not suffice" (Leviticus 5:7-8). We do not tell him to borrow money, and we do not tell him to take up a trade. If he has a sheep but lacks his necessities, from where do we learn that he brings the offering of a poor man? Scripture teaches, saying, "enough for a sheep." One is not liable for an offering on account of failing to testify when one has heard a call to give evidence, nor for a rash oath of the lips, nor for defiling the Sanctuary or its holy things; and the prince is treated like the rest of the people in these matters - these are the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. Rabbi Akiva says: the prince is liable in all of them except for failing to respond to a summons to testify, because the king neither judges nor is he judged. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yose the Galilean? It says "if his means do not suffice" (literally, "if his hand does not reach") and it says "if his hand attains" (Leviticus 5:11); the law speaks of one who can come to poverty, which excludes the anointed priest and the prince, who do not come to poverty. The prince is excluded, as it is written, "and he does one of all the commandments of the LORD his God" (Leviticus 4:22) - one who has none above him but his God. The anointed priest is excluded, as it is written, "and the priest who is greater than his brethren" (Leviticus 21:10) - that he should be greater than his brethren in beauty, in strength, and in wealth. Others say: from where do we learn that if he lacks wealth, they enrich him from the funds of his brethren? Scripture teaches, saying, "and the priest who is greater than his brethren" - make him greater from the funds of his brethren. It was taught: Rabbi Akiva says, the anointed priest is exempt from all of them, for the verse says, "this is the offering of Aaron and his sons" (Leviticus 6:13) - this offering comes as an obligation upon him, and no other comes as an obligation upon him. One might say that Scripture excluded him only from the lowest tier of poverty, namely the tenth of an ephah, but did not exclude him from the poor man's offering and the rich man's offering. Do not let this enter your mind, for it is written, "and the priest shall make atonement for him concerning his sin which he has sinned, from one of these" (Leviticus 5:13): whoever gains atonement by one of these gains atonement by all of them, and whoever does not gain atonement by one does not gain atonement by any. But if so, regarding "for one of these," should we likewise say that whoever becomes liable for one becomes liable for all, and whoever does not become liable for one does not become liable for any? Then why do we teach that Rabbi Akiva says the prince is liable in all of them except failing to testify? Because he derives meaning from "from one" but does not derive it from "for one." Why does the Merciful One write this at the end, regarding the tenth of an ephah? To tell us that one is liable for all the categories; for if it had entered your mind that he is liable for one even though he is not liable for all, the Merciful One should have written this clause "for one of these" by the poor man's offering or by the rich man's offering.

"And he shall bring his guilt offering which he has sinned" (Leviticus 5:7). He brings two and does not bring one. Is this not a matter of logical inference? This person brings according to his means and the leper brings according to his means; just as the leper brings one in place of one, so too this person - since his rich-man's offering brings one - should have his poor-man's offering bring one as well. Scripture therefore teaches, saying, "two turtledoves or two young pigeons": he brings two and does not bring one. One bird is for a sin offering and one is for a burnt offering, and the sin offering takes precedence over the burnt offering. The burnt offering is brought from the same species as the sin offering. And if he brought his sin offering and then died, his heirs bring his burnt offering.

Another interpretation: what does Scripture teach by saying "one for a sin offering and one for a burnt offering"? One might have thought that since the two come in place of one, both should be a sin offering. Scripture therefore teaches, saying, "one for a sin offering and one for a burnt offering" - the two are not both for a sin offering, and they are not both for a burnt offering, but rather one is for a sin offering and one is for a burnt offering. "And he shall bring" - that the owners should designate them, one for a sin offering and one for a burnt offering. From where do we learn that if the priest designated them, his designation is valid? Scripture teaches, saying, "one for a sin offering and one for a burnt offering." "And he shall bring them to the priest" - "and he shall bring," even after the Day of Atonement. "Them" - teaching that a bird offering has no redemption. "To the priest" - teaching that the owner is responsible for the trouble of bringing them.

"And he shall offer that which is for the sin offering first" (Leviticus 5:8). What does this come to teach us? If it teaches that the sin offering takes precedence over the burnt offering in all its rites, it has already been said, "and the second he shall make a burnt offering according to the ordinance" (Leviticus 5:10). If so, why does it say "and he shall offer that which is for the sin offering first"? It establishes a governing principle for all sin offerings that come together with burnt offerings: whether a bird sin offering with a bird burnt offering, or a bird sin offering with an animal burnt offering, the sin offerings precede the burnt offerings that come with them. Therefore the bird sin offering precedes the bird burnt offering from "and the second"; the animal sin offering precedes the animal burnt offering by rabbinic teaching; and the bird sin offering precedes the animal burnt offering by this governing principle built here. Come and hear: Rabbi Eliezer says, in every place the sin offering takes precedence, yet here the burnt offering is mentioned first; and in every place an offering that comes for a sin takes precedence, yet here the burnt offering is mentioned first; and in every place where two come, one a sin offering and one a burnt offering, the sin offering takes precedence, yet here the burnt offering is mentioned first. Rava said: Scripture gave the burnt offering precedence only in the reading, not in the performance. Come and hear: the bull for communal idolatry precedes the goats for idolatry, and this is so even though this one is a sin offering and that one a burnt offering. Say rather, in the opening case, the bull for an erroneous communal ruling precedes the bull for idolatry; within a single category we do not say the sin offering takes precedence - we say it only between two categories, and between two categories we have indeed found that the burnt offering precedes the sin offering. They say in the West, in the name of Rava bar Mari: the sin offering of idolatry is spelled defectively, missing an alef - "for a sin offering" it is written (Numbers 15:24). Ravina said: it is written there "according to the ordinance."

"From opposite its nape" (Leviticus 5:8). "Opposite" means the place that faces the nape. And so it says, "and he dwells opposite me" (Numbers 22:5), and it says, "for they have turned their nape to me and not their face" (Jeremiah 2:27). Why the second proof? Lest you say, I do not know where the nape itself is, so how shall I know where the place opposite it is? Come and hear: "they have turned their nape to me and not their face," from which we learn that the nape is on the side opposite the face. The school of Rabbi Hiyya said: the manner of pinching is that he turns the windpipe and gullet around to the back of the nape and then pinches. Some say he may also turn them; others say he must specifically turn them; and it stands to reason like the one who says he may also turn them. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua: I have heard that in the bird sin offering one may sever, and what is the meaning of "he shall not divide it" - that he need not divide it. Rav Acha son of Rava said to Rav Ashi: if so, regarding the pit, where it is written, "and he does not cover it, and an ox falls in" (Exodus 21:33), here too should it mean that he need not cover it? He said to him: there, since it is written, "the owner of the pit shall pay," we infer by implication that covering is required; but here, since it is already written "and he shall offer it" (Leviticus 1:15) and Scripture distinguished between the bird sin offering and the bird burnt offering, why do I need "he shall not divide"? Learn from this that he need not divide. "And he shall not divide" - yet if he did divide, it is invalid.

"And he shall sprinkle from the blood of the sin offering" (Leviticus 5:9) - from the body of the sin offering itself. How so? He holds the head and the body and sprinkles. "Upon the wall of the altar" - and not upon the wall of the ramp, nor upon the wall of the foundation, nor upon the wall of the sanctuary; and which wall is this? The lower wall. One might think the upper wall, by logical inference: if for an animal, whose burnt offering is performed below, its sin offering is performed above, then for a bird, whose burnt offering is performed above, is it not logical that its sin offering should be above? Scripture therefore teaches, saying, "and the rest of the blood shall be drained out at the foundation of the altar" - that the remnants of its blood are drained upon the foundation; and which wall is this? The lower wall. "It is a sin offering" - that all its rites be performed for the sake of a sin offering. "It" - excluding one that was pinched not for its own sake. One might say he places blood from above and afterward places it from below. Rava said: is it written "he shall make it flow"? It is written "shall be drained," meaning that it comes of itself. Mar Zutra bar Toviah said in the name of Rav: how does one pinch the bird sin offering? He holds its two legs between two fingers and its two wings between two fingers, stretches its neck across the breadth of his thumb, and pinches. In a baraita it was taught: the bird outward - he holds its two wings between two fingers and its two legs between two fingers, stretches its neck across the breadth of two fingers, and pinches. And this is one of the difficult services in the Temple. Is this the only one? There is also the taking of a handful, and there is the scooping of incense. Rather, this is one of the difficult services in the Temple.

The bird sin-offering was performed at the southwest corner of the altar. From where do we know these things? Rabbi Eliezer said: Because the verse states, "He shall put no oil upon it, nor shall he place frankincense on it, for it is a sin-offering" (Leviticus 5:11). A meal-offering is called a sin-offering and a sin-offering is called a meal-offering [by this verse linking them]: just as a sin-offering requires the north, so too a meal-offering requires the north; just as a meal-offering is at the southwest corner, so too the sin-offering is at the southwest corner. As for the meal-offering itself, from where do we derive it? As it is written, "before the LORD" (Leviticus 6:7). One might think in the west; therefore Scripture states, "toward the front of the altar" (ibid.). If "toward the front of the altar," one might think in the south; therefore Scripture states, "before the LORD." How so? He brings it near at the southwest corner, and that is sufficient. Does Rabbi Ishmael hold that the draining of the blood of the bird sin-offering is indispensable? But it was taught: Rabbi Ishmael says, "And the remainder of the blood shall be drained out" (Leviticus 5:9) means that if it remained, it is drained, and if it did not remain, it is not drained. These are two Tannaim reporting according to Rabbi Ishmael. Regarding the bird sin-offering, one is liable for misappropriation of it from the moment it is consecrated; once its neck is pinched, it becomes susceptible to be disqualified through contact by one immersed that day, through one lacking atonement, and through being left overnight. Once its blood is sprinkled, one becomes liable for it on account of piggul [improper intent], leftover, and ritual impurity, and there is no misappropriation in it. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: the draining of the blood of the bird sin-offering is not indispensable, and Rav taught "he sprinkled its blood." Rabbi Adda bar Ahava said in the name of Rav: the draining of the blood of the bird sin-offering is not indispensable, and Rav taught "he drained its blood." Come and hear: "And the remainder of the blood shall be drained out." This works well for Rav Adda bar Ahava, for this is what is written, "And the remainder of the blood"—even though it remained, it is a sin-offering [and still valid]. But according to Rav Huna, what is "and the remainder"? It is as Rabbi Ishmael taught, that if it remained, and what is "it is a sin-offering"? It refers back to the opening clause. Rav Aha the son of Rava said to Rav Ashi: if so, regarding the meal-offering where it is written, "and that which is left over" (Leviticus 2:10), does this likewise mean that if it was left over? And should you say it does mean so—but it was taught, "of its fine flour and of its oil, with all its frankincense" (Leviticus 2:2), excluding a case where its flour, its oil, or its frankincense is lacking. They said: there it is written "and that which is left over" as a superfluous verse, whereas here it is written "and the remainder."

"And the second he shall offer as a burnt-offering according to the ordinance" (Leviticus 5:10). Rava said: the burnt-offering is a gift. How so? If there is no repentance, then "the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination to the LORD" (Proverbs 15:8); and if there is repentance, [why is the burnt-offering needed]? For we have learned: if one transgressed a positive commandment and repented, he does not move from there until he is forgiven. Rather, learn from this that it is a gift. And it was likewise taught: Rabbi Shimon said: Why does the sin-offering come before the burnt-offering? It is like a defense attorney who enters to appease; once the attorney has appeased, the gift enters after him.

"And the second he shall offer as a burnt-offering according to the ordinance" (Leviticus 5:10): according to the ordinance of the animal sin-offering. Or is it only according to the ordinance of the bird sin-offering? When it says "and he shall offer it" (Leviticus 1:15), Scripture distinguished between the bird sin-offering and the bird burnt-offering. How then do I uphold "according to the ordinance"? It means according to the ordinance of the animal sin-offering: just as the animal sin-offering comes only from unconsecrated property, and by day, and with his right hand, so too the bird burnt-offering comes only from unconsecrated property, and by day, and with his right hand. If so, just as there [with the animal] the slaughter is at the majority of the two organs, so too here at the majority of the two organs? Scripture states, "and he shall pinch and burn" (Leviticus 1:15, 17): just as the burning has the head by itself and the body by itself, so too the pinching has the head by itself and the body by itself. Rabbi Ishmael says: "according to the ordinance of the bird sin-offering"—just as the bird sin-offering is from the back of the neck, so too the bird burnt-offering is from the back of the neck. If so, just as there he pinches and does not sever at one organ, so too here he pinches and does not sever at one organ? Scripture states, "and he shall offer it." Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon says: "according to the ordinance of the bird sin-offering"—just as there he holds the head and the body and sprinkles, so too here he holds the head and the body and sprinkles. What is he saying? This is what he is saying: just as there, when he holds the head with the body he sprinkles, so too here, and so on. If so, just as there with one organ, so too here with one organ? Scripture states, "and he shall offer it." And the first teacher: since we derive it from "and he shall pinch and burn," why do I need "and he shall offer it"? If not for "and he shall offer it," I would have said: what is "according to the ordinance"? According to the ordinance of the bird sin-offering. And if it were because of "and he shall pinch and burn," I would have said: just as the burning is at the top of the altar, so too the pinching is at the top of the altar. Now that "and he shall offer it" is written regarding it, expound this as well.

"And if his means do not suffice for two turtledoves" and so on (Leviticus 5:11). Rabbi Yehuda said: a commandment is precious in its proper time, for he immediately brings the tenth of an ephah, and we do not wait for him until he becomes wealthy and brings a lamb or a goat. Rabbi Eliezer says: a commandment is precious in its proper time, for in the matter of valuations he immediately gives a sela, and we do not wait for him until he becomes wealthy and brings fifty selas. Rabbi Shimon says: a commandment is precious in its proper time, for the burning of fats is fit all night, and they override the Sabbath in their proper time, and we do not wait for them until they are offered at the conclusion of the Sabbath. "And he shall bring his offering for that which he has sinned, a tenth of an ephah" (Leviticus 5:11): I have only the offering of his obligation as a tenth of an ephah; from where do I include also the offering of his free will as a tenth of an ephah? Scripture states, "his offering for that which he has sinned, a tenth of an ephah." "A tenth of an ephah": one part in ten of three seahs, which are seven quarters and a bit more. "Fine flour": just as the fine flour mentioned elsewhere is from wheat, so too the fine flour mentioned here is from wheat. "For a sin-offering": that its separation as a commandment be for the sake of a sin-offering. "He shall put no oil upon it": it was taught, Rabbi Shimon says: by right the meal-offering of a sinner should require oil and frankincense, so that the sinner should not profit; and why does it not require them? So that his offering should not be of fine quality. And by right the fat sin-offering should require libations, so that the sinner should not profit; and why does it not require them? So that his offering should not be of fine quality. It was stated: as for a handful of a sinner's meal-offering upon which he placed oil, Rabbi Yochanan said it is disqualified; Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said he himself stirs it among the remnants of the log of oil and offers it up. But is it not written "he shall put no oil upon it"? That verse means that he should not fix a measure of oil for it as for its companions. "He shall put no oil upon it," and if he placed oil, it is disqualified. One might think "he shall not place frankincense on it," and if he placed it, it is disqualified; Scripture states, "for it is a sin-offering." One might think the same for oil; Scripture states, "it is." And what did you see to disqualify with oil and to validate with frankincense? I disqualify with oil because it cannot be gathered off, and I validate with frankincense because it can be gathered off. Rabbi Yitzhak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: if he placed any amount of oil upon an olive's bulk of meal-offering, it is disqualified. What is the reason? "He shall put"—any placing at all; "upon it"—provided there is the required measure of meal-offering. And Rav Yitzhak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: if he placed an olive's bulk of frankincense upon any amount of meal-offering, it is disqualified. What is the reason? "He shall not place"—provided there is a placing; "upon it"—it was included again, and this is inclusion after inclusion, which serves only to exclude. The rabbis taught: "he shall put," one might think by means of two priests; Scripture states "upon it"—Scripture speaks of the body of the meal-offering itself. One might think he should not place vessel upon vessel, and if he did it is disqualified; Scripture states "upon it"—Scripture speaks of the body of the meal-offering itself. "He shall put no oil upon it": he may put oil on its remnants. "For it is a sin-offering": Rabbi Yehuda said, "it" and not the meal-offering of the High Priest, for that sin-offering [type] does not require frankincense. "And the priest shall take a handful" and so on, "upon the fire-offerings of the LORD" (Leviticus 5:12): that he burn it on the fire and direct his intent for the sake of [the offering]. "It is a sin-offering": excluding one whose handful was taken not for its own sake.

"And the priest shall make atonement for him concerning his sin which he has sinned in one of these, and he shall be forgiven" (Leviticus 5:13). What does Scripture teach? For one might think that the more severe among them should be atoned with a lamb or a goat, and the lighter among them with a bird, and the lightest of the light among them with a tenth of an ephah; Scripture states "in one of these," to equate the light ones with the severe ones for the lamb and female goat, and the severe ones with the light ones for the tenth of an ephah.